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Abstract 
This thesis examines the question of living nature and its bearing on ecological thought 
in the light of the philosophy of Martin Heidegger. The difficulty of adequately thinking 
about living nature in the terms developed in Being and Time (1927) is taken as the 
starting point for the investigation. The thesis concentrates on Heidegger's thought in 
the period beginning with the 1929/30 lectures The Fundamental Concepts of 
Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude and ending with the courses on Heraclitus in 
1943 and 1944. In this 'middle period' Heidegger attempts to formulate a 
phenomenology of animal life and then a thinking of the place of living nature in the 
'history of being' which does not return to the vitalist principles with which he had 
previously broken. The thesis considers the extent to which these attempts to find 
another way to think about living nature are successful. To this end a variety of lecture 
and seminar courses together with manuscripts from this period are discussed, some of 
which have only recently become available, including the seminars on Nietzsche's 
second Untimely Meditation and Herder's Treatise on the Origin of Language and the 
manuscripts Besinnung and Die Geschichte des Seyns. Contemporary responses to 
Heidegger's thinking of living nature and its relevance for philosophical ecology, 
including those of Jacques Derrida, Michel Haar, Giorgio Agamben and Michael 
Zimmerman are re-evaluated on this basis. 
The guiding concept of the investigation is the notion of poverty, which plays a variety 
of roles in the context under discussion. In particular, the thesis presented in The 
Fundamental Concept of Metaphysics that the animal is 'poor in world', has been 
seriously misunderstood by many commentators. If the poverty in question is properly 
understood as a thesis concerning the fundamental attunement of the encounter between 
Dasein and living nature, then we can see how this concept of poverty develops in 
various directions in the following years, informing Heidegger's understanding of the 
capabilities of living beings, of the 'earth', the silence of language and finally allows for 
the development of a thinking of freedom that is proper to the earth itself, rather than a 
development beyond the earthly. It is argued that the notion of poverty is an essential 
counter to a prevalent Spinozist and Nietzschean strain in ecological thought that thinks 
living nature on the basis of plenum or overflow and concedes no space for a true 
freedom of the earth. 
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Introduction 
§1 Poverty, Spirit and Environment 
The fundamental attunement of ecological thought is a sense of poverty. It is a strange 
sense, even in the midst of increasing wealth, development and progress, of becoming 
poorer. Of course, poverty that results from the lack of access to land and material 
resource remains the overwhelming experience of the majority of people in the world. 
The recollection of that fact is fundamentally bound to the sense of poverty which 
informs environmentalism. It is in poverty that social justice and environmental concern 
are joined, rather than forming two separate areas of concern which occasionally 
coincide and at other times conflict, as each struggles to fulfil its own objective. 
The poverty which concerns us here however, the poverty which initiates ecological 
concern, is not only poverty in material resource. Neither is it a poverty simply opposed 
to 'material' poverty. It is no 'poverty in spirit', if that means the severing of attachment 
to worldly or earthly things. ' The poverty that informs ecological concern is perhaps 
best initially understood as a poverty of experience, as Walter Benjamin described it: 
1 For an instructive comparison of Heidegger's thought to Meister Eckhart's sermon on 'poverty of 
spirit', see John D. Caputo, The Poverty of Thought: A Reflection on Heidegger and Eckhart' in 
Heidegger: The Man and the Thinker, ed. Thomas Sheehan (Chicago: Precedent Publishing, 1981) 
pp. 209-216. However, one of Caputo's observations which I cannot agree with is the idea that for 
'thought' there are no 'environmental factors' to be taken into consideration when reflecting upon, for 
example, the blooming of a rose. Caputo seems to equate such factors with mechanistic causal 
explanations. As should become clear during the course of this thesis, I think that 'poverty' is the key 
to developing a kind of ecological thought which avoids such an equation. 
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'With this tremendous development of technology, a completely new poverty has 
descended on mankind. ' A poverty of experience that brings with it, as its reverse side, 
an overwhelming wealth of ideas, styles and ideologies. In the midst of this poverty of 
experience which is, 'not merely poverty on the personal level, but poverty of human 
experience in general, ' Benjamin nevertheless sees the potential for a new kind of 
'positive barbarism': 'For what does poverty of experience do for the barbarian? It forces 
him to start from scratch; to make a new start; to make a little go a long way; to begin 
with a little and build up further, looking neither left nor right. " We are rich in lived 
experience (Erlebnis) but poor in transformational experience (Erfahrung), which is a 
distinction that Martin Heidegger too insisted upon. The poverty of experience must be 
converted into an experience of poverty. 
The 'poverty of ecology', as I understand it, has three interwoven meanings. On the first 
level, it expresses a dissatisfaction with certain environmental philosophies that try to 
derive normative standards in politics and ethics more or less directly from an 
'ecological' understanding of nature and which, inversely, can be seen to project 
normative axioms into nature. ' This is not to say that we should in any way reaffirm a 
2 Walter Benjamin, 'Experience and Poverty' in Selected Writings Vol. 2 1927-1934, trans. Rodney 
Livingstone and Others, ed. Michael W. Jennings, Howard Eiland and Gary Smith (Cambridge, Mass: 
The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1999) p. 732 
3A very important study which critiques both 'derivative' and 'dualist' modes of environmental thought 
is John M Meyer's Political Nature: Environmentalism and the Interpretation of Western Thought. 
Meyer finds both the idea that Western philosophy has always 'derived' its political concepts from 
concepts of nature and the idea that it has simply separated the two realms to be unconvincing. He 
backs up this critique with very illuminating readings of Hobbes and Aristotle and goes on to advocate 
a 'dialectical' understanding of the relationship between the concepts of politics and nature in Western 
history. He then examines various political struggles in which this dialectic can be seen to be 
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strict fact/value distinction. Ecological science, for example, has got a crucial role to 
play in our thinking of these issues and it seems to me that, although it is important to 
revise politically skewed concepts such as the formerly popular notion of a 'balance of 
nature', this science cannot and should not be cut off from political action or 
metaphysical reflection. Nevertheless, I do not think that ecological science can be 
taken as the foundation or touchstone of environmental philosophy. Just as science can 
call us to rethink our ontological and metaphysical prejudices, it can also perpetuate 
them in hidden ways. This is perhaps especially the case when a 'paradigm shift' or 
revolution in'worldview' seems to turn everything on its head. Ecological science must 
therefore be drawn into an ongoing philosophical deconstruction. 
On the second level, where environmental philosophy begins to negotiate the 
metaphysical terrain on which both ecological science and politics find themselves, 
'poverty' is not only something negative but refers to a generally hidden resource of 
ecological thought. In a way analogous to Karl Marx's critique of the philosophy of 
poverty in The Poverty of Philosophy, to which my title alludes, allegiance to certain 
philosophical and ontological assumptions can cause one to miss the true force of 
poverty. For Marx, socialists and Communists begin by seeing in poverty nothing but 
poverty, 'without seeing the revolutionary and subversive side, which will overthrow the 
old society. " Of course, such a thought can lead to a dangerous and suspicious 
instantiated and highlights the importance of place for understanding political differences in the 
environmental movement. The final notion would chime well with some of Heidegger's later thought, 
although Heidegger is not mentioned in this study. Whilst agreeing with much of Meyer's analysis, I 
would hesitate to call the relationship between philosophy of nature and politics 'dialectical'. The 
present study provides a somewhat different approach, proposing another way to characterise the 
relationship between nature and politics. 
4 Karl Marx, The Poverty of Philosophy (New York: International Publishers, 1963) pp. 125-126 
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glorification of poverty as the engine of revolution. Here, as I have said, it is not so 
much social and material deprivation, but the sense and experience of poverty which 
accompanies environmental destruction that makes us poor. We must maintain the idea 
that there is an indispensable sense of poverty which is the true force of ecological 
thought, in the face of those critics who see in ecological thought nothing but pure 
negativity, a 'doom saying' without positive vision. The inability to maintain the sense 
of poverty alongside affirmation and even to affirm that sense of poverty itself is 
perhaps the greatest threat to ecological thought. 
This leads on to the final sense which I give to the poverty of ecology. Rather than 
being a denunciation of ecology, I wish to make the case for developing 'poverty' as the 
key term in an ecological thought. A term that can draw together various strands of 
metaphysical and political thinking and overcome many of the difficulties which arise 
for both compartmentalised environmental philosophy and more 'holistic' visions which 
eliminate all 'negativity' as either illusory or part of the engine of progress. It is through 
various modes of 'privation' that we can bring Martin Heidegger's critique of the 
metaphysics of presence to bear on ecological science and environmental politics. 
Heidegger has been claimed and repudiated as an ecological thinker for well over two 
decades. The depth and breadth of his deconstruction of metaphysics certainly takes in 
all of the central themes which concern the body of environmental thought and has 
guided and redirected many of those concerns. On the other hand, of course, concern 
about Heidegger's political engagement has frequently and naturally crystallised around 
the themes of 'ecology. ' Was it not, after all, a pathos filled 'return to nature' and desire 
to establish an affinity with the earth that made up a large part of National Socialist 
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ideology? It is not for nothing that ecological thought has been dogged by the worry that 
it attempts to establish an 'eco-fascism. " This has been brought about not only by the 
concern that 'normal' political decision making processes will be set aside in the face of 
what is portrayed as an overwhelming crisis, but the claim that ecological thought tends 
towards a holism which dissolves all individuals and singular relations into the whole 
and views the earth as organism. I try to elucidate and deal with some of these concerns 
as they arise in relation to Heidegger's thinking of the Earth in Chapter 3. For now I 
only wish to point out that this is why I have chosen to focus on the problem of 'living 
nature'. This focus is important for two reasons. Firstly, because it addresses a second 
area of concern for Heideggerian thought and exegesis, namely the adequacy of 
Heidegger's understanding of 'animality. ' At the same time it enables me to address an 
issue of wider interest in environmental philosophy, namely, how the 'holistic' concerns 
of environmentalism are to be reconciled with our responsibility towards individual 
living beings. 
In order to introduce some of these themes and to begin to show why I think that it is in 
the sense of poverty that we find one of the most important contributions of Heidegger's 
thought to environmental philosophy I want to spend some time in this introduction on 
an reading of Heidegger's essay 'Poverty'. " Heidegger presented this text to a small 
group on 27th June 1945, less than two months after the German capitulation. Germany's 
infrastructure lay in ruins and the country was divided between four occupying forces. 
5 The most sustained and influential argument against any ecological 'grand politics' on the basis that it 
lends itself to totalitarianism or at the very least remains a reactionary romanticism and anti- 
modernism is to be found in Luc Ferry, The New Ecological Order, trans. Carol Volk (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1995) 
6 This essay was first printed in German in Heidegger Studies 1994, Vol. 10, pp. 5-11. A working 
translation can be found in Appendix 1 below. 
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A time which called for reflection, but not a moment in which 'environmental' concerns 
could take centre stage. Far more a moment concerned with sheer survival and pressing 
need. A moment at which the possibilities for reducing human beings to their most basic 
and base condition, to what looked like a'bare life', were everywhere being revealed. A 
moment, one might think, in which broader relations and responsibilities towards the 
surrounding world would have to be set aside for richer times. 
Heidegger begins his essay by taking up a line attributed to Hölderlin: 
For us everything is concentrated on the spiritual, we have become poor so 
as to become rich! 
First of all, Heidegger asks, who does Hölderlin mean when he says 'for us'? No 
determinate answer is forthcoming. It is not in any way clear that the German nation, 
which ten years previously in the Introduction to Metaphysics Heidegger had pictured 
as the saving power of Europe caught in the pincers of Soviet Russia and America, is 
being addressed. Of course, that Germany had now been effectively crushed in the 
pincer, but this alone would not, surely, have removed it from its historical destiny, if 
that destiny had ever been anything more than an expression of military and ideological 
might. Yet it is now, at least for a moment, altogether unclear whether anyone could 
still believe in such a destiny. And did Hölderlin believe in anything of the kind? Does 
'for us, ' mean 'us' the Germans? Us the contemporaries of the turn of the Nineteenth 
7 The Stuttgart edition, which was published after the Hellingrath edition that Heidegger made use of, 
informs us that the historical sketch above which this line appears was found amongst H61derlin's 
papers, but in the handwriting of Christoph Theodor Schwab. Friedrich H61derlin, Sämliche Werke: 
Kleine Stuttgarter Ausgabe, ed. Friedrich Beissener (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1965) Vol. 4 p. 407 
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Century? It is altogether unclear. What we can be sure of, Heidegger writes, is that 
when Hölderlin thinks of history he thinks 'in long time periods'. Furthermore, the time 
which concerns him is not the time of datable occurrences, a time that comes forward 
most urgently perhaps in a time of war, but the time of a 'secret' event in the history of 
the West. We might add that when Hölderlin thinks the space and geography of a 
nation, he thinks in large expanses and is concerned not with the space of determinable 
borders, but with a 'secret place' where we might locate something like 'the West'. 
This becomes even more interesting when a little later Heidegger considers the spiritual 
situation of the East. Not the far East, but the East of the Eastern Church that set the 
scene for the spiritual development of Russia. This was the spiritual ground in which 
Communism had taken root. The seeds sown by Hegel and Marx had sprouted in a soil 
permeated by a very different spirit. The spiritual development of the East took a 
different path from the West. The Great Schism was, after all, partly a matter of the 
origin of spirit. In Russia the mystical tradition which flourished in this soil was 
mediated through German thinkers, Jakob Böhme and then Hegel and Schelling, but it 
remained Eastern, with a 'magical' essence as dark as the Greek pneuma whose breath 
brought it to life, and which is alive today in ways we cannot imagine. Who are 'we' 
who cannot imagine it? Perhaps not just the Germans at the end of the war, or their 
former countrymen on the eastern side of the country, soon to join forces with 'Russian' 
Communism. Perhaps it also means we who refuse to see in 'mysticism' anything but 
charlatanry and wilful obscurantism. 
So, what is spirit? Jacques Derrida once claimed that Heidegger never asked himself 
that question. At least not in the mode and form and with the development which he 
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afforded to his other central questions! At the same time, later in the same text, Derrida 
says that after 1933 when the quotation marks were lifted from the word, 'Heidegger 
never stopped interrogating the being of Geist. i9 He even cites an instance in which 
Heidegger explicitly poses the question. This is not simply an inconsistency on 
Derrida's part, since it is a question firstly of how far spirit will yield to such an 
interrogation, whether in questioning we have not already left it behind and secondly of 
whether Heidegger asks or could ask this question of himself. When he asks, he asks it 
of Trakl and takes up the poet's answer, not necessarily as his own but, it seems, almost 
without question. The essay 'Poverty', which was only published several years after 
Derrida made these observations, is extremely interesting in this context. It maintains a 
position, both chronologically and also in terms of its spirit, almost exactly between the 
Introduction to Metaphysics of 1935 and the interpretation of Trakl of 1953. "Spirit" 
itself seems to have been veiled once more in quotation marks, whose disappearance in 
1935 Derrida found so disturbing. Yet whether the note of caution or even attempt to 
avoid this term has returned, or whether the quotation marks mark the fact that it is 
Hölderlin's spirit which is in question, remains unclear. 
In order to answer the question of what spirit is for Hölderlin, Heidegger now cites a 
passage from Hölderlin's essay 'On Religion': 
Neither from himself alone, nor only from the objects which surround him, 
can man experience that more than a mechanical operation, a spirit, a god, is 
in the world, but [he can experience it] in a more lively relationship raised 
8 Jacques Derrida, Of Spirit: Heidegger and the Question trans. Geoffrey Bennington and Rachel 
Bowlby (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1989) p. 14 
9 Ibid p. 83 
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sublimely above (erhabenen) bare need (Notdurft), in which he stands with 
that which surrounds him. 1° 
The question of spirit thus turns out to be the question of how man relates to that which 
surrounds him, that is, it is nothing but a question of environment. That has nothing to 
do with the lifestyle choices or spiritual beliefs of certain environmentalists. It is 
precisely not in himself alone, nor in surrounding objects, nor in the projection of 
personal belief onto objects, that man can experience something of spirit. It is only in 
the relationship itself, only immanently to this relation, that something of spirit can be 
experienced. 
The relationship of spirit is one which is sublimely above bare need. That does not 
mean, however, that is is raised above worldly interest or involvement. Heidegger 
comments that Hölderlin also speaks of this height as a height to which man can 'fall', 
recalling the entire discourse of falling in Being and Time, whereby Dasein falls for 
beings so hard that it forgets all about their being. But the falling at issue here would be 
falling out of that first love, not in order to forget all about beings in return, but to 
recollect their being. The sublime relation, which does not extract us from the world but 
leads us into the depth of our involvement with beings, pervades the relation of human 
beings to objects and at the same time bears both of these. It is a relationship which 
cannot wait for the fulfilment of pressing needs. Human beings cannot wait until all 
their needs have been met in order to develop this relationship with their environment. 
If they do it may well be too late by the time they get around to it. " 
10 'Die Armut' Heidegger Studies 10 (1994) p. 7 
11 We can note in passing that what HSlderlin here calls a 'sublime' relation is already very different to 
what Kant understood by the sublime, precisely because it cannot be understood in terms of the failure 
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Hölderlin does not provide any further determination of the character of this 
relationship, but Heidegger suggests that, 'The sublime relationship in which man 
stands is the relationship of beyng to man, so in truth beyng itself is this relationship, in 
which the essence of man comes into its own as that essence which stands in this 
relationship and in so standing protects and inhabits i1' For the relation of man to his 
environment to be 'of spirit', it must be a relation brought about from within the 
relationship of beyng to man. That is, a relation to that which surrounds us which is 
forged in our relation to the space and the leeway (Spiel-raum) of being that is no 
longer modelled on or abstracted from beings. When the aphorism claims that for us 
everything is concentrated on the spiritual, concentration is not an attitude which is 
adopted, but is the environmental movement of spirit itself, gathered and centred around 
the relation of beyng to our essence. 
What this suggests is a way to escape and move beyond the endless debates about where 
we should place the focal point of environmental thought. Any kind of 'centric' thought 
of the usual kind becomes redundant, whether it be anthropo-, bio- or eco-centric. First 
of all because each of these terms can only receive its determination from out the 
relation of beyng to ourselves. That relationship now forms the 'centre' or middle of the 
of a subject to grasp an object of cognition. Nevertheless, it would be an important task which I 
cannot undertake here, to re-read the Third Critique in this context. For the moment it must suffice to 
say that in The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics Heidegger also uses the term to characterise 
life as and elevation of nature over itself, 'a sublimity which is lived in life itself. ' (FCM p. 278/403) A 
reading of Kant in the spirit of Heidegger would then have to think this sublimity which is not the 
failure of cognition together with a 'play' of beauty in nature which is not the play of the faculties of 
cognition. 
12 'Die Armut' Heidegger Studies 10 (1994) p. 7 
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circle, but as a relation it cannot form an Archimedean point around which the world 
moves. As the relation to beyng, it is not a relation between beings but a relationship 
that pervades all beings. The environmental relation is thus a ek-centric centre, 'a circle 
which is nowhere a periphery. '" 
The thought of such a relationship cannot, of course, resolve all of the pressing 
questions and conflicts which arise for environmental management. It cannot provide 
formulas to be followed when a conflict of interests arises between human beings and 
the environment, between human beings and animals, or between animals and the 
environment. Rather, the search for such formulas is set aside for a moment so that the 
fixity and necessity of the interests which are in conflict can be placed in question and 
perhaps seen in another light. 
In his interpretation of the second part of the aphorism Heidegger continues to clarify 
the environmental relationship which makes up the concentration on the spiritual. 'We 
have become poor so as to become rich. ' What does it mean to become poor? Wherein 
lies the essence of poverty? We think immediately of not having possessions, even 
'doing without' what is necessary. However, the term that I have rendered as 'doing 
without, ' entbehren, can also be a sparing, the sparing of possessions, of resources, of 
time. To be truly poor means to be able to spare nothing, to do without the unnecessary. 
Finally to spare nothing, to give free reign to nothing, to do and be without possession 
of the unnecessary, yet not to be able to be without the unnecessary to which we belong. 
So what are the necessary and the unnecessary which determine poverty? Necessity is 
determined by need and the compulsion to satisfy needs. In poverty need is not satisfied 
13 Ibid 
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and so the poor dwell in the unnecessary. The unnecessary is not determined by 
compulsion but has its being in the free. Freedom so understood is not a 'free for all', 
wilful or arbitrary choice. Freedom is a safe-guarding and caring for things in their 
essence and allowing them to rest in their essence. A relationship not exhausted by the 
purely negative stance of leaving alone or not using up. Freedom is caring and 
protecting in an environmental relation which is not determined by need. 
In fact, necessity itself is rooted in and turns upon this relation. Freedom and necessity 
are no longer to be thought of as opposites. We do not escape from need into freedom. 
Freedom is Not-wendigkeit, a turning in need. Not simply a different attitude towards 
need, but a movement and leeway of need which turns need away from compulsion. 
Freedom is then thought otherwise than in a long tradition of metaphysical thinking 
which finds at the heart of freedom an expression and an acceptance of necessity as 
compulsion. Whether it be the moral compulsion of a categorical imperative or the 
natural compulsion of natural laws, ultimately both moral and natural necessity rest in a 
metaphysics of compulsion. Freedom, however, does not flee from necessity but turns 
necessity inside out. 14 We can then find a freedom in ethics and nature which does not 
develop from out of a rigid set of laws, but which comes in a certain sense before the 
law of compulsion. 
Being poor in this sense, being able to spare the leeway of nothing that makes free, one 
14 This may appear to be an odd claim considering that for Kant, who is the figure explicitly referred to 
in this passage, the moral law only comes into play when human will has been removed from the 
compulsion of natural law. Clearly natural and moral law are not identical in this case, but the claim is 
that reason and the moral law do nevertheless compel the will of the subject, even if this law comes 
into conflict with the natural law of interestedness. 
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is at the same time rich. Becoming rich does not follow upon being poor as something 
causal. If we are able to spare nothing, to find the leeway and turning in necessity, then 
we stand in the abundance of being which overflows pressing need in advance. In 
becoming poor, in sparing nothing and the unnecessary, we become rich. 
This, in brief outline, is the sense of poverty that Heidegger explores in his 1945 essay 
and which I suggest can serve as the starting point for an ecological thought that goes 
beyond both managerial calculation and the complacency of 'spiritual' holism. For 
Heidegger this was not simply a retreat, in the face of defeat, from the talk of destiny 
and apparent triumphalism which is to be found in his manuscripts throughout the 
preceding decade. He had already begun to develop this sense of poverty. His 
description of it in a manuscript from 1941, On the Beginning, makes clear how central 
it had become to his thought: 
The highest property of humanity which is made ready for the in- 
abidingness of Da-sein after the overcoming of metaphysics and thus takes 
over the grounding of the truth of beyng and thus moves into the history of 
beyng is, following this entrance into Ereignis, poverty. 
Here poverty does not mean lack, but rather in-abidingness (Inständigkeit) 
(gathered-mind, attunedness) (das Gemüt, die Gestimmtheit) into the simple 
and the singular: this, however, is the essencing of beyng. 
From out of it beings first inceptively stand forth in the clearing of the there. 
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Poverty and giving- 
Releasement in the essencing of Er-eignung. 15 
Poverty in this sense then is not a lack, but the dispossession of humanity in order to 
concede space for releasement, for giving and for the clearing in which an appropriation 
of man to beyng can take place. Far from negativity or lack, poverty is the attunement 
which Heidegger associates in particular with'plenitude of beyng. i16 
The importance of this thought for us comes to the fore, I think, when faced with a great 
deal of contemporary philosophical ecology which takes its lead from Spinoza. " That 
Heidegger did not write a great deal directly concerned with Spinoza is well known. 
However, he spent so much time thinking and writing about Schelling, Hegel and 
Hölderlin that Spinoza could not fail to be implicated in this confrontation. When 
Hölderlin writes, for instance, in the passage quoted above, that in a certain sublime 
relationship with what surrounds us we experience that there is more in the world than a 
mechanical operation, it could well be the case that he has Spinoza's 'mechanical' 
understanding of the power of God in mind. It is not the mechanical operation of 
15 GA 70, p. 132 
16 Ibid 
17 See, for example, Arne Naess 'Spinoza and ecology in Speculum Spinozanum 1677-1977, ed. 
Siegfried Hessing, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1977) pp. 418-425 Freya Mathews, The 
Ecological Self (London: Routledge, 1991); Robert Hurley's introduction to Gilles Deleuze, Spinoza: 
Practical Philosophy, trans. R. Hurley (San Francisco: City Lights, 1988). An important study which 
is highly critical of the deep ecological 'reconstruction' or rather manipulation of Spinoza's 
metaphysics is Eccy de Jonge's Spinoza and Deep Ecology: Challenging Traditional Approaches to 
Environmentalism (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004). De Jonge goes on to try to find a surer footing for 
some deep ecological doctrines in a more thorough reading of Spinoza. 
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entities upon one another which is the direct object of criticism here, but the modelling 
of the very relation of being to beings on that operation. Natura naturans compulsively 
gives out and expresses its power in natura naturata. The only freedom in being or in 
beings is to follow through on the necessity of nature and of ones own nature. But if 
ones own nature is nothing but a relation to nature naturing and that naturing is not 
compelled by the force of its own power, but finds leeway in the midst of its power, 
then the freedom implied by an ethics of nature would be altogether different. 
Furthermore, affirmation of the plenitude and abundance of being would no longer be 
opposed to 'negativity. ' Such a thought would find in privation, in no-thing, in 
withdrawal, the leeway in which that very plenitude and abundance can come forth. 
Each of the chapters in this study explores the implications of poverty as the defining 
feature of an ecological philosophy developed in dialogue with Heidegger. In chapter 1 
I address Heidegger's first and only full scale phenomenological investigation of 
animality, conducted in his lecture course of 1929/30 The Fundamental Concepts of 
Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude. In this course Heidegger puts forward the 
famous and much disputed set of theses: the stone is woridless, the animal is poor in 
world, man is world-building. There has been much debate and concern about what 
precisely the 'world-poverty' of the animal amounts to. I address two central criticisms 
which have been made of Heidegger's approach. The first, forcefully posed by Jacques 
Derrida, questions the very idea that there is some easily identifiable region of beings 
which could be named 'the animal' and which has the character of 'animality'. Is it not 
the dogmatic positing of this thesis which compromises the entire project from the start? 
Secondly, there is the question of precisely what the 'world-poverty' of the animal is 
supposed to entail, especially for the relationship between human beings and animals. I 
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argue that when properly understood, although important difficulties remain, 
Heidegger's investigation does not falter on either of these points. The thesis concerning 
animality is a guiding thesis, rather than the positing of certain presuppositions as the 
foundation of a regional ontology. As such it follows the model of metaphysical 
questioning which Heidegger will later identify as the metaphysical procedure, the 
'guiding question' which understands being through and from out of beings. This is in 
tune with the 'met-ontological' experiment which Heidegger conducted in this period 
following Being and Time. Since it is anything but clear from the start what comprises 
the animal and what the world-poverty of animality consists in, the thesis actually takes 
on the form of a persistent question concerning living beings. The thesis guides us by 
returning us to this question. We may then gain an access point to the dimension of 
living nature without supposing that dimension to be accessible from the start, or ever 
utterly open to us. Part of the 'world-poverty' of animality is the refusal of complete 
openness by living beings and therefore the impossibility of fixing axioms as the 
foundation of a regional ontology of life. The poverty ascribed to the animal world is 
not identical with the privations which characterise the world of Dasein and the 
withdrawal which characterises being itself, but it is inextricably bound up with these. 
Nevertheless, I argue against Levinasian readings (which on the whole would have been 
rejected by Levinas himself) that see the animal as the ultimate figure of the Other and 
thus as utterly foreign and transcendent of all 'worldly' experience. It is precisely the 
ambiguous position between intra-worldly meaningfulness and absolute refusal of 
disclosure in 'worldly' terms which makes up the character of 'world-poverty'. The 
animal is other than Dasein, but animality is neither laid out before us from the start nor 
utterly 'beyond being'. We enter the ecological dimension of animality only through a 
precise phenomenological investigation of our relation to particular living beings, 
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because animality is not an homogeneous zone of life but is made up of the interlocking 
environments of living beings. 
In chapter 2I focus on one of the central problems which arises from Heidegger's 
account of animality and the 'essence' of living beings in The Fundamental Concepts of 
Metaphysics. In that text Heidegger makes a crucial distinction between the 'capacities' 
(Fähigkeiten) of living beings and the 'capabilities' (Vermögen) of human beings. He 
thus introduces a quasi-transcendental approach into the philosophy of life which has 
great significance for the way in which the 'question of animality' is posed today. I say 
'quasi-transcendental' because Kant's philosophy frequently seems to simply posit 
'faculties' (Vermögen) as the conditions of the possibility of experience. It is Heidegger's 
strategy, both here and in his readings of Kant, to inquire into the constitution or being 
of these 'faculties', not in terms of what they are able to do but in terms of what it is that 
enables them as faculties to do anything at all. The primary question as to whether there 
is an essential continuity or discontinuity between human beings and other animals is 
generally posed in terms of their abilities, what they can and cannot do. For Heidegger, 
such a question based on a vague and general concept of 'ability' ignores the possibility 
that there may be essentially different kinds of ability, in the sense not of being able to 
do different things, but in so far as the ability itself, 'that which enables', might be 
essentially different. The question of difference posed on the basis of a general concept 
of 'ability' has already decided the issue because it presupposes the continuity of ability 
itself. For Heidegger the fundamental question thus becomes more philosophically 
complex. It could no longer in principle be decided by empirical inquiry into the various 
abilities of living beings, but only by phenomenological inquiry into ability itself. I 
pursue this inquiry in a reading of Heidegger's 1931 lecture course on Aristotle's 
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Metaphysics e: The Essence and Actuality of Force. I analyse Heidegger's claim that 
we can find in Aristotle's text the possibility of bringing into view a 'spectrum' of 
dynamis, that is a range of essentially different kinds of ability which can nevertheless 
be gathered in a logic of dynamis as such. It is in this general logic that we see the 
reappearance of the notion of 'poverty', now as the steresis, privation, which is to be 
found in the essence of dynamis. 
Chapter 3 continues the analysis of this spectrum of dynamis, taking up the tail end of 
the spectrum in the concepts of violence (Gewalt) and power (Macht). Although 
capacity and capability were originally attributed to animals and human beings 
respectively, it now becomes clear that each band of the spectrum does not correspond 
exactly to a particular ontic species. Human beings employ, participate in and relate to 
the entire spectrum through the logos which gathers the spectrum as a whole. They are 
also essentially caught up in violence and power relations which do not belong 
exclusively to them, but make them what they are by constantly transporting their 
capabilities beyond their own sphere. In turn, the rest of living nature has been caught 
up in these relations, leading to a 'technicisation' of animality which need not only apply 
to those beings for whom Heidegger reserves the neo-Nietzschean epithet, the 
'technicised animal'. On the other hand, Heidegger also attributes 'power' to the earth, a 
concept which plays a crucial role in his thought as he develops the project of 'being- 
historical' thinking. From this perspective the untenability of any environmental ethics 
which would simply oppose these developments becomes clear. Any such ethics would 
need to be simultaneously an ecological politics. Not a practice to accompany the 
theory, but a thinking of the epochal dynamics of earth to accompany the preparation 
for another beginning and another dwelling. I explore these themes in readings of texts 
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including Introduction to Metaphysics, Contributions to Philosophy (from Ereignis) and 
Besinnung and contrast Heidegger's reading of Sophocles with that provided by Hans 
Jonas. Jonas attempts to ground the 'principle of responsibility' in a fundamental 
discontinuity between ancient and modern relations to nature, whilst Heidegger finds in 
the Sophoclean vision both the roots of the contemporary situation and the potential for 
another beginning where nature would find another dynamic. Thus 'poverty' takes on a 
more critical sense in this chapter, as the poverty of responses to the modern ecological 
situation which do not address that situation as one in which the self-empowerment of 
power has become the fundamental dynamic of nature itself. 
One of the phenomena which arises from this situation is an extension of the 'human' as 
a characterisation not only of those beings which we ourselves are, but as a way to 
understand the world; what might in other terms be called a 'humanist worldview. ' This 
is not an illegitimate extension of the human outside of its legitimate boundaries, an 
'anthropomorphism' in the usual sense, but a humanisation of the world which was a 
necessary counterpart of the humanisation of Da-sein. In the final chapter of this thesis I 
take up the suggestion made in Contributions to Philosophy that it is in reflection upon 
language, that which at first sight seems inextricably bound up with the humanisation of 
the world and man's projection of himself into the whole of nature, that we can initiate a 
re-covery of nature from this humanisation. To this end I analyse Heidegger's reflections 
on Herder's philosophy of language from this 1939 seminar course On the Essence of 
Language and his lecture courses from 1942/43 and 1944 on Parmenides and 
Heraclitus. This analysis remains focused on the problem of the relationship between 
human beings and animals since it is clearly in terms of the possession of logos that a 
fundamental distinction between the two has been posited and dissolved time and again 
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in the history of metaphysics. I discuss the way in which Heidegger works through the 
problematic relation of physis and logos as they inform that history and I argue that in 
Heidegger's interpretation they are not conflated with one another, as is often claimed, 
but are both understood as informed by the Greek thinking of aletheia. In order to 
interrupt this history, to project and initiate another beginning, it is therefore necessary 
to reorientate the uncovering of truth and think through the consequences of this for 
both language and nature. An important step in the re-covery of nature is a hearkening 
to that aspect of language which does not simply let something be seen or bring it to 
presence. The silence of language is the counterpart of the privation and withdrawal of 
nature. 
The main body of this thesis is thus concerned with the 'middle period' of Heidegger's 
thinking that can be roughly dated between 1929 and 1949. Where it seemed 
appropriate and helpful I have introduced short discussions of texts from before this 
period, in particular, The Fundamental Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy from 1924 
and Being and Time from 1927. Understandably, the vast majority of ecologically 
minded interpretation has concentrated on Heidegger's late essays, especially 'The 
Question Concerning Technology, ' published in 1953, but originally formulated as part 
of the Bremen lectures of 1949. Commentators have also been able to draw out 
ecologically significant aspects of Heidegger's earlier thinking of environmentality. It is 
only in this middle period, however, that Heidegger tackles in a sustained manner the 
question of living nature as a problem in its own right. At the same time he develops the 
notion of poverty that will act as our guiding thread in what follows. I give some 
suggestions as to why I think that Heidegger's post-1949 thought cannot tackle the 
question of living nature in a satisfactory manner in my conclusion. 
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What I hope to have achieved in this thesis is a step towards a philosophy of living 
nature that addresses the problem of freedom as the true bequest of Kantian 
metaphysics. 18 This would be a philosophy of freedom in and of nature. Not a 
philosophy that follows the traces of spirit and freedom as they develop from out of 
nature, but an environmental thought that in itself is already the exercise of spirit and 
freedom. Freedom will be found in nature when nature itself has been set free. 
18 Schelling claimed that since Kant the central problem of philosophy is no longer that of nature and 
spirit, but of freedom and necessity. F. W. J. Schelling, 'Philosophical Investigations into the essence of 
Human Freedom and Related Matters', trans. Pricilla Hayden-Roy, in Philosophy of German Idealism 
(New York: Continuum, 1987) p. 117 
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Chapter 1 
Encountering the Animal: Life-Cycles 
Something in the world forces us to think. This something is an object 
not of recognition but of a fundamental encounter" 
Gilles Deleuze 
We are always the ones who first take up into the unconcealed such 
"looking" and who, on our own, interpret the way animals "watch" us as 
a looking. On the other hand, where man only experiences being and the 
unconcealed sketchily, the animal's "look" can concentrate in itself a 
special power of encounter. 2° 
Martin Heidegger 
How do we encounter living beings today? Is it otherwise than in previous decades? 
There is some consensus that our relation to living nature has changed significantly over 
the centuries. Clear indications of these changes are to be found in the ways that living 
beings are gathered, caught, cultivated and produced, for food and other essential means 
19 Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, trans. by Paul Patton, Continuum Edition 2004 (London: 
Continuum, 2004) p. 176 
20 Parmenides p. 107/159 
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of life. A more recent development, although one which may have historical roots going 
back just as far, is an encounter with living nature that does not stem primarily from a 
need or desire to put it to work. Environmentalism only began to gather pace as a 
political movement in the last decade or so of Martin Heidegger's life, but it certainly 
had political and philosophical forebears. Since then Heidegger's work has been taken 
up, although not without a great deal of mistrust and even foreboding, as a body of 
thought that belongs to this incubation period. I will argue throughout this thesis that 
Heidegger does indeed have a great deal to contribute to our understanding of how we 
encounter living nature today and how that encounter does not and could never take 
place in an isolated moment, since the moment of encounter is necessarily historically 
informed. 
Yet by posing this question, the question of our encounter with living nature, have we 
not as philosophers already decided the very point in question? Have we not, on the one 
hand, decided who we are, those would do the encountering? Have we not, on the other 
hand, posited the object of encounter? Living nature, or 'the animal, "' is posited as a 
21 In this chapter I will use the two terms virtually interchangeably. The justification for this should 
become clear during the course of the argument. If Heidegger were to posit any essential distinction 
between animal and plant life (or indeed any of the five kingdoms generally recognised today), which 
he never seems to do, then he could not do so on the Aristotelian basis of the kinds of abilities 
possessed by each. Neither does he follow the more plausible route pursued by Jakob von Uexkiill and 
Hans Jonas of positing a different environmental relation for each, either in terms of a difference in 
kind as the former does or a difference in degree of mediation as the later. It is interesting to note that 
in the first part of The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics when Heidegger is discussing the 
inadequacy of the concept of consciousness to account for different modes of 'being-away' he touches 
on the problem which will become central to the second part of the course, which he calls the question 
of the structure of being of stone, plant, animal and man. (FCM p. 62/93-94) In the second part of the 
course this fourfold problem is reduced to the famous threefold problem of stone, animal and man. It 
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background thesis and even if we do not already recognise it for all that it is, we assume 
that we know what we are talking about here. This criticism of Heidegger's thinking of 
animality was made powerfully and influentially by Jacques Derrida: 
Can one not say, then, that the whole deconstruction of ontology, as it is 
begun in Sein und Zeit and insofar as it unseats, as it were, the Cartesian- 
Hegelian spiritus in the existential analytic, is here threatened in its order, its 
implementation, its conceptual apparatus, by what is called, so obscurely 
still, the animal? Compromised, rather, by a thesis on animality which 
presupposes- this is the irreducible and I believe dogmatic hypothesis of the 
thesis- that there is one thing, one domain, one homogeneous type of entity, 
which is called animality in general, for which any example would do the 
job. 22 
In this chapter I will argue that Derrida is absolutely right to suggest that an encounter 
with animality will threaten the 'order', if there ever was such a thing, of the conceptual 
apparatus in Being and lime. Such a threat is acknowledged and developed by 
seems likely that Heidegger intends ultimately to include plant life in his thinking of 'the animal' from 
statements such as the following: Then again, we can only determine the animality of the animal if we 
are clear about what constitutes the living character of a living being, as distinct from the non-living 
being which does not have the possibility of dying. ' (FCM p. 179/265) and later, 'Yet this means that 
we must take up the task of defining the essence of the living being, of characterising the essence of 
life, if only with particular reference to the animal. ' (FCM p. 212/310) The justification for this 
'particular reference' is not made clear and one might certainly find some unacknowledged 
significance which it has for the characterisation of life as a whole. 
22 Jacques Derrida, Of Spirit: Heidegger and the Question, trans. Geoffery Bennington and Rachel 
Bowlby (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1989) p. 57 
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Heidegger himself in texts both prior to and after the publication of Being and Time and 
even in that text itself. However, the suggestion that this encounter prompts a falling 
back into pre-deconstructive ontology cannot be made good. Rather, it is precisely this 
encounter with animality which prevents deconstructive ontology from falling into 
anything like a conceptual apparatus or programme which could simply be implemented 
when it comes to the specific requirements of any regional ontology, including the realm 
of living nature. 
§2 Two Types of Encounter and the Circle of Encountering 
How, then, do we encounter the animal today? There are two types of encounter which 
are of particular prominence. They are by no means novel, although they are subject to 
changing needs, concerns and conditions of understanding. Neither are they mutually 
exclusive nor generally well defined possibilities. They are, nevertheless, still indicative 
of a tension which is irreducible in any encounter with animals and living nature as a 
whole. It is only by attempting to understand the fundamental torsion of which these 
two types of encounter are symptomatic that we can begin to understand both its 
manifestations in our familiar encounters with animals and think through possible 
transformations of those encounters. 
Firstly, animality is investigated in scientific inquiry. The scientific encounter with 
animality is by no means restricted to biological research 'proper'. Biology itself often 
seems caught in a tension between the dominant power of bio-chemistry and 
evolutionary theory's bearing upon history and society, which has turned it towards the 
historical sciences. Defending the proper region of beings to be investigated by any 
35 
particular scientific discipline has become less and less meaningful. All of these 
scientific investigations are supposed to coax the animal to show itself, if not in itself, 
then at least in some way that is appropriate. Anthropomorphism is the incessant enemy 
of all scientific encounter with animality, whether approached from the side of the 
historical or natural sciences. Science is thus already caught in the tension between the 
knowledge that it must articulate its encounter with the animal, that it 'uses' the animal 
in more that the most obvious sense, yet wishes to make that articulation as appropriate 
to the animal itself as possible. This leads to a problem: how can we encounter the 
animal on its own terms when on the whole we think of animals as lacking terms in 
which they can understand themselves? The only safeguard that seems to come to hand 
is a frequently disingenuous attempt to avoid'reading in' our own concerns, which more 
often than not involves nothing more than sticking to a set of pre-prescribed and 
dogmatically held terms laid down for properly scientific investigation. 
Secondly, there is still today and perhaps more prevalent than ever, the 'romantic' 
encounter with living nature. This is often seen as nothing more than an encounter 
which forsakes the scientific attempt to guard itself against 'reading in' our own terms. 
Taken further, it is a deliberate refusal of the safeguarding measures which scientific 
investigations prize. It allows for a 'personal' encounter with the animal. Yet it is 
precisely here, where we hope to open ourselves to other possibilities that we find, as 
science always feared, everywhere only ourselves in the animal and the animal in 
ourselves. A great deal of popular interest in animals revolves around this mutual 
mirroring. Every aspect of our own behaviour is supposed to be legitimated and 
explained when we come across it elsewhere in the animal kingdom, whilst those 
animals which should be most unfathomable to us are suddenly brought into a 
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comfortable familiarity with an analogy to our own building, herding, tool using or 
mating behaviour. Such two-way comparisons, which are somehow supposed to give us 
instant orientation and insight no matter which way round they are presented to us, 
remain strangely unsatisfying. The unfathomable mystery of nature, which romanticism 
hopes to protect from the penetrative grasp of science, reverts immediately into the most 
banal familiarity. In the end, instead of grounding an understanding of the strange upon 
the familiar, such analogies make everything equally strange and familiar and tell us 
nothing about ourselves or the animal. 
Ecological political theory and environmental philosophy is also caught in the tension 
between these two types of encounter. The literature is pervaded by the distinction 
between 'anthropocentric' and 'ecocentric' approaches. The reason that I have chosen not 
to follow this nomenclature but to term these two poles of the contemporary encounter 
with living nature 'scientific' and 'romantic' is to bring out the fact that what is at stake 
here is a tension that informs our everyday lives and is only mirrored in these theoretical 
debates. Furthermore, it becomes easier to see from this broader perspective that they 
are not mutually exclusive experiences, but rather that they mutually implicate one 
another. 
This can be demonstrated in a preliminary way when we note that even as scientific 
encounter strives for objectivity, it must at the very least declare an interest in the region 
of beings which it identifies as its area of concern. The romantic encounter, meanwhile, 
apparently gives free reign to subjectivity and feeling, only to discover that it has left 
the encounter altogether to endlessly revel in the repeating patterns of its own familiar 
sentiment. Yet each of these popularly conceived scenarios easily reverses or flips over 
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into its opposite upon closer inspection. It was Kant who saw that the scientific notion 
of objectivity could be secured only by grounding the conditions of objecthood in the 
subject. On the other hand, in the Critique of Judgement, it was Kant too who saw that 
the feelings aroused by nature, of pleasure at indeterminability (beauty) and fear and 
awe at unfathomable scale (sublimity), arise because nature escapes and remains beyond 
the conditions of objecthood, that is, it escapes the conceptual nets and snares of the 
subject. This inspired a whole generation of romantic philosophy of nature, which far 
from being a pure sentimentalism that reduces our relation with nature to what we feel 
about it, has its core in the idea that nature fundamentally escapes the subject and that it 
is this that affects the subject so greatly. 23 
23 Merleau-Ponty discusses various conceptions of nature similar to those that I am discussing here in his 
first lecture course on 'Nature' from the College de France 1956-1957. He contrasts the 'humanist' 
conception of nature beginning with Kant to the 'romantic' conception initiated by Schelling. lie then 
goes on to discuss the relation of modem science to nature. That science, he claims, is able to 
critically take up its own ontology and he argues that Ileidegger is wrong to suggest that no science is 
able to do so. As an organised body of experience it also forms a crucial inroad for our thinking of 
nature, which then becomes the basis for Merleau-Ponty's thinking of animality in his second lecture 
course and of the human body in his third course. It would be an important and illuminating study to 
compare these courses to Heidegger's Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, especially considering 
that both thinkers are grappling with the relation of philosophy to natural science and the close 
proximity of the examples that each takes up. However, it seems to me that the linear presentation of 
Merleau-Ponty's exposition, moving towards the human body from the nature of space and time does 
harbour the danger, if not of a teleology, then of of a one way movement of thought which 
undermines some of his best insights. This is, I hope to show, one of the things which Heidegger tries 
to avoid in his circling around the problem of animality. See, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Nature: Course 
Notes from the College de France, trans. Robert Vallier (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 
2003) 
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So scientific investigation and romantic encounter are not mutually exclusive. On the 
contrary, they constantly pervade and threaten one another. They are each in themselves 
pervaded by an inner tension which is only symbolised in their antagonism towards one 
another. This tension resolves itself into a circularity in which every attempt we make to 
open ourselves to the alterity of the animal and encounter it on its own terms revolves 
around into a moment of self-recognition as we recognise our own terms as the terms on 
which the meeting takes place. We find ourselves circling around the animal, revolving 
by turns into a scientific and romantic moment, which immediately tumbles around into 
its opposite. It is precisely this circular movement which Heidegger identifies as the 
inevitable and inescapable movement of any encounter with the animal. 
In his 1929/30 lecture course The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics Heidegger 
struggles to maintain a sense of this encounter, rather than to overcome it. At the 
beginning of the second part of the lecture course he explicitly directs our attention 
towards this circular movement on two separate occasions. In §43 it arises from the 
posing of two fundamental difficulties to be faced in an exposition of world that takes 
its lead from a phenomenology of animality: 'I. What are we to determine the essence 
of life in general as? 2. How are living beings as such- the animality of the animal and 
the plant-character of the plant- originally accessible? ' (FCM, 179/266) At first this 
appears to be a familiar difficulty. How are we to allow our methodology to be directed 
by the character of the beings which are to be investigated, when the methodology is 
required in order to have any access to those beings in the first place? This variety of 
hermeneutic circle is to be found in any investigation, although we shall see that 
Heidegger assigns a particular significance to it in this instance. Once again in §45, after 
he has put forward the guiding thesis that the animal is `poor in world', Heidegger 
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pauses to consider how any such proposition could be justified: `Here I merely wish to 
point out the peculiar character of the proposition in question and the manner in which 
ordinary understanding approaches such propositions. We must take them from the 
relevant science (here zoology) and, at the same time, we try to use them to first secure 
a specific domain for the science in question and thus to secure its possibility as a 
science. Thus it is that we find ourselves moving in a circle. ' (FCM, 187/276) Far from 
simply reinforcing the traditional view of philosophy of science, in which philosophy 
can conceptually ground scientific investigation, Heidegger here points out one of the 
inherent difficulties with proposing such a task for philosophy. If philosophy were to 
attempt anything like a grounding of the investigations of zoology it would have to take 
its lead from zoology as to the methods and object of that science, and thus not simply 
posit the existence of such a science, but engage with the actual content of zoological 
research, which presupposes that the research is underway prior to its conceptual 
foundation. On the other hand, were philosophy to seek some kind of verification for its 
own propositions in the sciences it would find itself moving in the exactly the same 
circle in the other direction. We cannot remove ourselves from this circularity if we 
wish to maintain the possibility of encounter with animality, although Heidegger 
imagines the response that such a suggestion will receive from those unwilling to 
entertain any circularity in thought: `But going around in circles gets us nowhere. 
Above all, it makes us feel dizzy, and dizziness is something uncanny. We feel as though 
we are suspended in the Nothing. Therefore there must be no such circling and thus no 
circle in philosophy! ' (FCM, 180/266-7) 
Yet the way in which we are to maintain ourselves in this circular movement of thought 
is not indeterminate. The circle must not only be maintained but maintained in a specific 
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manner. Hermeneutics has perhaps taught us to put up with a certain amount of 
dizziness. We are willing to maintain ourselves in the circle in the hope that its 
centrifugal force will expand the horizon of our understanding. The force of 
Heidegger's circling movement, on the other hand, is quite the opposite: `The only thing 
that ordinary understanding can see in this circling motion is the movement around the 
periphery which always returns to its original point of departure on the periphery. Thus 
it misses the decisive issue here, which is an insight into the centre of the circle as such, 
an insight made possible in such a circling movement and in this alone. For the centre 
only manifests itself as such as we circle around it. ' (FCM, 180/267) The importance of 
this view towards the centre is reiterated some pages later: `The essential feature of the 
circular movement of philosophy does not lie in running around the periphery and 
returning to the point of departure. It lies in that view of the centre that this circular 
course alone can provide. The centre, that is, the middle and the ground, reveals itself as 
such only in and for the movement that circles it. ' (FCM, 187/276) The centripetal force 
that philosophy generates turns our view towards the centre, which in this case is the 
place of encounter with the animal. Although it is the middle and the ground, it is by no 
means a solid ground upon which we can anchor ourselves before the encounter. If the 
movement of thought desists, then there is no longer any centre and no place of 
encounter itself takes place. The centre is a place already charged with that tension that 
is the source of the ambiguity of ordinary understanding and the various contemporary 
encounters with animality. It is only by moving in this circle, but with a view to the 
centre, that we can hope to transform our everyday understanding of animality. That 
would by no means dispel the ambiguity, but it might allow it to manifest itself in ways 
which are not violently expressed and ultimately repressed by attempts to anchor our 
animal encounters in a particular moment or segment of the circle. Any attempt at 
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transformation which does not first catch sight of the centre is liable to fall into just 
such a logic of repression. If we form the desire to find solid ground and refuse the 
movement of life cycles, then rather than enabling its transformation we are liable to 
destroy the encounter altogether. Furthermore, if we were to dialectically overcome the 
tension that led to the circular movement in the first place, then the centre of encounter 
would disappear altogether. Heidegger expresses his opposition to the overcoming of 
circularity and ambiguity in philosophy in the strongest terms, suggesting that, 'All 
dialectic in philosophy is only the expression of an embarrassment. ' (FCM, 187/276) 
However, for Heidegger himself by the time of the lecture course of 1929/30, Dasein's 
relation to the animal finds itself in a widely recognised indeterminacy, the source of 
which it has not been easy to identify. Dasein's encounters with beings in general are 
divided into two prevailing types: encounters with `intraworldly' beings and encounters 
with other Dasein. In the Basic Problems of Phenomenology Heidegger states this with 
particular clarity: `Because being-in-the-world belongs to the basic constitution of 
Dasein, the existent Dasein is essentially being-with (Mitsein) others and being-among 
(Seinbei) intraworldy beings. "' Being and Time had already left us with the difficulty of 
24 The Basic Problem of Phenomenology, trans. Albert Hofstadter. Indiana University Press, 1982) p. 
278. Interestingly, at the very beginning of the Twenties, Heidegger held a lecture course in Freiburg 
with an almost identical title (GA 58 Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie 1919/20), in which he 
points us towards a threefold structure of 'factical life', what will later become the analytic of Dasein. 
There factical life is divided into Self-world (Selbstwelt), With-world (Mitwelt) and Environing-world 
(Umwelt) (GA 58, § 10). During the course of the Twenties this structure is simultaneously reduced 
and given greater complexity. Self-world, a structure which is in danger of reverting back to a 
transcendental ego, becomes co-extensive with With-world and Surrounding-world, since Dasein's 
being is being-in-the-world. The being which is `in each case mine' only comes across something like 
a self through specific modifications of its With-world and Surrounding-world. With these 
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locating a place for animality in its analytic of Dasein. Animals certainly are 
encountered as ready-to-hand `equipment'. Animals are bred and raised as part of an 
equipmental totality. Yet animals also give us a decisive argument against any reading 
of `equipmentality' which would understand this environing world as the result of 
purely human productivity or as advocating a pragmatist ontology: `Animals also occur 
within the world without having been raised at all; and, in a way, these entities still 
produce themselves even when they have been raised. So in the environment certain 
entities become accessible which are always ready-to-hand, but which, in themselves, 
do not need to be produced. ' (BT, 100/70) So animals and living nature refer us back to 
the `double source' of all equipment which Aristotle already recognised, that all 
equipment in a way produces itself, is `natural' and may also be produced artificially. 
What concerned Heidegger here was that an appreciation of either source is lost when 
nature is understood as pure presence-at-hand. Furthermore, we only encounter the 
`production of nature' through an appreciation of equipmentality. So the problem of the 
self-productivity of nature is to some extent covered over by and at the same time first 
made accessible through the analysis of environment as equipmental totality. Hence the 
equipmental totality of our everyday environment hints at a nature which it cannot fully 
disclose, a nature which, "`stirs and strives', which assails us and enthrals us as 
landscape. " Yet we should be particularly careful when it comes characterising this 
further sense of nature: `Here, however, "Nature" is not to be understood as that which 
is just present-at-hand, nor as the power of Nature (Naturmacht). ' (BT, 100/70) It 
remains, however, less than entirely clear how it is to be understood. By emphasising 
that access to nature is gained through an insight into equipmentality, Heidegger blocks 
a view to what will later become of greatest importance to him in thinking living nature, 
`modifications' come all the complexities which are worked through in Being and lime and lecture 
courses of the later Twenties. 
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the `power' of nature, or rather the potentialities specific to living nature, which will be 
our topic in chapter 2.25 
On the other hand, there are certain indications even in Being and Time that another 
possibility for encountering the animal remains, an encounter which is perhaps closer to 
being-with than being-amongst. Certainly there is no suggestion that the animal could 
ever have the structure of Dasein. Yet any ontology of `mere life' requires first the 
fundamental analytic of Dasein. It is, he claims, a `privative' ontology. In Being and 
Time the thought of a privative ontology of life is brought into play at two key moments. 
Firstly, where Heidegger distinguishes the analytic of Dasein from `Anthropology, 
Psychology and Biology': `The ontology of life is accomplished only by way of a 
privative interpretation; it determines what must be the case if there is to be anything 
like mere life (Nur-noch-leben). Life is not a mere Being-present-at-hand, nor is it 
Dasein. In turn, Dasein is never to be defined ontologically by defining it as life (in an 
ontologically indeterminate manner) plus something else. ' (BT, 75/50). Then later, when 
Heidegger wants to distinguish his investigation of the `being-in' of `being-in-the- 
25 An important note in the essay On the Essence of Ground (PM p. 370 note 59, WM p. 155, note 55), 
refers to the fact that 'nature is apparently missing' in the analytic of Dasein. Here Heidegger hints at 
the possibility of developing an understanding of nature 'in a more originary sense' than that which 
predominates in natural science and that which is discovered in the analysis of equipmentality. 
Heidegger even goes so far as to explain that this absence in Being and Time is, `due to the fact that 
nature does not let itself be encountered either within the sphere of the environing-world, nor in 
general as something towards which we comport ourselves. ' The encounter with an originary nature as 
that which we are in the midst of is precisely the encounter which Heidegger hopes to initiate in The 
Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics. This goes a long way towards explaining the absence of any 
substantive analysis of the environing-world in that text, something which had formed the core of 
almost all Heidegger's philosophical writings in the preceding decade. Dasein now finds itself in the 
midst of nature, rather than being-amongst intraworldly beings. 
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world' from the ontologically indeterminate notion of environment current in biology: 
`Yet, even as an a priori condition for the objects which biology takes for its theme, this 
structure itself can be explained philosophically only if it has been conceived 
beforehand as a structure of Dasein. Only in terms of an orientation towards the 
ontological structure thus conceived can `life' as a state of Being defined a priori, and 
this must be done only in a privative manner. ' (BT, 84-85/58)26 Life is not Dasein nor 
can Dasein be analysed in terms of life, but life may appear within the analysis of the 
structure of Dasein. What is at issue, however, is which structure of Dasein gives us 
insight into our encounter with living nature. Is it the being-amongst, whether present- 
at-hand or ready-to-hand, or is it something like a being-with, if not exactly the being- 
with which we share with other Dasein? 
26 Macquarrie and Robinson add the interpretive note: 'The point is that in order to understand life 
merely as such, we must make abstraction from the fuller life of Dasein. ' Giorgio Agamben also finds 
a 'metaphysical play of presupposition and reference, privation and supplement, between animal and 
man' in Being and Time, see, The Open: Man and Animal, trans. by Kevin Attell (Stanford: Stanford 
Univesity Press, 2004) p. 50. Yet it seems strange that a text which insists so strongly that we can learn 
nothing about Dasein by interpreting it as an amalgam of mere life with an additional supplement 
should then suggest that we can learn something of mere life by disassembling just such an amalgam. 
In the 1939 lectures Zur Auslegung von Nietzsches 11. Unzeitgemässer Betrachtung Heidegger writes 
concerning this passage: "`Being and Time" (p. 58) said: The determination of the being of life- the 
gathered joining (Gefüge) of this kind of being can be made, "only by way of privation" (From out of 
the interpretation of Da-sein). Some have grossly misunderstood this sentence and claim that it is 
attempting to say: Life is only a 'privation' of Da-sein, i. e. roughly: the animal is a lacking and lower 
level man! No, the animal is never man, but rather 'animal'. But the question concerns the possibility 
of determining the animality of the animal through man (durch den Menschen)! " (GA 46, p. 243) It is 
exactly this problem of concerning ourselves with the animality of the animal itself, yet not being able 
to do so by turning away from our own being, which forms the central problem addressed by the 
'privative ontology' of The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics. 
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We can make this problem of encountering animality a little more precise and avoid the 
temptation to turn the structures of Dasein which Heidegger describes in Being and 
Time into immutable categories, if we consider precisely what is involved in the idea of 
'encounter'. The word itself seems to contain within it a trace of the tension which I am 
trying to elaborate. To en-counter is to enter in or be drawn into a meeting, but a 
meeting which at one and the same time offers some counter or resistance. We are not 
given open access, but we are drawn in enough to feel the weight of the counter. In 
German the countering is very clear in the word which Heidegger often employs for 
encounter, Begegnis. This could be contrasted to the term which in Being and rime 
describes the way that Dasein is drawn into its intra-worldy care, involvement or 
Bewandtnis. Countering and involvement form a pair which make up the irreducible 
tension of encounter. Of course, in Being and Time Heidegger offers a well known 
criticism of Max Scheler's argument that our primary engagement with the world is in 
coming up against it as resistance. In order to experience the world as something which 
resists me, something must already have been made manifest which I am 'out for': 'The 
experiencing of resistance- that is, the discovery of what is resistant to ones 
endeavours- is possible ontologically only by reason of the disclosedness of world' (BT, 
253/210) There is certainly a sense, as we shall see, in which the encounter with 
animality two years later will bring the phenomenon of resistance to the fore once 
again? ' Nevertheless, it will remain a phenomenon, so that the ontological value of 
27 For two readings which suggest that Heidegger's criticism of Scheler ultimately proves to be too 
partial, see. Kenneth W. Stikkers, 'Value as Ontological Difference' and Philip Blosser, 'Scheler's 
Theory of Values Reconsidered', both in Phenomenology of Values and Valuing, (The Hague: Kluwer 
Academic Publishers, 1997). Frank Schalow argues that Scheler's point arises again as a implicit 
critique of the analysis of Being and Time with Heidegger's introduction of the concept of earth in the 
following decade. Frank Schalow, The Incarnality of Being: The Earth, Animal, and the Body in 
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resistance, if it is to gain any further significance will have to be incorporated into the 
phenomenality of the world and removed from the ontology of will which formed the 
context within which Heidegger developed his critique; something that was already 
begun in Being and Time by the analysis of truth as disclosedness. Ultimately, however, 
it will not be a question of deciding whether it is Scheler or Heidegger who was correct 
with regards the primordiality of resistance in our encounter with the world. Rather, I 
would suggest, the controversy itself can be seen as another symptom of the primordial 
tension in encounter. When it comes to our encounters with living nature it is neither a 
sheer resistance nor an open invitation that confronts us. Rather, we are drawn into a 
circle of invitation and resistance, which will have different points of departure and 
emphasis depending upon the creatures encountered and the situation in which they are 
encountered. 
In the context of the anomaly which animal encounters seem to present for Heidegger's 
understanding of intra-worldly involvement, much attention has been paid to the 
discussion of being-towards-death in Being and Time. Here Heidegger famously denies 
the potential of an authentic relation to death and even an inauthentic 'demise' or 
abdication of life (Ableben) to the animal. The animal can only 'perish' or come to an 
end (verenden). (BT, 291/247)28 Somewhat less attention has been paid to the 
Heidegger's Thought (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006) p. 93. Although this may 
certainly be the case for the description of earth in "The Origin of the Work of Art', I do not think it 
remains the case once earth is given its place as one of the four 'world regions'. It is precisely the 
encounter with animality which shows there to be what in the language of Being and Time would be 
called an equi-primordiality between resistance and involvement. 
28 In The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics Heidegger still insists that: `The touchstone for the 
appropriateness and originary character of every question concerning the essence of life lies in 
whether or not this question has adequately grasped the problem of death and whether or not it is able 
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subsequent point at which Heidegger re-opens the whole question of the kind of relation 
the animal has to the world and thus the kind of encounter which Dasein could have 
with the animal up for future examination: `It remains a problem in itself to define 
ontologically the way in which the senses can be stimulated or touched in something 
that merely has life, and how and where the Being of animals, for instance, is 
constituted by some kind of `time'. ' (BT, 396/346) He is in the process of interpreting 
the fundamental constitution of Dasein, Care, in terms of temporality. If Heidegger will 
always insist that it is 'death as death' that marks out Dasein from animals, there may be 
another temporality, that pertaining to living nature, which remains an enigma to us 
precisely because our temporalising is always marked by death in this way. 
This is the situation when Heidegger begins his phenomenology of living nature in The 
Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics. Animals and perhaps living nature in general 
to take it up into its own question concerning the essence of life in the correct way, and vice versa. ' 
(FCM p. 266/387) David Farrell Krell has brought to our attention just how thoroughly Heidegger's 
thought concerning the essence of life revolves around this point and he has placed in question some 
of the distinctions which Heidegger wants to maintain here. See, Daimon Life: Heidegger and Life- 
Philosophy(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992) esp. pp. 84-99. Yet since Heidegger's 
thinking of death is never the absence of life, but revolves around the working of a certain negativity 
within life, he goes on to add the following qualification to the touchstone of death: 'Of course it 
would be just as foolish to try to explain life from death as it would be to try to explain death from 
life. Nevertheless, on the basis of its apparent negativity as the annihilation of life, death does possess 
the methodological function of revealing the apparent positivity in the problem of life. ' (FCM 
p. 266/387) Death is then linked explicitly to the problem of the `motility of life'. I will therefore leave 
this question until chapter 2, where we will take up the potentiality specific to living nature and with 
that the form of negativity which belongs to that potentiality. In so doing we will be able to address 
Krell's objections, which are informed by a 'life-philosophy' which emphasises the positivity of the 
plenum of life. 
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are caught between the being of intra-worldly beings and the being of others. It may 
seem that Heidegger prejudices the outcome of this encounter by insisting on an 
confrontation with zoological accounts of animality. He explicitly insists that here he 
will restrict himself to the `scientific and metaphysical' mode of truth. (FCM, 204/300) 
However, it is significant that Heidegger does not fall back on the position which he had 
always maintained until then, that living nature can only be encountered as part of a 
referential totality or within an equipmental context. Nevertheless, he does still 
understand this as an encounter with a specific kind of intra-worldly being. At the same 
time this encounter is kept in tension with a sense of the animal as a being which 
almost falls outside of the world, or at least hovers at the edges of our understanding. 
The animal too describes a cyclical path around the place of encounter as a being which, 
if it does not itself articulate the world, is articulated by it. 
However, the tension does not appear first of all in this form. It appears in the attempt 
to do justice to the animal in its alterity whilst admitting the necessity of some 
articulation of that alterity. So we find, situated at either end of Heidegger's analysis of 
the essence of animality these two statements, which appear to contradict one another, 
but which in fact formulate two moments of the circular movement which we will 
attempt to pursue: 
What is lacking in all this is insight into the necessary task of securing 
above all else the essential nature of life in and of itself and a resolute 
attempt to accomplish this. 
(FCM, 192) 
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For we ourselves have also been in view all the time, whether we wanted to 
be or not, although not in the form of some arbitrary and contingent self- 
observation or in the form of some traditional definition of man. 
(FCM, 272) 
Before we attempt to trace this circle ourselves and perhaps catch a glimpse of the 
centre from a somewhat different angle to Heidegger, I want to make it clear that what 
he has in view here is not simply of great importance for understanding how he viewed 
the possibilities of dialogue between biology and philosophy at this pivotal point in his 
career. When he restricts himself to the `scientific and metaphysical' mode of truth, this 
is not a limitation to theoretical encounter in opposition to our practical dealings with 
animals. To show clearly that what is at stake here is also our political and ethical 
encounters with living nature, I will begin by examining two contemporary readings of 
Heidegger's encounter with animality by Jacques Derrida and Giorgio Agamben. In 
both of these readings the question of encounter becomes inseparable from its techno- 
scientific articulation. Furthermore, in both cases the practical encounter with animality 
is held in a tension between the ethical and political. That distinction has nothing to do 
with a division of the private and public spheres. It is a distinction between that part of 
our encounter with animality which attempts to do justice to the alterity of the animal 
and that part which understands the necessity of articulating alterity. It is in this tension 
that the ambiguity of the place of encounter manifests itself in both these readings, 
apparently so different in approach. This should not project us out of Heidegger's 
sphere of concern, but will hopefully aid us to reinsert ourselves there on our own 
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trajectory and with a view to catching our own glimpse of the centre, thus perhaps 
enabling us to initiate a transformation of our own relation to living nature. For the 
'centre' in question is not a stable and localisable source of value. It is only generated by 
the circling around one another of man and animal and disappears from view when 
colonised by either, as in the case in both 'anthropocentric' social environmentalism and 
'ecocentric' ecologism. Heidegger provides us with a 'non-centred' environmentalism, 
but one in which centres of meaning and value are generated as man and animal circle 
around and encircle one another. 29 
§3 Animal Alterity and its Articulation 
We have found ourselves caught in a tension between the force of the animal's own 
claim upon us and our own inevitable articulation of the animal's being. I have claimed 
that in The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics Heidegger will lead us towards the 
root of this everyday tension, that is, the essential character of Dasein's encounter with 
living nature. Before I attempt to make good that claim I want to explore two ways in 
which the tension in question has manifested itself in recent readings of Heidegger's 
account of animality. The interpretations in question are those of Giorgio Agamben in 
his essay The Open: Man and Animal and Jacques Derrida in his lecture entitled The 
Animal That Therefore I Am (More to Follow). These two readings take very different 
paths towards Heidegger's encounter with animality. However, upon closer examination 
29 For an extremely illuminating account of the development of noncentred ecological thought by 
various French theorists eliding the distinction between 'anthropocentric' and 'ecocentric' ecology 
which dominates the English-speaking literature see, Kerry H. Whiteside, Divided Natures: French 
Contributions to Political Ecology, (Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press, 2002). This is perhaps not 
surprising, I would suggest, given the unprecedented engagement with Heidegger's thought in post- 
war France, although Whiteside does not mention this connection. 
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I think that each reading can be seen to approach the issue from a point which requires 
supplement from the other. 
Agamben's interest in the problem of animality is clearly motivated by his broader bio- 
political concerns. In The Open he provides us with a condensed history of the 
theological, metaphysical, political and biological attempts to separate out human life 
from animal life. He argues that these separations and the whole economy of relations 
between man and animal depend upon a distinction which is maintained within 
ourselves between our humanity and animality. The locus classicus for the 
establishment of this caesura can be found in Aristotle's De Anima, in which Aristotle 
separates out the different faculties of the soul and nutritive life becomes the faculty to 
be found in all living beings. It is nevertheless still within the human soul that the 
distinctions between nutritive life and perceptive life and perceptive life and life bearing 
logos is first made. It is only then that we turn to plant life and see it as bearing the 
nutritive but not perceptive or logical faculties. Far more than serving as a basic concept 
for botany (where incidentally recent work has come more and more to appreciate the 
perceptive faculties of plants), we can see the functioning of the concept of nutritive or 
vegetative life as applied to man, above all in medical and political science. Thus, 
Agamben claims, when it comes to the encounter of man and animal it is always first of 
all and primarily the encounter with the animal 'in us' which is at issue and which 
informs all other encounters with other living beings. 
What Agamben fails to do is adequately distinguish two senses of the `in us' when we 
say that our encounter with animality is always an encounter with the animality `in us'. 
He argues that any encounter with other animals is always articulated by our 
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understanding of our own being in part animal. For Heidegger too there is an important 
and undeniable sense in which any encounter with the animal would have to be `in us'. 
Yet it does not necessarily result from processes which lead to a split `within ourselves, ' 
between our own humanity and animality. The sense in which any encounter with the 
animal must be `in us' is not a function of our own supposed animality. Rather, it stems 
from the claim that any encounter of Dasein's will take the form of an 'existential', one 
of the structures that make up the various ways that Dasein is in the world. An 
encounter must take place `in us, ' to the extent we are the place, or at least intrinsically 
bound up with the place, the Da, which allows for encounters. But the phrase `in us' 
should not mislead us into thinking that any encounter for Heidegger would remain 
anthropocentric, in the sense that it would remain sealed within a human `point of 
view'. 
In The Fundamental Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy, a lecture course delivered in 
the summer semester of 1924, Heidegger attempts to draw out of Aristotle's De Anima a 
different sense of the 'in us' which determines our encounter with the animal. In that 
course the term `being-in-the-world' was not yet used exclusively to describe the way 
Dasein inhabits a world, but is also used to describe animal life. Yet there is already an 
important sense in which the animal as being-in-the-world can only be thought `in us': 
When one follows the distinction through then one must remember that the 
particular possibilities of being which the animal has come into, as Aristotle 
shows in his investigation of the being-character of life `De anima, ' do not 
simply stand next to those of man, but like all possibilities which the animal 
has, are in man there along-with (mit da), not lying next to one another, but 
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rather determined by the ousia of man, by his way of being in the world.. 30 
For Heidegger then, Aristotle does not simply dissect the soul on the operating table of 
humanity and then take the various dismembered parts as the measure for encounters 
with living nature. Our own possibilities for encounter determine the possibilities which 
we see in the animal, but determine them in a kind of co-determination which occurs in 
the encounter. It is only in this encounter, which remains determined by our own being 
that we can release the animal into its own distinctive possibilities, the possibilities 
which make up its being-in-the-world. Were we to desire the absolute purity of an 
encounter which has no articulation or is articulated only from the side of the animal, 
then there would be no encounter at all. We will see that Heidegger's aim in The 
Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics is still the elaboration of this thought which he 
draws out from Aristotle's text: to think animality from out of the encounter so that the 
animal and man do not simply stand next to one another with their similarities and 
differences. The claim on the part of the animal, the claim of the animal upon us to try 
to think animality on its own terms becomes all the more pressing precisely at this 
moment when we are faced with the animal's refusal to provide us with a set of ready- 
made terms that we can take with us to every encounter. 
Heidegger's analysis in this 1924 lecture course, in so far as it remains fixed upon the 
determination of the particular possibilities of man and especially the levels of 
wakefulness to the Open (Da) which are achieved by man and animal, is still caught up 
in the determination of levels of being. Nevertheless, as the passage cited above shows, 
he begins to free us and animal life from the bonds of this chain of being. Here begins 
the deconstruction of the Aristotelian encounter with the animal, in which it will no 
30 GA 18 p. 53 
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longer be a matter of laying out the possibilities and capabilities of animals and human 
beings next to one another and especially not a matter of adding particular sets of 
capabilities to others to reach a determination of any particular creature. Rather, 
Heidegger will try to understand what capability means in each case. The first step 
towards that goal nevertheless involves an admission that any understanding will take 
place within Dasein, since Dasein is the very openness to the world which allows for 
understanding. Without an articulation, which does indeed bring with it the threat of 
imposition, there will be no encounter at all. The deconstruction of our drive to lay out 
beings for a comparative analysis in terms of levels of capability will not be completed 
in the lecture course of 1924, but that course does prepare an ongoing attempt to think 
an encounter with the animal which does not function in this manner. 
Is it not the case that the deconstruction of the distinctions with which we articulate our 
separation and relation to animals needs to be brought to bare in the encounters 
themselves? Does Agamben pay enough attention to the everyday, the unexpected and 
the unique animal encounters which, whilst certainly shaped by our own bio-political 
articulations, can only be reshaped and called into question within the encounter? 
Although he longs for a 'between' which is no longer subject to these articulations, 
Agamben risks blocking the circular trajectory of encounter and thus making the 
reshaping of its articulations impossible. I will discuss a particular aspect of this danger 
in chapters 3 and 4 below. For now, let us turn to a somewhat different reading of the 
situation. 
In The Animal That Therefore I Am (More to Follow) Jacques Derrida describes an 
encounter in which he is looked at by a cat, looked at and even appealed to, by a cat 
whilst he stands face to face with it: 
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If I say "it is a real cat" that sees me naked, it is in order to mark its 
unsubstitutable singularity. When it responds in its name (whatever respond 
means, and that will be our question), it doesn't do so as an exemplar of a 
species called cat, even less so of an animal genus or realm. It is true that I 
identify it as a male or female cat. But even before this identification, I see it 
as this irreplaceable living being that one day enters my space, enters this 
place where it can encounter me, see me, even see me naked. Nothing can 
ever take away from me the certainty that what we have here is an existence 
that refuses to be conceptualised. 3' 
Derrida may steadfastly hold on to this certainly, but it is clear that in order to do so he 
must constantly fend off conceptualisations. For the refusal of conceptualisation on the 
part of this singular existence is rarely even noticed, precisely because it is all too easily 
conceptualised in all of the ways which Derrida alludes to in this passage. 
Derrida, interestingly and perhaps surprisingly, tries hard to hold on to this moment of 
pure encounter, this unsubstituable singularity which refuses conceptualisation. He does 
not dismiss such a thought out of hand. But he will not be able to maintain it in its 
purity. The very nakedness of the encounter betrays itself. This is a bare encounter, a 
face to face in which I am exposed to the Other in all my vulnerability. Thus Derrida 
describes an encounter which is supposed to recall the naked ethical encounter of the 
face-to-face as described by Emmanuel Levinas. Such animal encounters, as is well 
known, always remained problematic for Levinas himself. 32 Yet Derrida is well aware 
31 `The Animal that therefore I am (More to follow)' in Animal Philosophy: Ethics and Identity p. 116 
32 For attempts to push Levinas to the limit on the issue of an animal encounter see, The Middle Voice of 
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that even in this encounter, where one is apparently divested of all the masks which can 
seem to be sealed over the face in an encounter with another person, the encounter 
cannot be utterly bare. His very nakedness articulates his response. He feels an 
unaccountable shame in the face of the cat's look. Furthermore, a true nakedness would 
not be felt as such. This nakedness and exposure to the Other is felt as the unveiling of 
the self which would usually be clothed by all manner of techniques, not least by 
conceptual apparatus of identification and recognition when faced with an animal. But 
when Derrida claims that before all of that there is the singularity of an animal which 
demands a response, one wonders where this priority comes from. The naked encounter, 
the bare face-to-face, is denied to us in its purity as soon as we recognise it as such. 
Derrida begins with something like the pure encounter which Agamben thinks is denied 
to us by bio-political machinations. Yet this encounter is already masked by a myriad of 
articulations and it is even articulated as bare encounter. So there seems to be a possible, 
indeed inevitable, movement from the ethics of the encounter to the politics of its 
articulation and vice versa. For Derrida this movement takes place in an almost 
emblematic fashion precisely where Levinas was not even sure that any genuine 
encounter could take place, in an encounter with the animal. Nevertheless, whilst 
Derrida, like Agamben, is caught up in the movement between the ethics of encounter 
and politics of articulation, we have to wonder if its impetus can carry us far enough. 33 
Ecological Conscience, A Chiasmic Reading of Responsibility in the Neighbourhood of Levinas. 
Heidegger and Others (Basingstoke: MacMillan, 1991) pp. 49-67, David Wood, Thinking after 
Heidegger (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2002) pp. 135-152 and Animal Philosophy: Ethics and Identity, 
ed. Matthew Calarco and Peter Atterton (London: Continuum, 2004) pp. 47-61 
33 This, for example, is David Wood's concern in reading Derrida's encounter with his cat, that the 
singularity of the encounter will remain just that and will be unable to address the ecological politics 
which at once articulate that encounter and demand a responsive transformation in that very 
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If Agamben begins with the machinations that politically articulate an encounter before 
it has even taken place, Derrida begins with a face to face whose articulation is stunted 
by his prior certainty that what is truly important in the encounter cannot be 
conceptualised. Each moves in the direction of the other but fails to turn full circle. 
What Heidegger will allow us to see, if we in turn trace his account of animality in The 
Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, is that when we find ourselves caught between 
these two possibilities we must not attempt to escape by fleeing in one direction or the 
other. What needs to occur in order for us to arrive at an appropriate comportment to the 
animal and eventually living nature as a whole is that we are able to trace back this 
tension to its root in the place of encounter. 
Derrida expresses the hope at one point in his meditation that we will come to be able to 
encounter the animal in a way whereby its lack of language, its lack of its own terms, 
will not be understood as privation. 34 He still seems to hold fast to the idea of a certain 
unwanted and unnecessary negativity which this concept betrays, an idea which he first 
expressed in Of Spirit. Yet were he to succeed in this desire then he would not transform 
our relation to the animal but would destroy it altogether. For Heidegger, as I hope now 
to show, poverty is no longer the name of an undue negativity which constantly betrays 
an allegiance to the hierarchisation of beings. Poverty becomes the name for the tensed 
structure, or rather circular trajectory, of animal encounters. 
§4 Impoverished Empathy 
articulation. David Wood `Thinking with Cats' in Animal Philosophy: Ethics and Identity, ed. 
Matthew Calarco and Peter Atterton (London: Continuum, 2004) pp. 129-44 
34 Ibid p. 126 
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We can now turn to the 1929/30 lecture course itself and pursue the circular trajectory 
which we have identified, with an eye towards the place of encounter at the centre of the 
circle thus described. This 'centre', however, does not form the heart of Heidegger's 
account but remains on the periphery, in the midst of what appear to be merely 
methodological concerns. 
i) Comparative Examination and the Problem ofAccess 
The most striking of these `methodological' features is Heidegger's claim to be 
conducting a comparative analysis of the `worlds' of stone, animal and man. He 
contrasts this method to two other methods which he had previously employed in order 
to try to bring to light the phenomenon of world. In 1929, just before he gave this 
course, he used an historical method in On the Essence of Ground, to trace the concept 
of kosmos through mundus to 'world'. In Being and lime he attempted, `to provide a 
preliminary characterisation of the phenomenon of world by interpreting the way in 
which we at first and for the most part move around in our everyday world. ' (FCM, 
177/262), that is, the analysis of the modes of `being-amongst' beings which operate in 
our environing-world. Both of these approaches, the phenomenological analysis of our 
everyday being-in-the-world and the tracing of the history of concepts which inform 
that analysis, are familiar to us as complimentary and mutually necessary aspects of 
Heidegger's hermeneutic phenomenology of world up until 1929. That is why it comes 
as something of a surprise that Heidegger now proposes a third path of investigation- 
'the path of comparative examination'. 
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The idea of a comparative examination as a way of gaining access to the phenomenon 
of world is surprising primarily because it seems to assume that the world is already 
manifest to us. Does a comparative examination not require that various varieties of 
world, or ways of having world, can be laid out before us for inspection? Is this not 
precisely the kind of dissection and classification of worldhood which I have just 
claimed Heidegger tries to deconstuct? The previously employed historical method was 
perhaps comparative in some sense, but Heidegger's understanding of historicity makes 
it clear from the start that the concepts of world so compared did not simply succeed 
one another, but rather interpenetrate, whilst each brings to the fore and covers over 
different aspects of the problem of world which Heidegger was attempting to expose. 
The comparative examination now being proposed, on the other hand, seems to invite 
the kind of dogmatic assertions about levels of being which we are trying to avoid. The 
problem is exacerbated when the `guiding theses' of the examination are proposed: The 
stone is worldless; the animal is poor in world; man is world-building. (FCM, 177/263 
& 184/272) What could be more arbitrary than to take up these theses, of all the 
possible theses which could guide a comparative examination? Nevertheless, what this 
examination will never be is a `presentation, ' a setting out of the three relations to world 
for point by point comparison. 
My claim will be that the thesis of world-poverty cannot in the end be a thesis about the 
animal 'in itself. That is because the animal is not itself when considered outside of its 
encounters. That is not an epistemological thesis which claims that we cannot know 
what the animal in itself is, but an ontological thesis which claims that the very being of 
the animal is informed by its encounter with Dasein. This is not to say that 'before' or 
'outside' of these encounters the being of the animal is marked by a lack that is only 
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filled by its encounter with man. If the being of the animal is marked by privation of 
some kind then it is to be found in this encounter with Dasein. The thesis of world- 
poverty concerns the encounter between man and animal, beings with fundamentally 
different modes of encounter. That is what gives this particular encounter its uncanny 
quality. For which mode is to prevail so that one would know whether to say 'I 
encounter the animal' or 'The animal encounters me'? Heidegger is not always 
completely clear about this, frequently claiming that the thesis of `world-poverty' is a 
determination of the animality of the animal. This must be taken as a defence against 
any reading which would understand `world-poverty' as `mere projection, ' as having 
nothing to do with the animal 'itself', but only our subjective view of the situation. The 
`thesis' certainly does say something about the animal, but it does so only as an 
articulation of the encounter. 
The question now becomes one of access. Rather than simply assuming that a 
comparative examination is possible Heidegger witnesses the transformation of the 
chosen method into an apparently uncircumventable problem. We must already 
approach the substantive question of what kind of being belongs to the animal, the stone 
and the human being as we raise the methodological question of whether we can 
transpose ourselves into those other beings. This is largely why Heidegger claims that 
these are not strictly speaking methodological questions at all, since that designation 
assumes a separation of methodological and substantive considerations. Although every 
methodological question must be intimately connected with the substantive matter, this 
is inescapably so in this case, since every initial approach already lands us in the middle 
of the substantive difficulties. That is also true of every philosophical investigation, qua 
philosophy. Heidegger remarks later that: `It is a unique characteristic of all 
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philosophizing in comparison with every scientific orientation that at the moment which 
proper philosophical knowledge is to emerge, what is decisive is not so much a taking 
hold of the matter, but appraising the standpoint of the investigation- and that has 
nothing to do with methodological reflections. ' (FCM, 287/415-416) Nothing to do with 
methodological reflections because that would already assume the strict division 
between methodological and substantive investigations, as though philosophy were 
simply a more elaborate and laborious preliminary to a scientific taking hold of the 
matter. Philosophy cannot take hold of the matter precisely because its `matter' is the 
standpoint. We should not let the proposed form of a `comparative examination' distract 
us from this point. Furthermore, although this is true of all `methodological' reflection, 
Heidegger claims that, `[H]ere this is the case in a quite exceptional sense. ' (FCM, 
201/295) An encounter with animality is a philosophical experience par excellence and 
that means that the science of biology presents a unique opportunity to turn science 
back towards thought. The question of access then, takes the form of a set of questions 
about the possibility of `transposition': `Thus when we ask about transposing ourselves, 
about the possibility of man's transposing himself into another human being, into an 
animal, or into a stone, we are simultaneously asking this question as well: what is the 
kind of being which belongs to these beings insofar as they permit, resist, or possibly 
forbid as entirely inappropriate any such self-transposition into them in each case? ' 
(FCM, 201/295-296) 
ii) Transposition 
The three questions then are as follows: Can we transpose ourselves into the animal? 
Can we transpose ourselves into the stone? Can we transpose ourselves into another 
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human being? What is remarkable about Heidegger's response to these questions is that 
he claims that only the question about the animal actually makes sense as a question. 
The other two questions actually turn out to be intrinsically nonsensical, although for 
very different reasons in each case. The question of transposition will therefore turn out 
to be a question unique to our encounter with the animal. 
The question concerning the animal makes sense as a question because we do not doubt 
that animals have dealings with what surrounds them. They carry with them, `a sphere 
offering the possibility of transposition. ' (FCM, 204/299) Yet, the question does not 
simply ask whether we can make some kind of sense out of what is being demanded of 
us here, but whether we can actually carry it through. Whether we can, `go along with 
the animal in the way in which it sees and hears, the way in which it seizes its prey and 
avoids its predators, the way in which it builds its nest and so forth. ' (FCM, 204/299) It 
is not clear that we will be able to do this, but we understand at least to some extent 
what is being asked of us. On the other hand, if we are asked to transpose ourselves into 
a stone that makes no sense. We do not say that it is impossible because we are not sure 
if we can accomplish it or how to go about it. Rather, we say it is impossible because we 
cannot make any sense of the demand. Or at least this is our usual response. In an aside 
which fundamentally challenges many of the assumptions at work here, Heidegger 
suggests that it is well within the power of Dasein to `animate' material things and even 
technical things. The two principle ways in which this can occur are myth and art. 
Furthermore, we should not imagine that these ways of encountering other beings are 
fantastical illusions as opposed to the reality of the scientific attitude. Myth and art are 
different kinds of truth. We should not even imagine that these possibilities are 
exceptional. They are unusual because our `natural' way of thinking has been 
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determined by scientific and metaphysical knowledge. Since this is the subject matter of 
the current investigation, Heidegger proposes to limit himself to these possibilities. This 
decision, although it can seem strangely artificial, actually forms one of the great 
strengths of this text. Heidegger works upon human existence as he finds it, determined 
by scientific and metaphysical knowledge. It is only later that the potential of other 
'kinds of truth' will really be explored. 
The question as to whether we can transpose ourselves into another human being turns 
out to be nonsensical for a very different reason. It does not make sense to ask whether 
we can transpose ourselves into other human beings because our way of existing 
involves our constantly and always already being 'transposed' in this way. It is clear to 
us in our everyday existence that others not only have the possibility of having the same 
comportment towards things, but that we can share a comportment without this 
experience being fragmented in the process. (FCM, 205/300) There is no problem here, 
nothing questionable about the very possibility of such a transposition. 
Yet is it not the case that here too, as with the animal, there is a question of whether we 
can actually carry through the transposition? In fact, these questions remain distinct. We 
intrinsically assume the possibility of transposing ourselves into the animal. But in the 
case of the other human being we do not even need to assume the possibility because 
we know that it is one of our essential characteristics: `Insofar as human beings exist at 
all, they already find themselves transposed in their existence into other human beings, 
even if there are factically no other human beings in the vicinity. Consequently the Da- 
sein of man means, not exclusively but amongst other things, being transposed into 
other human beings. ' (FCM, 205/301) Certainly there are difficulties, often severe, 
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which arise in our being with others. There are also achievements in our relationships, 
such as when we are able to share perspectives and empathise with the other. There are 
arguments and blank incomprehension when we are unable to do so. The problem is that 
we do not realise that these disappointments and achievements take place on the basis of 
our being transposed into the other, in a state of `inconspicuous and self-evident going 
alongside one another. ' (FCM, 206/302) Only on the basis of this going alongside are 
we able to come into conflict with others, to be utterly astounded by them, or even to 
find them simply unfathomable. It is because the problems and achievements are 
conspicuous, whilst their basis is so self-evident that it does not show up at all, that we 
are led to an utterly misleading view of how we exist alongside other human beings and 
are thus apt to mistake what is at stake in the questions about transposing ourselves onto 
the animal and the stone. 
The problems and achievements of our existence with one another are often understood 
as problems and achievements of `empathy'. It is theories of our being with one another 
which take their cue from empathy that Heidegger blames for some of our most 
entrenched and pernicious views about how human beings exist and the most persistent 
pseudo-problems in philosophy: `Philosophy has reinforced this illusion even further by 
propounding the dogma that the individual human being exists for him- or herself as an 
individual and that it is the individual ego with its ego-sphere which is initially and 
primarily given to itself as what is most certain. ' (FCM, 206/302) Theories of empathy, 
rather than bridging the space between isolated egos, end up digging a deeper trench, 
because they rely upon this illusory view of how human beings exist with one another 
for their very sense " 
35 It is above all Husserl's attempts to understand inter-subjectivity in terms of Einfühlung that 
Heidegger has in mind when voicing these objections. 
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What particularly concerns Heidegger about empathy when it is thought as a special 
ability to feel what the other feels is that it cannot do justice to the other, and that, 
especially in the case of the animal, it will end up being a, `premature psychological 
interpretation of the specific manner of being pertaining to the lizard... `empathetically' 
projecting our own feelings onto this animal. ' (FCM, 197/291) If we `feel ourselves in' 
to the place of the other we risk simply displacing them. Nevertheless, perhaps 
Heidegger is over hasty in rejecting empathy as a way to understand the problem of 
animality. That haste is based not upon an overall rejection but upon a prior and decisive 
incorporation and transformation of pathos in Heidegger's thought. Pathos is so 
overwhelmingly present in Heidegger's entire understanding of Dasein that no place 
remains for it as a special ability, such as the 'the ability to empathise'. Dasein is an 
empathic being through and through. 36 Its ability to be moved and taken along with 
those beings which it is amongst and those beings that it is with underlies all of its 
encounters. Yet what marks out Dasein from those beings which are simply subject to 
affects is an ability to take up its own disposition and to project itself into the 
enveloping atmosphere of a mood. This does not amount to an emotional voluntarism. 
Dasein does not simply choose its mood. But neither is it simply subject to its 
fluctuating disposition. It can take up its disposition and project itself into an attunement 
which does not simply affect it as an intra-worldly being, but affects the world which its 
very being is to be in. To enter into such an attunement would be em-pathy in a strict 
sense. 
36 The development of some of Heidegger's most important designations of the being of Dasein in Being 
and Time, including disposition (Befindlichkeit) and attunement (Stimmung) from out of the 
Aristotelian notion of pathosis made absolutely clear in Grundbegriffe der aristotelischen Philosophie 
GA 18, esp. § 18, pp. 20-21 and p. 26. 
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Is there not then a case for understanding the basis for our animal encounters as 
something like empathy? Not as a special ability, but as the name of an event which has 
to take place before an otherwise impossible encounter? Such an event would always 
remain superfluous in the case of the other human beings because we are always there 
already with those others. If empathy is a second order phenomenon in the case of our 
being-with other Dasein, perhaps it is the very ground for encountering the animal. In 
that case it would be an always uncertain ground, a ground created anew in each 
encounter. Heidegger will in the end also rely upon a specific kind of affect when it 
comes to being amongst living nature. The pathos which allows us to enter into the 
realm of animality is called forth in the word 'poverty'. 
iii) The Mood of Poverty as Empathy with the Animal 
The first part of The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics is taken up by an extensive 
analysis of the fundamental attunement of profound boredom. The awakening of this 
fundamental attunement is supposed to interrupt our everyday dealings with the world 
and allow us to to catch a glimpse of the world 'as whole. ' Yet the awakening of this 
mood is not confined to the preparatory phase of the investigation, to be used as a kind 
of 'step up' to the issue at hand. Rather, the mood awakened in the investigation informs 
all subsequent attempts to catch sight of the phenomenon of world. Heidegger only 
returns specifically to the attunement of boredom after his discussion of animality, when 
he comes to discuss the 'world-building' character of man. However, I think it can be 
shown that within this context the notion of 'poverty' has the primary signification of a 
'mood of poverty' and it is on this basis that I argue that a certain kind of empathy plays 
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the central role in our encounter with animality. 
In his comparative investigation Heidegger has put forward the thesis that the animal is 
'poor in world'. This does not mean that the animal is of a lower order than man. 
Animals have capacities which are beyond human beings, as Heidegger illustrates with 
the examples of the discriminatory capacity of the falcon's eye and the dog's sense of 
smell. (FCM, 194/286) Furthermore, there is no hierarchy between animals. Every 
animal is as complete as another. Being 'poor' in this context does not mean to simply 
lack a particular set of capacities nor to have a lesser degree of any particular capacity. 
Rather, it is an 'Entbehren', a 'deprivation, ' but also a 'doing without', to get along 
without. It is helpful to bear this in mind. 'Deprivation' is not the name of sheer lack but 
of a way in which something becomes lacking and does without. `Doing without' is a 
response to this deprivation, how one comports oneself in the given situation. It is this 
double characterisation of the how lack occurs and how it is responded to that 
Heidegger wants to direct our attention towards: 
Such deprivation (Entbehren) in turn is possible in different ways 
depending on how whatever is poor is deprived and comports itself to its 
deprivation, how it responds to the deprivation, how it takes this 
deprivation. In short: with regard to what such a being is deprived of and 
above all the way in which it is deprived, namely the way in which it is in a 
mood (zu Mute)-mood of poverty (Ar-mut). 
(FCM, 195/287) 
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What is strange about this passage is that Heidegger seems to shift from giving an 
explanation of what the phrase `poverty in world' is meant to tell us about the animal's 
world, to a description of how human beings can respond to deprivation. He is clear that 
he is now discussing a comportment of Dasein, a `mood of poverty' which is analogous 
to a `mood of melancholy' or a `mood of humility': 
This is meant to indicate that poverty is not merely a characteristic property, 
but the very way in which man comports and bears himself. Poverty in this 
proper sense of human existence is also a kind of deprivation and 
necessarily so. Yet from such deprivation we can draw our own peculiar 
power of procuring transparency and inner freedom for Dasein. 
(FCM, 195/288) 
A power peculiar to whom? A power peculiar to those human beings who comport 
themselves in a mood of poverty, a power which seems to distinguish us from other 
beings and empowers our Dasein. Yet that, it seems, is a power of self-distinction which 
is peculiar to human beings in general. It is strange indeed that in the elucidation of the 
concept of poverty, which is supposed to characterise the animal as opposed to man, 
there should be a turn towards this mood of poverty which is a peculiar power of 
Dasein. Heidegger excuses himself with the claim that we will not be able to understand 
the function of the term 'poverty' in the expression 'poor in world' through a linguistic 
analysis, but must turn to the animal itself, bearing in mind what we now know about 
poverty, that is, that it need not signify a simple quantitative difference, but rather how 
difference is taken up and responded to. Yet the concrete interpretation of the animal's 
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relation to its environment will not mitigate the problem which arises here as Heidegger 
hopes. If anything the problem of how the animal's 'poverty in world' relates to Dasein's 
'mood of poverty' becomes even more obscure following the investigation of animal 
environments which follows. 
Paragraph 63, which follows the analysis of the animal's environment which we will 
take up in the next section, is entitled 'An objection raised by ourselves to the thesis 
concerning the not-having of world as deprivation and poverty of the animal. Removing 
the force of the objection. ' The quite reasonable objection which Heidegger raises 
against his own approach is that once we come to understand the essence of animality 
'drawn from animality itself and maintained within the limits of animality', we will no 
longer be able to maintain the thesis that the animal is poor in world. The thesis 
encourages the apparently fanciful view that, 'if deprivation in certain forms is a kind of 
suffering, and poverty and deprivation of world belong to the animal's being, then a 
kind of pain and suffering would have to permeate the whole animal realm and the 
realm of life in general. ' (FCM, 271/393) Would that not be a blatant case of the so- 
called 'pathetic fallacy'? Perhaps such a thesis could be legitimated with the claim that it 
can serve to guide us towards the essence of animality per se. But surely poverty has 
nothing to do with animality in itself, which is why, `Biology knows absolutely nothing 
of such a phenomenon. Perhaps it is the privilege of poets to imagine this sort of thing. ' 
(FCM, 271/393) It is we, on the other hand, who are supposedly the positive side of this 
comparison, those who have world and are even 'world-building'. Heidegger then 
counters this objection by returning us to precisely the problem which he had hoped 
would be alleviated by the concrete interpretation of the animal environment: 'That is 
why, through the apparently purely negative characterisation of world in our 
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examination of the animal's not-having of world, our own proper essence has 
constantly emerged in contrast, even if not in any explicit interpretation. For we 
ourselves have also been in view all the time, whether we wanted to be or not, although 
not in the form of some arbitrary and contingent self-observation or in the form of some 
traditional definition of man. ' (FCM, 272/394-395) 
Can Heidegger really remove the force of his own objection? Our own proper essence, 
which is constantly at work behind the scenes of these specialised theoretical 
investigations into life, seems to be made to betray itself together with the animal which 
we thought we had encountered. What Heidegger's objection and subsequent response 
make clear is that we cannot avoid facing this difficulty. Furthermore, it is not a 
difficulty which requires resolution one way or the other, but a point at which 
philosophy finds its way back to the ineluctable tension that lies at the heart of the two 
types of encounter with which I began this chapter. It is an essential and unavoidable 
tension which any encounter with the animal must bear and from which it cannot 
remove itself without falling one way into anthropomorphism or the other way into 
obscurantism. 'Poverty' is the mood in which this tension bears down upon us and which 
can 'do without' a solution that would only dissolve the place of encounter. 
So Heidegger has not removed the force of the objection as promised. Rather, he tries to 
teach us to bear the tension of encounter, which must take place in all scientific and 
metaphysical investigations of life, but which those investigations can only experience 
as an objection: 'The thesis that 'the animal is poor in world' must remain as a problem, 
and one which we cannot broach now but which guides the further steps of our 
comparative investigation, i. e., the proper exposition of the problem of world. (FCM, 
273/396) The problem has not been broached if that would mean to resolve and 
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dissolve its problematic character, to finally discover whether world-poverty is an 
intrinsic characteristic of the animal itself or simply a projection of our own. But if the 
problem were to be broached in this way, then the tension which it embodies, a tension 
which is necessary for the encounter, would be broken. In the end the 'mood of poverty' 
is an atmosphere which envelops the encounter as such and belongs both to Dasein and 
to the animal in that encounter. The mood of poverty names above all, that original 
tension which leads us into the circularity of encounters with living nature. 37 
We can now return to the problem of transposition. When Heidegger poses the three 
questions: Can we transpose ourselves onto a rock? Can we transpose ourselves onto an 
animal? Can we transpose ourselves onto another human being?, it may sound as 
though 'transposition' has been presupposed as a general term for our encounter with 
any other beings and that the problem is only to discover those particular modes of 
transposition which apply in each case. However, what becomes apparent in the 
working out of these three questions is the very inappropriateness of assuming just such 
a general mode of encounter. What is at stake is an attempt to find a more adequate way 
to speak of what happens when we encounter the animal. 
A trans-position is a moving over of position, a changing of position and taking up of 
position elsewhere. It is somewhat like a change in 'point of view'. Although this does 
37 William McNeill comes across the very same problem when he identifies two forms of refusal at work 
in The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: 'I. The way in which things refuse themselves to the 
animal, so as to preclude it from attending to them as such; 2. The refusal on the part of the animal to 
allow our going along with it. ' The term 'poverty' thus marks for him the finitude which allows the 
other to be other in this encounter. See, VIsions: of Animals, Others and the Divine (Centre for 
Research in Philosophy and Literature at The University of Warwick: Research Publication Series, 
1993) p. 52 
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not lead immediately to the theories of ego and consciousness, we should already be 
wary of these connotations if we recall the understanding of Dasein which Heidegger 
worked out in Being and Time. Dasein never has a point of view, in its being it is never 
a point. Dasein is outside of itself, stretched between its being thrown and projection, so 
that just as there are no points in time but rather ek-stases which are shot through one 
another, so in its temporalising Dasein is ecstatic and never a point in time or space. The 
primary danger of speaking of 'transposition' is therefore that we understand human 
being in general as a position or point of view. 
Heidegger's other suggested formulation adds an important dimension and avoids some 
of the problems which a theory of transposition as a change of perspective or point of 
view harbours. Our being with the animal is now said to be a kind of 'going along with' 
the animal in its access to the world and its dealings with the world. It is a movement 
which tarries alongside the animal but does not displace it. Our being with the animal is 
a going along with the animal as it, `sees and hears, seizes its prey or evades its 
predators, the way it builds its nest and so forth' (FCM, 204/299) Amongst other things 
this formulation emphasises the continuous movement which belongs to the being of the 
animal, so that a going along with it is not just a single movement of transposition from 
one perspective to another. It is rather a continuous achievement, one which falls away 
as soon as our tarrying alongside the animal is discontinued. 
If we add to this the idea that the mood of poverty must be understood as an attunement 
that does not simply belong to us, but which must be entered and felt and to which we 
may come to belong, then animal encounters can be understood as empathic-going- 
along-with the animal. It is empathic, I want to insist, not because it requires us first of 
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all to attune our feelings to the feelings of the animal, but because the encounter itself, 
however successful or unsuccessful we feel it to be, involves a specific attunement, 
which has a very different function from the role of mood in our being-with other 
Dasein. This attunement, the atmosphere which envelops an encounter with living 
nature, is what Heidegger names poverty. It is the attunement which grounds the 
possibility of an encounter with the animal and remains an achievement, although not 
simply our achievement. It is an encounter which differs greatly from the `being-with' 
that we share with other human beings, which in a certain sense has always been 
achieved a priori. Thus the problems that we face in our being-with other human beings 
and our encounter with the animal are different in kind. On the one hand, we find 
ourselves in an originary communality of the non-individualised every-one (das Man) in 
which a certain attunement and modification is required simply to extract the 
individuality necessary for any 'other' to appear. On the other hand, when we face the 
animal, when we understand the animal to be looking back at us, it is not at all a matter 
of extracting ourselves from a prior communality. There is no 'being-with' the animal 
which we can rely on to form a background for our encounters. If we can empathise 
with other Dasein only once a fundamental attunement has allowed us to extract our 
being from theirs, we can feel the being of living nature in our being only if we can 
become empathically attuned to the dimension which the living beings that surround us 
inhabit. 
Do the terms which we choose to describe our encounter with the animal make such a 
difference? Is it so important that we allow the appropriateness of a certain call to 
empathy to be heard once again? Isn't it more important that we begin to do whatever it 
is that is to be done in order to gain a perspective on the animal in its animality and to 
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transform our comportment towards living nature? Does it make a significant difference 
how we describe what is to be done? Heidegger is convinced that it makes all the 
difference. It is not simply a matter of differing terminology, nor even a matter of 
refining terminology to more precisely describe a relation which does not change. 
Rather, the attempt to find an appropriate way to say what the encountering relation 
involves becomes at the same time the inception of its transformation: 'we find 
ourselves forced to adopt a new language because of a fundamental transformation of 
existence. Or to put it more precisely, this change transpires along with this new 
language. ' (FCM, 203/298) What looked like a preliminary methodological concern is 
actually the first crucial step towards the transformation of our relation to living nature. 
§5 Worlds Apart: Entering the Ecological Dimension 
I have been arguing that the way in which Dasein encounters living nature involves a 
circularity which manifests itself as the atmospheric tension in the mood of poverty. If 
we can learn to endure this tension and not to see it as objectionable in itself, then we 
may be able to enter into a more appropriate relation to living beings. Nevertheless, 
Heidegger will always maintain that human beings do not inhabit their surroundings in 
the same way as other living beings. It is this claim which has led many to accuse him 
of a certain obstinacy in the face of the biological 'facts'. A famous passage from the 
'Letter on Humanism', written fifteen years after the course we are now considering, 
seems to sum up what is problematic about his position: 
Of all the beings that are, presumably the most difficult to think about are 
living creatures, because on the one hand they are in a certain way most 
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closely akin to us, and on the other, they are at the same time separated from 
our ex-sistent essence by an abyss... Because plants and animals are lodged 
in their respective environments but are never placed freely in the clearing 
of being which alone is "world, " they lack language. But in being denied 
language they are not thereby suspended worldlessly in their environment. 
Still, in this word "environment" (Umgebung) converges all that is puzzling 
about living creatures. 38 
It is in this passage that many commentators find proof positive of Heidegger's own 
residual 'humanism' or even anthropocentrism. I want to suggest, on the contrary, that 
we find here far less of a final pronouncement about our relation to living nature. The 
'abyss of essence' is a name for the tension which has to be played out in all our 
encounters with living nature, it is the abyss in which we must maintain ourselves for 
any encounter to take place. 
Nevertheless, I have no wish to deny the problematic nature of Heidegger's continued 
allegiance to such an abyssal difference. It is precisely the problematic character of what 
is to be thought here that grips and puzzles Heidegger. Rather than simply deny certain 
facts about living beings he wants us to ask again whether we truly understand all of the 
'facts'. First of all, when we say that living beings live in relation to their natural 
environments, which is perhaps the primary 'fact' of all modern biology, do we really 
understand what we are saying? Furthermore, if we make the apparently traditional and 
well worn claim that the animal's relation to its environment is not one which involves 
language, do we know what that means? What Heidegger always emphasises when it 
comes to formulating any thesis concerning animality, is that it remains problematic. In 
38 `Letter on Humanism' in PM, p. 248, WM, pp. 157-8 
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order to see what he finds truly problematic here we need to trace back the position 
which is presented in the 'Letter on Humanism' to its formation in The Fundamental 
Concepts of Metaphysics. 
What then is the environment of a living being? First of all we need to point out that the 
'environment' in which all that is puzzling about living creatures converges, is not the 
same term as that which played a key role in Heidegger's analysis of Dasein's everyday 
involvement with the world in Being and Time. That environment was Dasein's Umwelt, 
its surrounding-world. It was therefore a particular modification of Dasein's being-in- 
the-world, the way in which Dasein most immediately and on the whole ('proximally 
and for the most part') encounters the world. This surrounding world forms the starting 
point for an analysis which hopes to penetrate into Dasein's worldhood in general and 
thus to understand environmentality as the everyday access point to that worldhood. 
Heidegger argues in Being and Time that to say man `has' an environment is 
meaningless unless we are able to say what this environment and this 'having' consist in. 
He even claims that biology can never define these terms but must always presuppose 
them. (BT, 84/58) In a note added to the text at a later date Heidegger goes even further. 
When it is a question of biology he asks: 'Is it right to talk about 'World' at all? [A world 
implied in the surrounding-world of the 'Umwelt'] Only environment! (Umgebung, 
given-surroundings). This 'giving' corresponds to the 'having'. Da-sein never 'has' 
world. ' (SZ, 441, note 58. a) It is these given-surroundings which form the locus for the 
specific mystery of the living creature described in the 'Letter on Humanism'. 39 
39 In fact Heidegger is content neither with the term surrounding-world (Umwelt) nor given- 
surroundings (Umgebung) to describe the environment of the living creature. There seems to be too 
much of a link between the `having' a world and surroundings being `given' up to us. In the 1946 
lecture course Towards the Interpretation of Nietzsches Second Untimely Meditation, Heidegger 
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Nevertheless, it is not a mystery which comes after the problem of articulating our own 
'having' of a world, but rather the living being is a being which takes a prominent place 
in our surrounding-world, so the two questions become inseparable. 
In The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics Heidegger is somewhat more generous to 
biology when it comes to allowing it some understanding of and ability to question the 
environmentality upon which it must base all its interpretations. Nevertheless he 
attempts to work out an understanding of the animal's environment which must in a 
sense come before all concrete experiment. Philosophy may then turn to concrete 
examples, but not straightforwardly for confirmation of its own concept of environment, 
for those examples only have meaning on the basis of interpretations bound up with that 
concept. If there is any confirmation then it will come only in the renewed vitality of 
our understanding of concrete examples on the basis of the conception of the animal 
environment which is to be developed. 
Heidegger names the conception of environment which he puts forward in this lecture 
course captivation (Benommenheit). This term suggests a lack of freedom, an 
enthralment to given surroundings. It also has etymological roots in the German word 
for behaviour- benehmen. Yet the concept as Heidegger develops it is not confined to 
these suggestive terminological allusions, but has quite a precise definition. Captivation 
has six distinguishing characteristics: 1. It involves the withholding of the manifestness 
of beings. The animal can behave but never apprehend something as something; 2. 
Captivation involves a 'being-taken' by instinctual behaviour; 3. The animal is absorbed 
in the totality of that instinctual behaviour; 4. The captivated animal is open to 
something else, to being affected within the ring of its instinctual drives; 5. The 
settles on the term `Surrounding-field-of-Captivation (Umfeld-Benommenheit) GA 46, p. 49 
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environment of the animal is not a 'rigid armour plate, rather it allows some leeway 
within the encircling of its instinctual drives. There is a 'struggling' (Ringen) within the 
encircling ring which characterises life itself and is at once attested to and covered over 
by such concepts as 'self-preservation' and 'adaptation'. Finally, 6. Captivation is the 
condition of the possibility of behaviour. It is the a priori structure which allows the 
animal to behave in certain specific ways and not in others, a structure which will 
therefore differ between species. (FCM, 259-260/376-378) 
The final point is crucial when it comes to avoiding any preemptive assumption that 
Heidegger's thought of 'animality' dissolves all life into a homogeneous field, unable to 
account for its huge variety and differentiation. For Heidegger it is not even simply a 
question of the variety of content which makes up the given-surroundings of various 
animals. The very structure of those surroundings differ. The given-surroundings of 
living creatures as such can be made manifest with the aid of a formally indicative 
concept such a captivation, but such a concept does not serve as a framework to which 
all varieties of life must conform. The very formality of the concept, as for all formally 
indicative concepts, allows it to point towards rather than reduce the specificity and 
variety which is to be met with in each particular encounter. The problem, far from the 
homogeneity of the field of'animality, ' may well turn out to be the very opposite. Rather 
than dissolving the whole variety of life back into a primordial soup, is it not the case 
that Heidegger separates species too rigidly from one another? If each species is 
assigned its own behavioural structure, can Heidegger account, on the one hand, for the 
extremities of behaviour of individuals which do not conform to the general structure of 
their 'species-being, ' and on the other hand, for the evolution of one species into 
another? Is the leeway which he assigns to captivation flexible enough to account for 
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those movements that apparently take animals beyond their captivating surroundings? 
That is a question which we will begin to address in the the remainder of this chapter 
and in the following chapter. For now it will be helpful take a closer look at the first 
four points of Heidegger's analysis. Since these rest upon a 'negative' characterisation of 
what the given-surroundings of the animal are deprived of, it is therefore also necessary 
to see what having and building a world involves, which being taken by ones 
surroundings does not. 
Constitutive of what Heidegger calls the 'world-building' character of man, is a double 
as- structure. World is characterised in this lecture course as an understanding of 'beings 
as a whole as such, ' a formula which will continue to form the core of Heidegger's 
conception of metaphysical thought for the rest of his career. I will take the elements of 
this formulation one at a time and contrast them with the 'openness' without world of the 
animal. Not that they are really separable, since they are both attempts to formulate 
what is special about manifestation, that overt character of beings which blinds us to 
their being and nevertheless allows us to work around them in order to catch a glimpse 
of their becoming-overt. Yet the two aspects of the formulation bring with them a shift 
of emphasis which will help bring to light different areas of the contrast between 
environment and world. 
Man, as 'world-building, ' is open to beings 'as such. ' 'As such' (als solches) is not to be 
confused with 'in itself (an sich). The manifestation of beings 'as such' requires an 
understanding of the being of beings and thus cannot suggest 'things in themselves, ' 
since they lie precisely outside the sphere of understanding. Heidegger only makes this 
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clear at the very end of the lecture course when it refers us back to Aristotle's distinction 
between on hös on- ontic truth and on he on- ontological truth. (FCM, 360/523) An 
understanding of beings 'as such, ' that they are beings at all and thus belong to being, is 
at work in any ontic judgement about those beings. Ontological truth is distinct from 
but involved in ontic truth. The 'as such' is not a search for the being in itself hidden 
behind subjective forms of manifestation, but for the being of the being which is 
obscured from view by the phenomenon itself. In fact, the understanding of 
manifestation as essentially a movement, of presence as relying upon a presencing, will 
in the final analysis mean that the 'as such' negates any possibility of the 'in itself. ' 
Beings which are essentially caught up in the movement of being cannot find absolute 
rest in themselves. 
According to Heidegger it is an apprehension of beings as such which allows any ontic 
judgement and thus any scientific judgement about beings. He contrasts this to the 
relation of a lizard to the rock and sun: 
It is true that the rock on which the lizard lies is not given for the lizard as 
rock, in such a way that it could inquire into its mineralogical constitution 
for example. It is true that the sun in which it is basking is not given for the 
lizard as sun, in such a way that it could ask questions of astrophysics about 
it and expect to find the answers. 
(FCM, 197/291) 
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Clearly the carrying out of such scientific investigations is only one possibility opened 
up by our apprehension of beings as beings. Few of us ever make such inquiries about 
the rock or the sun. Yet the fact that we can do so is granted by our apprehension of 
beings as such. The 'as such' is there already when I encounter the rock as a weapon or 
the sun as dangerously hot. These everyday practical dealings already imply a relation 
to the as such. The lizard may move out of the sun when it becomes too hot, but it did 
not perceive it as such. 
Later in the course Heidegger makes a somewhat confusing suggestion in an attempt to 
clarify the distinction between our perception of beings in the world and the animal's 
openness to its environment. He writes that: 'The one animal is never there for the other 
simply as a living creature, but is only there for it either as sexual partner or as prey- in 
either case only in some form of 'away' (weg). ' (FCM, 250/364) By trying to formulate 
this 'privation' operating at the heart of animal behaviour in this way Heidegger risks 
confusing the issue. On the one hand, if the animal can see others as sexual partners and 
as prey, then is this not a certain kind of as-structure? The 'as such' could then only be 
distinguished by a theoretical gaze which gives the as-structure a special symmetry: 
rock as rock, animal as animal. But the as-structure of worldly understanding always 
allows for such a gaze to develop, since what can be understood as one thing can always 
be understood as something else. Space is thus made for the reflexive understanding, 
even if it does not in fact occur. When Heidegger claims that animals encounter others 
as mate and as prey, that is not meant to imply that they inhabit the world of an as- 
structure. Rather, it is precisely the lack of an as-structure in this sense that he has in 
mind. For the 'as' implies the co-presence of another possibility. I encounter someone as 
a friend, but he could have been and could become foe, a possibility which is not 
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obliterated by the friendship. When an animal encounters another as a companion, the 
'as' does not signify a space of alternative possibilities in the same way. It is completely 
absorbed in the companionship. This is something commonly recognised in the 
unfailing and loyal character which people attribute to the companionship of animals. 
For the same reason that companionship can have a certain one-dimensionality when 
forced into the framework of our friendship with other human beings. This is not to say 
that animals cannot change their 'attitude' towards their surroundings. A female spider, 
for example, will regard a male first as mate and then as prey. The point is that at each 
stage the female is fully absorbed by her mate and then by her prey. The scene only 
takes on a macabre fascination for us because we see the second disposition already 
there alongside the first. Thus, the fact that human beings frequently regard others as 
mates and as prey should not be seen as evidence of our lingering 'animal nature. ' Mate 
and prey not only appear to us within a myriad of cultural and historical determinations, 
but they appear 'as such' in the sense that their appearance is always marked by other 
possibilities. 40 
It is for the same reason that the description of the living being's absorption in its 
environment as a kind of being 'away' can also be misleading. This description is meant 
to point towards the inability of the animal to attend to the other as such. However, it 
remains the case that the animal's absorption in its mate or prey only appears as an 
'away' in contrast to the 'there' of Dasein. Ultimately 'away' implies being 'there' and 
vice versa. Thus in Contributions to Philosophy (from Ereignis) Heidegger will write of 
the 'being-away' of Da-sein. The way in which the animal is 'away, ' if that is an 
appropriate description at all, is not connected to presence in this way. It relates to the 
40 For an illuminating discussion of Heidegger's understanding human and animal sexuality, see Frank 
Schalow op. cit pp. 37-67. 
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other in absorption, but its being away from itself is not manifest to it. 
At this stage of the argument William McNeill poses a most difficult question: 'What if 
we ourselves, as existing among the living, cannot be said to experience things as 
entities as such either? ' 41 Put like that it sounds as though McNeill has been led into 
confusing the 'as such' with the 'in itself. ' But McNeill goes on to make clear that what 
is at issue here is not whether there is ever an 'as-structure' to our understanding, nor 
whether that plays a crucial role in the development of theoretical inquiries. What is at 
issue is whether we can also apprehend entities without respect to their 'as such. ' This 
would then open the possibility that we could enter an encounter with the animal which 
would avoid 'techno-scientific' articulation. I think this suggestion must fail for the same 
reason that we saw earlier with Derrida, namely, that even refusal is encountered by us 
as refusal. The Other, even the most radically Other, can only be encountered as Other 
and if it is not then it would be cut loose altogether and utterly fail in its alterity. In a 
later interpretation McNeill seems to realise this danger: 'If the Being of animals and 
that of humans were absolutely other, such otherness would of course not even be 
conceivable. The otherness of the animal remains, as Hegel would say, an otherness "for 
us. "... It is an otherness that is manifest within the element of the Same, the element of 
Being, an element which in the 1929-30 course is thought under the title world. '42 This 
correction, however, seems to move too far in the other direction. Two questions 
immediately arise. Firstly, if one were to explore a Levinasian notion of alterity in the 
context of our animal encounters, as we have seen that Derrida does, would it not be 
41 Will McNeill, Visions: of Animals, Others and the Divine (Centre for Research in Philosophy and 
Literature at The University of Warwick: Research Publication Series, 1993) p. 45 
42 William McNeill, The Time of Life: Heidegger and Ethos (Albany: State University of New York 
Press, 2006) p. 18 
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precisely the point that such otherness remain 'inconceivable' in the strict sense? 
Secondly, in the light of Heidegger's insistence upon the distinction between a 
surrounding-world and given-surroundings is it not precisely the difficulty of 
conceiving the animal's relation to the element of world and the appropriateness of 
understanding the animal's being in terms of world which remains problematic for 
Heidegger? What I would suggest then, is that the difficulty in which McNeill finds 
himself, of how a being whose every encounter is marked by the 'as such' can come to 
terms with living beings which do not see others as such and thus have no 'terms' of 
encounter in this sense, is itself precisely the problematic around which Heidegger's 
inquiry revolves. Nevertheless, although I would insist that a view of the world as an 
element of the same in which difference can occur must remain problematic in this 
context, McNeill goes on to point out the great significance which a view of the world 
'as a whole' will have for our thinking of animality. 
If the 'as such' grounds all our comportments towards beings which we encounter in the 
world and that includes scientific investigation, it is the 'as a whole' which allows for 
metaphysics. Metaphysics is the insight into 'beings as such as a whole' and this will 
always remain Heidegger's definition of that enterprise, both in The Fundamental 
Concepts of Metaphysics where he is beginning a certain rehabilitation of metaphysics 
in the name of its radicalisation as 'metontology' and later when that radicalisation is 
pushed towards the 'overcoming' of metaphysics. Before any such radicalisation or 
overcoming can take place it remains first of all an uncircumventable task to open the 
dimension of metaphysics and that means to catch sight of beings as a whole. 
The character of the world 'as a whole' appears twice in Being and Time as the result of 
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two kinds of 'interruption' of our everyday involvement in the world. There is the 
interruption which takes place when the equipment of our everyday environmental 
dealings fails, breaks or goes astray. Then the 'totality' of those dealings is made explicit 
for the first time and the possibility is opened up that we could extract 'a piece' of 
equipment, a thing, from the totality. On the other hand, there is the much more radical 
appearance of the world as a whole which takes place in the mood of anxiety, when it is 
a case of the withdrawal of beings as a whole, so that the 'whole' character of the world 
becomes visible to us. Strictly speaking this a not an interruption of the whole. That is 
why, unlike in the case of equipmental breakdown, such a fundamental attunement can 
allow the whole to become visible without shattering its character of wholeness. If 
metaphysics is the understanding of beings as such and as a whole then anxiety gives 
birth to metaphysics within fundamental ontology. 
Now in The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics the fundamental attunement which 
is analysed in great depth is not anxiety but profound boredom. Despite significant 
shifts from the function of anxiety in the earlier work the result of profound boredom is 
once again the withdrawal of beings as a whole. Heidegger maintains this vision of the 
whole throughout the lecture course and contrasts it with the scientific investigations of 
animality which are grounded in the 'as such'. In fact Heidegger finds tendencies in this 
direction already at work in the biology of his day. It remains to push biologists as far as 
possible in the direction of a metaphysics of life, an understanding of life'as a whole'. 
In paragraph 61 of the course Heidegger identifies 'two essential steps in biology, ' 
pioneered by Hans Driesch and Jakob Johann von Uexküll respectively. The first is to 
recognise the 'holistic' character of the organism. This tendency towards holistic 
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research recognises the structural interconnection of all of the respective functions and 
structures which have become the objects of research for anatomy, ethology, physiology 
and so forth. The second step goes even further, recognising the essential bond between 
the animal and its environment. We have already seen that Heidegger understands the 
essence of the living creature to be its 'captivation' by its given surroundings. He 
proposes an ontology of life in which the essence of the animal coincides completely 
with its structural relations to its environment, that is, as Heidegger explicitly says, its 
ecology. (FCM, 263/383) He even goes so far as to claim that when the biologist 
Buytendijk suggests that the unity of the animal and its environment is almost as 
intimate as the unity of its body itself, then we must reply that, 'the way in which the 
animal is bound to its environment is not merely almost as intimate, or even as intimate, 
as the unity of the body but that the unity of the animal's body is grounded as a unified 
animal body precisely in the unity of captivation. ' (FCM, 258/376) 
Yet there is a further step which Heidegger only begins to make and which is decisive if 
we are to gain a true appreciation of being in the midst of life 'as a whole'. The measure 
of the difference which Heidegger perceives between the animal and the human is the 
difference between what he understands as world and environment. That can only be 
achieved, I would suggest, when we follow Heidegger in his attempt to understand the 
animal and its environment 'as a whole' and then witness the explosion of complexity 
which occurs when these creatures are returned to their native environments, when these 
environments intersect as is the case in all ecological communities: 
The ring that encircles the sea-urchin is quite different from that of the bee, 
and that of the bee is quite different again from that of the great tit, and this 
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different from the squirrel and so on. But these encircling rings belonging to 
the animals, within which their contextual behaviour and instinctual activity 
moves, are not simply laid down alongside or between one another but 
rather intersect one another. The woodworm, for example, which bores into 
the bark of the oak tree is encircled by its own specific ring. But the 
woodworm itself, and that means together with this encircling ring of its 
own, finds itself in turn within the ring encircling the woodpecker as it looks 
for the worm. And this woodpecker finds itself in all this within the ring 
encircling the squirrel which startles it as it works. Now this whole context 
of openness within the rings of captivation encircling the animal realm is 
not merely characterised by an enormous wealth of contents and relations 
which we can hardly imagine, but all of this is still fundamentally different 
from the manifestness of beings as encountered in the world-forming Dasein 
of man. 
(FCM, 277/401) 
This vision goes even further than the 'radical ecology' which understands the bond of 
the animal to its environment as the condition for the unity of its own body. The essence 
of each animal is identical with the structure of its environmental relations; but an 
animal is not first alone, struggling within its captivating ring and then through that 
openness connected to other living beings. This is not a 'web of life' in which each 
creature appears as a node connected by a multitude of strands to others. Animal lives 
intersect, surround and literally engulf one another, even before they devour one 
another. Living beings are not connected in the first instance by causal, logical or 
metabolic bonds, but by the interlinked and enmeshed domain of their environmental 
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rings. The domain of animality forms for Heidegger not a net woven from continuous 
strands nor a sea of life where we observe the occasional wave and ripple on the 
surface, but a vast and tangled mesh of captivating rings. That is why we cannot remain 
content with encountering an animal as another 'looking back' at us. The encounter with 
one draws us into the domain of animality itself, which is not a continuous and 
homogeneous plane, but a discontinuous and hybrid mesh. Yet this is a 'discontinuity' 
without gaps or limits. Living creatures do not come into contact with one another on 
the outer edge of their being but in the midst of their captivating rings. Ecological 
phenomenology would thus have no more to do with the logic of the limit in this sense, 
nor with borders, even when doubled, thickened or folded, whether borders of exchange 
or borders which touch and fail to touch. "' It would rather be the defiance of all such 
limitation and borders of recognition, an intersection of lives which has already taken 
place. 
The move towards an enmeshed ecology does not involve or require the dissolution of 
essential differences. On the contrary, it requires that they be maintained and upheld in 
43 The logic of the limit informs the attempts of very diverse thinkers to develop an ecological 
phenomenology. Whilst Derrida speaks of a `limitrophy', `The Animal that Therefore I am (More to 
Follow)', trans. by David Wills, Critical Inquiry, 28 (Winter 2002) p. 122, David Wood hopes to 
develop a `liminology' 'What is Eco-phenomenology? ' in Eco-Phenomenology: Back to the Earth 
Itself ed. Charles Brown and Ted Toadvine (Albany: SUNY Press, 2003) p. 220. At the extreme other 
end of the scale of attempts to 'naturalise' phenomenology, Barry Smith develops a formal concept of 
'niche' based on mereology and topology of the boundary (see. esp. 'The Niche' in Nous 33: 2 214-238 
and `Husserlian Ecology' http: //ontolo y. buffalo. edu/smith/articles/husserlianecolo htmn. 
According to my thesis an ecological phenomenology would have to defy all logic of the limit, no 
matter how it is complicated, because any limited 'niche' of a living being would be intersected and 
pulled in multiple directions by a multitude of other encircling rings. 
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the face of a constant tendency towards dissolution which would see all beings as 
essentially the same, as undifferentiated in their being. The 'as a whole' of a radicalised 
metaphysics remains only one way to approach the ecological dimension. Yet it is an 
important path with respect to biological investigations, which Heidegger hopes to push 
towards metaphysical questioning. Metaphysics, on the other hand, as a vision of the 
world 'as a whole' can be prompted by reflection upon the 'holistic' character of life: 
'This indicates to begin with that this 'as a whole' is not tailored to any particular area or 
even any particular species of beings. Rather this 'as a whole, ' the world, admits 
precisely to the manifestness of manifold beings in the various contexts of their being- 
other human beings, animals, plants, material things, artworks, i. e., everything we are 
capable of identifying as beings.. . If we only recall the particular 
domain of the animal 
realm, we already noticed there a peculiar enmeshing and intertwining of the rings that 
encircle animals, rings that in turn are incorporated in a peculiar way into the human 
world. ' (FCM, 354/514) 
Yet generic limitations are so familiar to us that for the enmeshed rings of life to 
become manifest we are required to maintain ourselves in the midst of the ecological 
dimension. We do not simply find ourselves there by default: 
It does not at all require the possibility of being able to distinguish the 
various specific ways of being, as though these were simply lined up 
alongside one another in a vacuum. The interweaving of the distinctions 
themselves oppresses and sustains us, is, as this prevailing, the primordial 
lawfulness out of which we first comprehend the specific constitution of 
being pertaining to those beings standing before us or even those beings that 
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have been made the object of scientific theory. 
(FCM, 354/514) 
Heidegger never closes the abyss of essence between environment and world, animal 
and man, but neither does he ever think them as generic realms placed beside one 
another. His concern is rather to maintain the abyss of essence not as a limit but as a 
space of encounter. This space is constantly being closed not only by a completely 
undifferentiated everyday understanding of life but also by an understanding which 
penetrates into various kinds of being in order to line them up next to one another for 
classification. The 'abyss' can only become apparent when it is already involved in some 
'peculiar incorporation' of interwoven animal lives into the human world. It is not at all 
that the abyss precludes contact with the animal. Rather, it presupposes that we have 
encountered the animal not only as a singular being, but through such encounters 
entered the ecological dimension of animality as such and as a whole. 
We find ourselves in the midst of the intersecting and enmeshed lives of living nature. 
Rather than simply happening to find ourselves in that domain, perhaps having gone 
astray from our own world, that means above all that we come to an understanding of 
ourselves in the ecological dimension. We do not intersect with living nature, according 
to Heidegger, as another encircling ring but we are amongst living things. We are in the 
midst of life and come to be ourselves in the midst of those enmeshing rings. 
§6 The Privation and the Plenitude of Life 
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In the final analysis Heidegger's encounter with the animal may seem to result in failure. 
The going-along-with that the animal grants to us is always at the same time a refusal. 
The animal flirtatiously invites a transposition into the sphere of its access to its 
surroundings and at the same time denies us this access: 'From the side of the animal, 
what is it that grants the possibility of transposedness and necessarily refuses any going 
along with? What is this having and yet not having? ' (FCM, 210/308) It is, we discover, 
deprivation and poverty. The poverty of the animal world seems to deny us any being- 
with and reduces our encounter again and again to a being-amongst or alongside. This is 
because being-with in the proper sense is something always already fulfilled, it is part of 
the structure of Dasein. An encounter with animality, on the other hand, always remains 
as a task to be undertaken. 
Is it still possible to say then, as Heidegger does here, 'from the side of the animal' (Vom 
Tier aus gesprochen), to speak from the side of the animal? Do we always find 
ourselves on our side and the animal on its? When Heidegger asks his three questions 
concerning the possibility of transposition, is it not the animal's side of the story which 
seems to be conspicuously missing? Do we not also need to ask what the animal can 
do? Whether it can transpose itself onto a rock, another animal or into the world of 
man? If the enmeshed rings of animality are incorporated into the world which man 
builds, how does it look from the other side? How do human beings appear to the 
animal? Do they show up only as prey or mate? Is the animal itself guilty of reducing 
man to a state of animality? It may be objected that such questions cannot be answered 
until we have first determined what we ourselves are capable of and in particular 
whether we can carry off the transposition into the animal environment. But perhaps 
knowledge of our own capabilities only comes with knowledge of the capabilities of 
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animality. We would then only come into our own by entering the ecological dimension 
of animality. 
In that case the only failure in this encounter will have been not to have recognised that 
any attempt to remain on one side or another betrays its intrinsically circular nature. The 
absolutely necessary generosity of this gesture which begins and tries to speak from, 
'the side of the animal', betrays animality by affording it too much, more than it can 
bear. The refusal certainly is from the side of the animal, but it is from the side of the 
animal in the encounter. It is the encounter with the animal itself which is marked by 
privation and in the end prevents us from determining whether the poverty in question is 
our own property or that of the animal. 
Moreover, the refusal on the part of the animal is a telling-refusal (Versagen), a refusal 
which we must allow to speak to us. It may remind us of a certain silent call which calls 
to us in our distracted immersion in our own cultivated sociability. That was a call from 
Dasein to itself which called out for nothing other than for a return to itself. Neither 
does the telling-refusal of the animal impart any word of comfort to us. It is a call from 
another who is no other, not because it retains the purity of an absolute alterity, but 
because it will always hover on the brink of telling us something of its world which is 
none. It calls us into a disposition in which we can build a relationship which does not 
come entirely naturally to us, but which will be the only ground for our relation to living 
nature. This disposition is the mood of poverty. That is where we find ourselves with the 
animal: in the midst of beings which call us to be-with them and at once refuse all our 
efforts to do so. 
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As we have seen, Heidegger insists that the essence of life is only accessible to us in a 
'privative' manner. That now means that the encounter with the animal can only take 
place in the mood of poverty. In The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics this 
privative method becomes explicitly deconstructive. The animal's access to the world 
remains utterly different to our own; for all that they may have access to beings in some 
way, beings are never manifest for them. Heidegger has not yet found the language to 
speak of living nature. In fact, language as understood in this lecture course always 
expresses an ontological relation and so must necessarily fail to speak of animality 
when it comes down to the essay or experiment which is being-with the animal: 
This question now leads us toward the distinction we tried to express by 
talking of man's world-building and the animal's poverty in world, a poverty 
which, roughly put, is nonetheless a kind of richness. The difficulty of the 
problem lies in the fact that in our questioning we always and inevitably 
interpret the poverty in world and the peculiar encirclement proper to the 
animal in such a way that we end up talking as if what the animal relates to 
and the manner in which it does so were some being, and as if the relation 
involved were an ontological relation that is manifest to the animal. The fact 
that this is not the case forces us to claim that the essence of life can become 
accessible only if we consider it in a deconstructive (abbauenden) fashion. ' 
(FCM, 255/371) 
Always and inevitably we misinterpret the animal's poverty in world. In this case 
interpretation is as such misinterpretation. Yet what Heidegger hints at here are hidden 
powers of language which have not yet been tapped. The fact that he thinks even at this 
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stage that there is a language, or a way of relating ourselves to language, which would 
not be wholly inappropriate to our encounter with the animal is encouraging. The 
deconstructive task which he assigns to us must no longer be thought of as one of 
stripping layers away from man until we arrive at the animal. Rather it must be thought 
of as the deconstruction of a philosophical language which thinks life in terms of layers 
of ability and the recovery of a language which allows us to maintain the circle of 
encounter without experiencing that circle as something objectionable in itself. 
I have tried to show that 'the animal' which is met with in this encounter does not refer 
to a homogeneous zone of life for which any example will do. Rather, this formally 
indicative concept is supposed to point us towards the enormous variety of animal life. 
Only by engaging with the specific living beings that we encounter can we find our way 
into the ecological dimension where the encircling rings of living beings are enmeshed 
and woven into one another. To gain a true appreciation of the living beings that we 
exist in the midst of we cannot remain 'face to face' with them, but must allow that 
encounter to draw us into an appreciation of the ecological dimension. It is only there 
that the true specificity of each living being is revealed. When Heidegger speaks of the 
'essence' of animality, that is not something that can be discovered and then an 
investigation made into its environmental relations. The essence of animality is to be 
found nowhere but in this plenitude of relations. 
Furthermore, I have argued that 'poverty' is not to be understood as implying either an 
hierarchical relation nor as simply marking alterity. " Rather, poverty is the attunement 
in which animal encounters take place. Strictly speaking then, it is is not the property or 
44 These are the only two 'values incompatible in their "logic'" which Derrida is able to discern in such 
terminology. Of Spirit: Heidegger and the Question p. 49 
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exclusive right of either man or animal. The mood of poverty is like an expropriation 
(Enteignis) in which man is divested of his most treasured possessions in order to make 
room for an appropriate relationship to take place (Ereignis). To hold out hope for an 
encounter which is not marked by privation, as Derrida does, would be to remove 
oneself from the very task of building a space for encounter which the sense of poverty 
demands. 
Two convergent sets of questions now arise. Firstly, it remains to be seen whether 
Heidegger's understanding of animal capabilities is adequate. For deconstructive 
ecology the question of capability does not demand an investigation of what various 
species and individuals are able to do. Rather, it asks about the meaning of this being 
able. Are the abilities of living beings, for example, different in kind to the abilities of 
human beings, even if the actualisation of these abilities appears to produce identical 
results? Are these abilities themselves marked by privation and if so, why should this be 
the case? Secondly, how are we to understand the relationship between the richness of 
the ecological dimension and the poverty which Heidegger attributes to the animal 
world? Are they reconcilable? Do they simply refer to different measures of wealth in 
each case? Or is there a more intimate relation between the two, such that the plenitude 
of life would find room for itself, for movement, change and growth, only in the space 
of privation? If an appreciation of the ecological dimension has removed the animal 
from solitary confinement it still remains in captivation. Can we find resources in that 
captivation to set living nature free? Does an environmentalism which insists on the 
poverty of nature only offer a negative alternative to philosophies which insist on the 
plenitude and joyful exuberance of life? After all, Heidegger ends his 1929/30 lectures 
by citing Nietzsche's song of Zarathustra, in which appear the lines: 'The world is deep, / 
Deeper than day can comprehend. /Deep is its woe, / Joy-deeper than heart's agony: Woe 
96 
says: Fade! Go!! But all joy wants eternity,! Wants deep, profound eternity! ' Is this an 
expression of opposition between the joy and woe of the world? Are the poverty and 
plenitude of life at odds with one another as transition and change seem to be with 
eternity? Is it possible to think the plenitude, exuberance, movement and growth of 
living nature without founding that plenitude on a plenum? 45 Or think a gathering of 
powers which is never complete or fulfilled? Can we find in the depths of the world a 
strife which rests neither upon a distinction nor a contradiction? Or discover a 
fundamental dynamic that incorporates the world poverty of the animal? In order to 
answer these questions we will have to take a closer look at the dynamics of the 
ecological dimension which these animal encounters have allowed us to bring into view. 
45 Spinozist ecology insists upon the plenum as the background for the plenitude of life. It is therefore 
required to assume the dynamism of substance whilst renewing the plenum ontology and metaphysics 
of constant presence which makes it inexplicable. See, e. g. Freya Mathews The Ecological Self 
(London: Routledge, 1991) pp. 76-90 
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Chapter 2 
Dynamic Ecology 
What happens to nature in technicity, when nature 
is separated out from beings by the natural 
sciences? The growing- or better, the simple 
rolling to its end- destruction of "nature. " What 
was it once? The site for the moment of the 
arrival and the dwelling of gods, as the site- still 
physis- resting in the essencing of beyng. 
Since then physis quickly became a being and 
then even the counterpart of "grace, " and after 
this deposition was completely set forth in the 
compulsion of calculating machination and 
economy. " 
Martin Heidegger 
Ecology is a dynamic discipline. It has become part of the dynamics of complex 
systems. " General systems dynamics attempts to discover patterns and laws in the 
46 CP, 195/ 277- translation modified. 
47 For a complex systems approach which attempts to unify many fields in the natural and social 
sciences, see for example, Yaneer Bar-Yam, Dynamics of Complex Systems, (Addison-Wesley, 1997) 
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development of any complex system, which can be applied across scientific disciplines 
from complex physical systems and the development of ecosystems and biospheres, to 
economies and human societies. As part of such a general dynamics, ecology would not 
necessarily lose all of its distinctiveness, nor would the life of an ecosystem or 
biosphere necessarily be explained 'reductively' in terms of principles derived from 
outside ecology. Rather, when it comes to complex systems, the underlying principles of 
all disciplines begin to converge. 
If the study of complex systems now gathers around the sign of 'dynamics' and our 
interest is in how living nature is thought under that sign, then we must consider how 
dynamics is thought or whether it is thought in any determinate way at all. Does 'general 
dynamics' consider what is dynamic about complex systems beyond the indeterminate 
generality of change and exchange within and between systems? What part does 
dynamism play in the thinking of a living system? If it remains indeterminate, will it not 
be determined by prejudices at work in the thinking of movement, change and 
development which governs dynamics? Only by returning to the phenomenology of 
dynamis, of potentiality, possibility and force will we be able to avoid the occupation of 
this space of indeterminacy by prejudices and tendencies already on the way to the 
domination of living nature and keep it open as a space in which a broad diversity of 
possibilities can flourish. 
To start with, is it absolutely clear that a general theory of dynamics takes us 
fundamentally beyond a 'mechanistic' view of nature? Certainly it is able to recognise, 
for example, 'auto-poetic' phenomena in both evolutionary and developmental biology 
and beyond. This would seem to move us decisively beyond mechanics, understood as 
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the study of externally acting forces and perhaps even back towards a physics of internal 
movement and sources of change. Nevertheless, although some of these ideas have only 
been developed in full over the last half century, it is worth taking pause for thought 
when we see Heidegger proclaim decisively in 1943 that: 'Modern natural sciences, 
chemistry no less than physics, biology no less than physics and chemistry, are and 
remain so long as they are, 'mechanics. ' 'Dynamics' is also a mechanics of 'forces'. r48 
Had Heidegger simply failed or refused to recognise the ongoing and deep seated 
changes which were taking place in the physical sciences? Or did he perhaps see the 
essence of mechanics as abiding elsewhere? Not only in the physics of externally acting 
forces as opposed to the physics of 'internal' sources of change, but already in operation 
wherever possibilities and potentialities are in the service of actuality. From this 
perspective we might be able to make more sense of Heidegger's certainty that science 
will not so easily escape the bond of mechanism. 
It thus becomes necessary to return to that moment when the bond of service and 
privilege between dynamis and energeia was forged. In Aristotle's texts, if we follow 
Heidegger's interpretation, we can find resources to think the true place and radicality of 
dynamics. Not in order to cut potentiality completely free from the actual, but to allow 
for the cultivation of a free space in which actualisation is no longer a compulsive 
activity and the actual is not itself completely imprisoned in advance by the fixed 'range 
of the possible. ' 
In this chapter I will explore the possibilities for thinking what remains unthought in 
contemporary dynamics and was already in the process of being concealed in Aristotle's 
treatment of dynamis, energeia and entelecheia. I begin by establishing the position in 
48 GA 55, p. 88 
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which ecology finds itself when integrated into general systems theory and argue that 
this integration was already prepared by the original definition of ecology as the 
'economy of nature'. I then return to Heidegger's Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics 
and some related texts to see how the 'dynamics' of living nature is understood there by 
way of the distinction between capabilities (Vermögen) and capacities (Fähigkeiten). 
Having seen why Heidegger is not completely happy with his initial characterisation of 
capacities I move on to a reading of his 1931 lecture course Aristotle's Metaphysics 
Thetgl-2: On the Essence and Actuality of Force. Here we find Heidegger draw out of 
Aristotle's 'general dynamics' a whole spectrum of dynamis, together with an 
interpretation of logos which does not confine its range to human capabilities as did the 
initial distinction between capability and capacity. Finally, I argue that what we must 
draw from this extraordinary reading of Aristotelian dynamics is a thinking of living 
beings which undermines key aspects of Heidegger's own earlier account, which was 
still wedded to the idea of the 'structure of behaviour' and as such inadvertently 
perpetuated the economisation of nature. 
§7 General Systems Dynamics and the Economy of Nature 
There are many places to which one could turn for an account of the integration of 
ecology into dynamic systems theory. One particularly interesting account for our 
purposes is that given by Stuart Kauffman. Kauffman is a theoretical biologist who is 
engaged in speculative attempts to integrate theories of the evolution of complex 
systems in physics, chemistry, biology and the social sciences. In order to do this he 
makes use of the concept of an'adjacent possible'. This concept is an attempt to explain 
what Kauffman sees as a general tendency for complex systems to become more 
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complex over time. The biosphere is always at an 'actual' degree of complexity, but this 
state expands persistently into an 'adjacent possible'. He begins by developing the 
concept in terms of the development of complex organic molecules: 
The adjacent possible consists in all the molecule species that are not 
members of the actual, but are one reaction step away from the actual... 
Note that the adjacent possible is indefinitely expandable. Once members 
have been realized in the current adjacent possible, a new adjacent possible, 
accessible from the enlarged actual that includes the novel molecules from 
the former adjacent possible, becomes available. " 
Kauffman claims that the biosphere is thus characterised by a more or less persistent, 
although not uniform, expansion into its adjacent possible. The adjacent possible does 
not make up a pre-ordained logical space into which the actual expands. It is 'adjacent' 
because new dimensions of possibility are opened up at each stage of expansion, 
making it impossible to calculate the precise direction of the expansion in advance. 
Nevertheless, the expansion is persistent and indefinite, and each step is bound to the 
previous state of actual complexity. This is first explained in terms of a chemical 
potential which drives the system into expansion: 'The simple conclusion is that there is 
a real chemical potential from the actual to that adjacent possible. Other things being 
equal, the total system "wants" to flow into the adjacent possible. "' This is of course 
only an inexact analogy. However, it does show the continued influence of a general 
concept of potentiality, in that it never differs in its being across systems, gains its 
power from being "real" potential and which persistently and compulsively actualises 
49 Stuart Kauffman, Investigations, (Oxford University Press, 2000) p. 142 
50 Ibid p. 143 
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itself. It is this 'dynamic' that forms the basis for an understanding of ecology as part of 
the general dynamics of complex systems. 
The 'adjacent possible' is not confined to chemical potential. It operates on 'chemical, 
morphological and behavioural levels. "' Furthermore, it is a principle that may be 
applicable to other complex systems, especially economies. Thus, Kauffman writes: 'It 
is no accident that the words for economics and ecology have the same Greek root, 
"house. " Ecology and economics are, at root, the same. 'S2 Not only do they operate upon 
the same principles, but the 'metabolic exchange' of trade is at work in the same way in 
ecology and economy: 'The trading of the econosphere is an outgrowth of the trading of 
the biosphere. "' Economy is simply one direction which the persistently expanding 
biosphere has taken. 
Ecology and economy have in fact been bound together for a long time. From its very 
inception as a scientific discipline ecology has been thought as'economy of nature'. The 
first recorded use of the word 'Oecologie' by Ernst Haeckel in 1866 was glossed as `the 
economic science of ways of life and of the living external relations of organisms to one 
another. ' (der Wissenschaft von der Oeconomie, von der Lebensweise, von der äusseren 
Lebensziehungen der Organismen zu einander) Three years later he offered a further 
definition: 
By ecology, we mean the body of knowledge concerning the economy of 
nature (Naturhaushalt)- the investigations of the total relations of the animal 
51 Ibid p. 207 
52 Ibid p. 211 
53 Ibid 
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to its organic and to its inorganic environment; including above all, its 
friendly and inimical relations with those animals or plants with which it 
comes directly or indirectly into contact- in a word, ecology is the study of 
all the complex interrelationships referred to by Darwin as the conditions of 
the struggle for existence. sa 
Ecology has always been economy. Not only that, but ecology has always sought 
justification in and sought to give justification to political economy. This does not take 
place primarily in a reductive doctrine which seeks to 'carry over' the principles of 
biology into social and economic science. One could cite the influence of Malthus on 
Darwin or the influence of Darwin on Marx. Ultimately neither is grounded in the other. 
They are already bound together by a general 'economisation' of human action and 
living nature. 
It is this historical bond of ecology and economy that Heidegger has in mind when he 
writes in The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: 'It is not by accident that 
Darwinism emphasized the concept of self-preservation, which in this sense grew out of 
an economic perspective on man. ' (FCM, 259/377) The problem turns around how the 
relation of the animal to its environment is conceived, something which we have 
already touched upon in the last chapter. By way of elaboration Heidegger too appeals 
to the etymology of the word'ecology': 
The word ecology derives from oikos, the Greek word for house. It signifies 
the investigation of where and how animals are at home in the world, of the 
54 Cited in, Donald Worster, Nature's Economy: A History of Ecological Ideas, Second Edition, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994) p. 192 
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way in which they live in relation to their environment. But in Darwinism 
precisely this was understood in an external manner in the light of the 
question of adaptation. In Darwinism such investigations were based upon 
the fundamentally misconceived idea that the animal is present at hand, and 
then subsequently adapts itself to a world that is present at hand, that it then 
comports itself accordingly and the fittest individual gets selected. Yet the 
task is not simply to identify the specific conditions of life materially 
speaking, but rather to acquire insight into the relational structure between 
the animal and its environment. 
(FCM, 263/382) 
The problem with evolutionary and ecological science is, according to Heidegger, that it 
has still failed to interrogate the notion that animals 'dwell' in their environments 
rigorously enough. That bond is something which simply arises when organism and 
environment are subsequently brought into conjunction, it being possible to investigate 
either as present at hand or 'extant' beings outside of this conjunction. It seems unlikely 
that this characterisation is entirely just to most classical or contemporary Darwinism. 
Certainly nobody believes that the adaptation of living beings to their environments is 
like the pouring of water into a glass. Nevertheless, concepts such 'co-evolution' will not 
necessarily eradicate Heidegger's difficulties, since rather than making the 
environmental relation 'internal' to the structure of living beings, they frequently only 
serve to make an external relation reciprocal over time. To work out precisely how 
Heidegger's interpretation of living nature relates to Darwin and Darwinism would be a 
complex project in its own right. " We will only be able to touch upon certain aspects of 
55 That Heidegger would reject or deny the theory of evolution seems to me very unlikely. He is 
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that problem in what follows. My main purpose is to trace a particular line of thought 
concerning the dynamics of living beings in order to discover how it feeds into a 
dominant understanding of living nature. In this passage Heidegger refers to 
'Darwinism' as an entire scientific and cultural movement, but it is certain that much of 
his criticism is meant to apply to Darwin himself. At least this much is clear for the 
present: for Heidegger ecology must begin with this relational structure, with living 
beings not as living within and alongside their environments, but their living as itself 
the living out and unfolding of the life of environmental relations. 
The appeal to the oikos of ecology can only be a preliminary step. The relational 
structure which makes up the oikos is still left entirely indeterminate by this etymology. 
In particular, it is quite possible that the ecological relation is already predetermined in a 
quite specific way within the economy of nature. We have seen Heidegger's preliminary 
characterisation of the internal, intrinsic and essential, relational structure as 
'captivation'. Is it not possible that this interpretation itself is caught up in the 
economisation of ecology, which would then turn out to be more deeply rooted than the 
interested in the ontological assumptions inherited in the concepts employed by this theory. Thus it is 
interesting to see that he focuses on the concept of adaptation and the externality it implies as the 
problematic features of Darwinism. The adequacy of these concepts has also been challenged in recent 
evolutionary theory, with the development of concepts such as 'exaptation, ' 'internal constraint' and 
the repudiation of exclusively functionalist explanation in evolution. See, e. g., Stephen Jay Gould, 
The Structure of Evolutionary Theory (Cambridge, Mass: The Belknap Press of Harvard University 
Press, 2002) pp. 1214-1258. For suggestive remarks as to how Heidegger might have understood 
evolutionary biology as a 'theory of the real' see, Frank Schalow, The Incarnality of Being: The Earth, 
Animals, and the Body in Heidegger's Thought (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006) 
pp. 174-176. For a more skeptical view of whether Heidegger's thinking of science will ultimately be 
up to the challenge of evolution see, Miguel de Beistegui, Thinking with Heidegger: Displacements 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003) pp. 103-118 
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simple carrying over of a particular 'economic perspective on man'? If we are to appeal 
to etymology, then what is needed is not a reminder of the common root of oikos in 
economy and ecology, but further to this a fuller characterisation of the mode of that 
dwelling. We need to remind ourselves of the difference between the regulation and 
ordering of economy and ecology, that is, the difference between the nomos, of 
economy and the logos of ecology. We can begin by asking if there has ever been an 
eco-logy properly speaking, an interpretation of living nature which focuses on the 
determining role of logos, if ecology has from the start been determined as the economy 
of nature? Such an ecology would not necessarily be 'lawless, ''arbitrary' or 'random' but 
would rediscover the breadth of meaning which nomos once had in conjunction with 
logos, setting about freeing living nature from a narrowly conceived law of compulsion. 
The law and compulsion which has come to govern economy is growth. " Thus in all 
complex systems Kauffman finds a drive towards greater complexity and expansion of 
the 'adjacent possible' as actuality progressively encroaches upon the space of 
possibility, which at each stage is secured upon the platform of the actual. Diversity and 
56 It is not only ecology but metaphysics itself that has been bound up with an 'economic perspective on 
man'. Frank Schalow provides a very helpful 'counter-balance' to Ileidegger's concentration on the 
metaphysics 'production' inherited from the Greeks, to the detriment of what he sees as the 
fundamental feature of modem economies, exchange. Ile repeats the analysis of everydayness in 
Being and Time with an eye towards exchange and capitalist economics. In doing so he hopes to 
recover resources for a 'another form of exchange'. In this context Schalow also refers us to the 
common root of 'dwelling' to be found in ecology and economy. It seems to me, however, that we fail 
to understand the true law of 'economy' if we do not see that production and exchange have both been 
yoked to the compulsion of growth. See. Frank Schalow, The Incarnality of Being: The Earth, 
Animals, and the Body in Heidegger's Thought (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006) 
pp. 15-20 
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complexity become a function of the expansion of the actual into the ever increasing 
logical space of possibility. What an ecology demands is the primacy of difference and 
variation, joined and gathered by a logos which does not compel the constant 
encroachment of the actual into an ever increasing space of possibility. We need a 
conception of growth which does not function under this law of constant expansion of 
the actual. This requires a rethinking of the potentiality of living nature as a terrain or 
dimension of living capacity with a flexible horizon which expands and contracts, 
through which life negotiates various pathways. 
The argument of the rest of this chapter is that the economisation of ecology ultimately 
rests in an inability to pursue and overturn the metaphysics of dynamis at the heart of 
ecological thought, even and perhaps especially when it becomes a part of 'general 
dynamics'. First of all I will return to the distinction which Heidegger draws in The 
Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics between animal and human 'dwelling' in an 
environment, this time in order to highlight the distinction he makes between living 
capacity and human capability. However, Heidegger himself maintains that this 
phenomenology of living nature remains incomplete with regard to a set of problems 
revolving around 'movement' and 'historicity'. These problems come to the fore once 
more in the 1931 lecture course, Aristotle's Metaphysics Thetal-2: On the Essence and 
Actuality of Force. The phenomenology of living nature is now incorporated into the 
broader philosophical problem of dynamis. In following this line of thought Heidegger 
allows us to see how a one-sided interpretation of dynamis has had a direct bearing upon 
the economisation of nature and how his own earlier phenomenological interpretation 
still relied upon and fed into that economisation to some extent. The exposure of this 
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one-sided interpretation of dynamisinvolves the refraction of a broader spectrum of 
dynamics than can be imagined by any 'general dynamics' and will allow us to uncover 
the roots of Heidegger's claim that living nature is exploited, exhausted and even 
annihilated by metaphysics prior to its actual destruction. 
§8 From Captivation to Living Potential 
In the previous chapter we saw that Heidegger insists upon a distinction between the 
surrounding-world of Dasein and the interwoven given-surroundings that make up the 
ecological dimension of animality. I outlined the six features that he ascribes to the 
animal environment understood as captivation and contrasted them to the 'as-structure' 
of Dasein's surrounding-world. In order to understand how Iieidegger's thinking of 
animality develops after the 1929/30 course we now need to consider the dynamics of 
the animal environment and the difficulties it gives rise to. 
Captivation, the environmental relation understood as the condition of the possibility of 
behaviour, involves the 'self-encircling' of living beings with a ring of capacities. The 
circle of capacities is not fixed, for example, by the organs available to the animal for 
use. Rather, the reverse is the case, the organs of an organism remain 'subservient' to its 
capability. Thus the paradigmatic examples of animal life turn out to be the 'lowest' 
kinds of single cell protoplasmic organisms, that 'produce' and 'exchange' organs with 
no fixed structure: 
Around the food in each case there forms "an aperture which first becomes 
a mouth, then a stomach, then an intestine and finally an anal tract. " We are 
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thus confronted with a determinate sequence of organs which replace one 
another in this specific sequence. This conclusively shows that capacities 
for feeding and for digesting are prior to the organs in each case. Yet at the 
same time this capacity, a complete dynamic process which we could also 
roughly describe as 'assimilation, ' is a regulated one. Indeed, it is a form of 
regularity in relation to a determinate sequence of processes. 
(FCM, 224/327) 
This kind of 'Wechseltier, ' literally an '(ex)change-animal', produces digestive organs 
because it has the capacity for digestion. Yet it does not do so in a arbitrary fashion, but 
rather in a way which is essentially regulated. The regulation is 'inner regulation, ' not a 
prescription (Vorschrift) which is imposed upon the capacity from above or without. 
(FCM, 228/333-334) 
The difficulty comes not with the inner regulation of capacities, but when we try to 
account for the mutability of the regulatory ring itself. The ring does not form a 'rigid 
armour plate' around the animal, nor do the pathways of instinct and habit precede the 
capacities which they regulate within the ring. Yet it remains unclear whether the ring 
itself, as Heidegger understands it, is essentially mutable. On the one hand, he claims 
that: 'Nothing else can penetrate the ring around the animal. Here we are not yet 
concerned with any particular content whatsoever, but only with the fundamental 
character of that to which the animal can stand in relation at all. ' 
(FCM, 254/369-370) Not just anything in the habitat of the animal can penetrate into its 
encircling ring. The animal can only be stimulated by that which it has a prior relation 
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to, i. e., what already comes within the range of its capacities. Those capacities can only 
be 'disinhibited' by specific environmental stimuli. On the other hand, the animal does 
seem to be exposed to disruptive forces in its environment: 
For with the animal's being open for what disinhibits, the animal in its 
captivation finds itself essentially exposed to something other than itself, 
something that can indeed never be manifest to the animal either as a being 
or a non-being. Rather that which disinhibits, with all the various forms of 
disinhibition it entails, brings an essential disruption into the essence of the 
animal. 
(FCM, 273/369) 
Nevertheless, precisely how essential this disruption is remains debatable. Is the ring of 
capacities itself thus exposed to mutation and re-inscription? It is the lack of clarity here 
that leaves the notion of captivation at the very least incomplete, if not highly 
questionable. Heidegger himself realises the incompleteness of the analysis when he 
admits he has been unable to deal adequately with what might be called the 'life process' 
and even the 'history' of life. Neither ontogeny nor phylogeny can be adequately 
understood if the essential motility of life is left out of the account. (FCM, 265/385) The 
notion of captivation not only leaves this account incomplete, but seems to bring with it 
an essential difficulty when it comes to thinking this peculiar kind of motility. A more 
adequate account cannot simply add motility to the organism as captivated in a ring of 
capacities, but must itself transform our understanding of the phenomenon as a whole. 
If we are to move towards an understanding of living capacities that can take account of 
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what is here called motility, together with the 'inner regulation' and retention of those 
capacities, then I suggest we take a clue from the contrast that Heidegger sees between 
these capacities and another kind of potential. Contrasting the capabilities (Vermögen) 
of human beings to the capacities (Fähigkeiten) of animals, he argues that the former 
are always informed by a logos prior to the propositional logic of truth and falsity. This 
originary logos holds out the possibility of truth and falsity. Falsity is not a perversion or 
evasion of truth but a co-originary possiblity made possible by logos, as is every human 
capability: 'The essence of the logos consists precisely in its containing as such the 
possibility of 'either true or false', of 'both positive and negative'. It is precisely the 
possibility of all these kinds of transformation- which have merely been outlined in a 
rough and ready fashion- that comprises the innermost essence of the logos. ' (FCM, 
337/489) Nevertheless, the logos that makes possible human capabilities is not an 
indeterminate logical space in which possibility is thought as a mode belonging to 
certain possible states of affairs: 
For whatever is possible does not become more possible through 
indeterminacy, so that everything possible would, as it were, find room and 
be accommodated in it. Rather whatever is possible grows in its possibility 
and in the force that makes it possible through restriction. Every possibility 
brings its restriction (Einschränkung) with it. 
(FCM, 363/528) 
If human capacities are made possible only by a logos that brings with it its own 
restrictions, rather than the restrictions of a fixed boundary, then might it not also be the 
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case that living capacities bring with them their own restrictions? Not, to be sure, of the 
same kind as human capabilities, but their own ecological dynamic? If so, then 
animality might be freed at once from captivation and from the law of compulsive 
striving against both external and self-imposed boundaries, against which its behaviour 
and growth are seen as a continual struggle. It is just such a possibility that arises in 
Heidegger's return to the phenomenon of dynamis following the 1929/30 course. 
§9 Gathering the Spectrum of Dynamis 
We can and must investigate everything which belongs to the 
essence of the animal's being in accordance with its inner 
possibility. That is, we can and must investigate amongst 
other things the inner possibility of capacity as such, so that 
we can recognise in our investigation a peculiar range of 
quite different kinds of possibility. 
(FCM, 236/343-344) 
In the summer semester of 1931 Heidegger returns to the locus classicus of 
metaphysical exposition of potentiality and actuality in the lecture course entitled 
Aristotle's Metaphysics Thetas: The Essence and Actuality of Force. " The entire lecture 
57 Between The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics and Aristotle's Metaphysics O Heidegger held 
two lecture courses, both of which prepare the way for the return to Aristotle's notion of potentiality. 
A large part of The Essence of Human Freedom: Introduction to Philosophy (GA 31) is already 
concerned with Aristotle's text, that is, Chapter 10 of Metaphysics 0. Heidegger defends, contrary to 
much philosophical and philological work of the time, the place of this chapter concerning truth at the 
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course is devoted to the first three chapters of Metaphysics 0, a text little more than 
140 lines long. Heidegger translates the text in small paragraphs and follows each of 
these by an extended commentary. Accordingly, after an introduction which seeks to 
locate this reading in a general interpretation of Aristotle's work, situating it against the 
backdrop Brentano's problem of the manifold senses of being in Aristotle and whether 
the unity of these senses is adequately understood as analogy, the main text has three 
parts which correspond to the three chapters under consideration. Although Heidegger 
presents us with a close reading I think it will become clear that he is developing his 
own philosophical view concerning dynamics, in dialogue with Aristotle. There is a 
great deal in this lecture course to be taken in from both a philological and philosophical 
point of view. I will confine myself to two points which address our problem of how we 
can think a dynamics of living nature in a way which can highlight what is unthought in 
general systems dynamics. 58 The first concerns a spectrum of senses belonging to 
apex of the metaphysics of potentiality and actuality. The following semester Heidegger lectured on 
the first two parts of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit (GA 32). In Heidegger's discussion of the 
section of Hegel's book entitled 'Force and Understanding' we also find a preparation for the 
revisiting of potentiality. Hegel finds in the Kantian view of the understanding a vision of nature in 
which the concept of a law of nature and of a force of nature turn out to be indistinguishable. A play 
of forces in nature also turns out to have an intrinsically double aspect: 'Force is both at the same time: 
being-driven-back-into-itself as the drive-towards-externalisation. ' (GA 32, pp. 114-115/166) In 
Ileidegger's re-thinking of Aristotle's concept of dynamis one can discern an attempt to get to the root 
of this duplicity in force, but in doing so to think it no longer as the mutual movement of 
externalisation and internalisation, a thought which is also be found at the heart of much thinking of 
living nature in terms of drives and which, as I shall argue below, Heidegger is not immune to himself. 
58 Nancy J. Holland's paper 'Rethinking ecology is in the western tradition: Heidegger and/on Aristotle', 
Continental Philosophy Review 32: 407-420 (1999) provides an excellent introduction to Heidegger's 
text, relating it to themes which emerge in his later work, especially The Question Concerning 
Technology. ' Moreover, Holland makes fruitful suggestions as to how Heidegger's reading of Aristotle 
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dynamis which Heidegger brings into view. The second concerns an essential duplicity 
and finitude of all dynamis, the essential restriction which goes with empowerment, 
right across the spectrum. 
In the first part of the main text Heidegger tries to give the reader a sense of how 
ubiquitous the concepts of actuality and potentiality remain, even if they have fallen out 
of favour in modem scientific discourse. These concepts are at work throughout our 
thinking and yet we find ourselves impotent when it comes to delimiting precisely what 
we mean by concepts such as force, ability or power. Potentiality is everywhere, in a 
multiplicity of forms, yet we never seem to be able to lay our hands on it. Dynamis 
presents itself to us as a range of possibilities. Heidegger sketches them in a way that 
may at first sight give the impression of an arbitrary list. It will, however, contain the 
germinal seeds of practically every problematic to be encountered in Heidegger's 
can be understood as an attempt to recover aspects of the metaphysical tradition which are conducive 
to ecological philosophy, when cursory readings of Heidegger have so often led to sweeping 
disparagement of 'Western Metaphysics' as the source of all technological domination of nature. In 
particular, Holland takes up Heidegger's understanding of Aristotle's 'passive potentiality' as 
'bearance, ' and points out that this recurs as a feature of the earth in `The Origin of the Work of Art'. 
Much of what follows is an attempt to take up Holland's preliminary suggestions, broaden their 
significance as part of our overall understanding of Heidegger as an ecological thinker and 
simultaneously focus on the problematic case of animality and living nature. Holland herself leaves 
this problem to one side, citing Derrida's criticisms of Heidegger's account of animality as making the 
issue particularly contentious. Since we have found those criticisms to be not entirely justified, we 
must return to the problem posed by living nature. Michael Zimmermann comments briefly on 
Holland's paper in, 'Heidegger's Phenomenology and Contemporary Environmentalism', in Eco- 
Phenomenology: Back to the Earth Itself, ed. Charles C. Brown and Ted Toadvine (New York: State 
University of New York Press, 2003) pp. 73-101. However his criticisms revolve around a set of issues 
concerning Heidegger's thinking of physic, which will be dealt with the chapter 4. 
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thought in the coming years: 
All this multiplicity- is it something arbitrary and trivial, or does a basic 
occurrence of every being and of each way of being here present itself to us? 
Force (Kraft)- the forces of material nature; what would nature be without 
forces? Capacity (Fähigkeit)- the capacities of living being; capability 
(Vermögen)- this and that capability of the human; art (Kunst)- the art of 
Michelangelo, of Van Gogh, what would we understand of both if we did 
not understand art? Violent force (Gewalt)- the violent force of Napoleon; 
power (Macht)- the power of the divine, the power of faith. 
(AMT, 61/73) 
How are we to understand this range or spectrum of dynamis? Three misunderstandings 
have to be guarded against. Firstly, we are not presented here with various species to be 
subsumed under the genus dynamis. These are not particulars to be subsumed under a 
universal. In the following paragraph Heidegger admits that it appears as if what is at 
issue are various specific kinds of ability (Können). Each falls under the general concept 
of ability, which is something ultimate and not open to further definition. If we leave it 
at that, 'philosophy is finished. ' (AMT, 61/73) What is required is that we open the 
dimension of dynamis and attempt to think through the way in which this multiplicity 
presents us with a difference that is nevertheless gathered as a set of phenomena that 
belong together. Secondly, this is not supposed to be a developmental series. We should 
not presume that there is some latent developmental narrative to be told here, whereby 
brute forces of material nature lead to other kinds of ability through a process of 
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involution, evolution or sublimation. It is clear that 'violent force' can be the most brute 
ability, yet it sits in this spectrum between art and divine power. Finally, this is not a 
range of possibility in the sense of an arrangement set out before us, of abilities which 
are at hand, complete and ready for classification or to be taken up as abilities. There 
does indeed remain something arbitrary about this list. " It is not intended to set out a 
system of potentialities. Rather, it is intended to open up the realm of dynamis as a 
ubiquitous mode of being which we nevertheless seem unable to set out before us in an 
arrangement. Rather, the list should be understood as a kind of spectrum. The elements 
can be refracted so that we can see them in contrast to one another, or they can be 
focused and gathered together. 
That Heidegger should choose to emphasise the multiplicity of dynamisat this point may 
seem somewhat strange. The first chapter of Metaphysics Q attempts to provide a 
guiding definition of dynamis, that is, to provide us with a thread which runs throughout 
the series. It is not a question of analogy. Indeed, Aristotle specifically sets aside 
analogical meanings of dynamis, such as mathematical 'powers, ' and concentrates this 
part of the investigation on dynamis as it pertains to movement, dynamis kata kinesin. 
59 This is confirmed by the fact that in the previous paragraph Heidegger has enumerated another such 
list: '.. force (Kraft), capacity (Fähigkeit), art (Kunst), talent (Begabung), capability (Vermögen), 
competence (Befähigung), aptitude (Eignung), skill (Geschicklichkeit), violent force (Gewalt), and 
power (Macht)', yet he insists that such a list is, 'not completely arbitrary'. (AMT p. 60/72) Although 
each particular list remains in itself somewhat arbitrary, the philosophical task is to dig out what it is 
that makes such a list possible, what holds it together as a list of elements which belong together, 
whilst maintaining the elements in their difference. Although this first spectrum is actually more 
extensive than that which follows it I have decided to concentrate on the latter because it brings into 
juxtaposition those elements of the spectrum which are of particular interest for our current 
investigation. 
117 
The guiding definition of dynamis offered by Aristotle is'arche metaboles'the source or 
origin of change, which Heidegger translates as the 'from-out-of-which of change. ' 
However, Heidegger is not working against Aristotle's search for a unity within the 
multiplicity of dynamic. He is insistent upon the 'guiding definition' and the need to 
uncover all that Aristotle understands by the origin of change. What Heidegger is 
arguing is that this 'guiding definition' does not unite dynamic under a sign of identity, 
but rather opens a dimension in which we can encounter essentially different kinds of 
dynamis. He is trying to draw our attention towards the essential diversity which is 
gathered or focused into a unity. This is not unification under a general principle. The 
'guiding definition' does not provide us with a rule for categorisation under a concept, 
but a focal point around which essentially different kinds of dynamis can be gathered. 
The problem which now arises however, is that the very possibility of opening out the 
spectrum of dynamisas a simultaneous gathering of its powers, turns out to pertain in 
particular to one moment in the series: human capability. What are the consequences of 
this 'privileged' relation and how far can it be maintained? 
To open up the possibilities which lie between Dasein and living nature, we must 
concentrate on the juxtaposition of the capacities of living beings and the capabilities of 
the human. This juxtaposition is brought into focus in the second chapter of 
Metaphysics 0, and thus in the second main part of Heidegger's text. In the opening of 
this second chapter Aristotle clearly distinguishes different kinds of dynamis. He 
focuses his attention on the distinction between dynameis alogoi and dynameis meta 
logou; still standardly translated as 'non-rational' potentialities and potentialities 
'accompanied by reason. i60 Yet Aristotle reminds us that the spectrum of dynamisis more 
60 Metaphysics 1046b. An New Aristotle Reader ed. by J. L Ackrill (New York: Oxford University Press, 
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complex than this. There is firstly the distinction between those beings which are 
'without soul by way of belonging to them and co-constituting them' and those which 
'are present in the besouled. ' (AMT, 99/117) (The point of these quite peculiar 
translations should become clear in what follows). There are two distinctions: that 
between besouled and soulless beings and that between beings with discourse and those 
without. All those with discourse must have soul, whilst those with soul need not have 
discourse. The former are human beings the latter animals and plants. 
Heidegger now argues that we must understand this 'having' of soul and of discourse in 
a very particular way. What is at stake in these distinctions is not whether beings have 
particular properties or abilities which belong to them. It is their way of being as a 
whole which is being characterised. This is something that Heidegger highlights in his 
translation of the expression enuparchousin, as 'belonging to and co-constituting, ' which 
is completely lost in translations like 'present in, ' as though these forces just happen to 
emerge in a certain region of beings at a particular time. Rather, these forces, 'belong to 
and co-constitute the being and the being character of the realms of being which are 
encountered. ' (AMT, 99/117) Thus, in the case of the soul, "Through being besouled, a 
being is something living. "Life, " however, is a way of being. ' (AMT, 101/119)61 In the 
same way, to say that a being 'has discourse' is also to mark out an essential character of 
its being. Not something which is added to a besouled being in an amalgam, but a 
characterisation of how that being is besouled, which characterises its being as 
1987) p. 323 
61 The point had already been made succinctly in The Fundamental Concepts of Ancient Philosophy: 
"The soul is not a being (the psychic) next to the bodily (physical), but rather it is the way of being 
(Seinsart) of certain bodies, indeed those which on this ground are distinguished as living beings from 
the lifeless. " (GA 22, p. 184) 
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something living in every respect. 
It remains for us to consider how Heidegger understands the distinction between 
capacity and capability now that powers have been placed within a broader spectrum of 
dynamis. Are there any significant differences with or advances upon what was said in 
The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics? At first sight that would appear unlikely. 
Heidegger pays far less attention here to characterising the capabilities of living beings 
in themselves. He forgoes the kind of detailed analysis of biological experiment which 
made The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics so unique and, as we have just seen, 
stays very close to Aristotle's text. For all that, I suggest we can find here a reorientation 
of an entire field of concepts which will not only inform the direction of Heidegger's 
philosophy in the coming years but call into question the approach to living nature 
pursued so far. 
We saw above that at the end of The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics Heidegger 
traces back the logosof propositional statements first to an essential ambiguity between 
truth and falsity and then to a projection of Dasein in its world-building, a 'making- 
possible'. The analysis of Aristotle's text in the 1931 course begins by translating logos 
as 'discourse' (Rede). This is a term which was used in Being and Time to designate the 
'existential ontological ground of language. ' (13T, 203/160-6) There Heidegger had tried 
to to win back the phenomenon of language, of speaking and listening, from various 
abstract frameworks into which it had been forced. Now he seems to take what was 
there understood as a partial view of language and expand it so that it escapes even the 
remit of 'discourse'. In Being and Time the 'making known' (Kundgabe) of experiences 
was still considered to be a partial and abstract understanding of language. (BT, 
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206/163) Now this making known expands to incorporate the entire breadth of speech 
acts that lie outside the scope of propositional judgements, which have been the focus of 
so much attention in more recent years: 'Logos is discourse, the gathering laying open, 
unifying making something known (Kundmachen); and indeed above all in the broad 
sense which also includes pleading, making a request, praying, questioning, wishing, 
commanding, and the like. ' (ATM, 103/122) Questioning makes known in the sense of 
exploring (Er-kunden); public discourse in the sense of announcing (Ankündigung), 
proclaiming (Verkünden), and declaring (Künden): 'Logos is thus discourse in the utterly 
broad sense of the manifold making known and giving notice (Kundgeben)- 
"conversance" (Kundschaft)' (ATM, 103/122) 
Conversance is the logos which 'belongs to and co-constitutes' human beings. It not only 
embraces the whole breadth of 'discourse, ' eschewing translations such as 'reason, ' 
'judgement' and even 'sense, ' it points beyond language as a particular faculty, ability or 
even existential of Dasein. In doing so, Heidegger suggests, it also becomes possible to 
see how logos can form a peculiar relationship with force so as to produce capability 
(Vermögen). All human abilities or 'faculties' are the result of an 'extraordinary 
relationship' between force and conversance. 
It is the elaboration of this extraordinary relationship that 'Heidegger understands as the 
focus of Aristotle's interest in the second chapter of book Q. Our question concerns 
what happens at the margins of this elaboration to the capacities of living nature which 
are 'without logos'. Heidegger now seems to seriously entertain a possibility which 
many have thought he is always too quick to lay to rest. Can we actually be sure which 
beings have conversant capabilities and which have capacities without conversance? It 
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is worth dwelling on this briefly, because Heidegger is at pains to suggest that for all its 
categorial tendencies, Aristotle's phenomenology of life opens this question rather than 
deciding it for us. Heidegger recalls the characteristics of life which are to be found in 
De Anima. Life has two chief characteristics, movement and perception, which allow a 
distinction between 'bare' or purely 'nutritional' life and the life of animals. It is 
surprising that Heidegger makes little comment on this, considering the way that we 
have seen the analysis of 'captivation' seems to work against the possibility of any such 
distinction. In any case, he passes over this and concentrates on perceptive life. Now it 
becomes utterly unclear whether we should attribute 'conversance' to the animal. 
Animals have, after all, to kritikon(09): the possibility of separating out and bringing 
out of something, for example, to stalk prey, to lie in wait, to notice, to know their 
dwelling places, to protect themselves against attackers' (AMT, 106/125). We may be 
reluctant to attribute conversance to the animal because that is meant to be the defining 
characteristic of the human. Nevertheless, the question becomes not only possible but 
pressing. It emerges not because we realise that animals have superior abilities which 
we did not know they had before. It is not a question of discovering that animals have or 
do not have certain abilities, but of how we understand the abilities which we know 
them to have. The 'boundary' question is then opened up in a completely different 
dimension, one which in many ways is far more difficult to decide. It is no longer a 
question of deciding whether certain beings do or do not have certain abilities, but of 
questioning the basis upon which they 'have' those abilities. Only when logosis 
understood as conversance, as the way in which human beings are capable and not as 
itself any particular ability, can the question which Aristotle poses be understood in all 
its difficulty. (AMT, 106/126) Only then does it make sense to suggest that this question 
is the most difficult to decide, whilst leaving open the possibility that, `The perceiving 
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of the animal is [... J from the ground up other than that of the human. ' (AMT, 169/196- 
197) 
This analysis does not give us a clear understanding of living capacities that are not 
'conversant, ' but it does make it clear that the issue cannot be decided simply by 
designating certain abilities as belonging to conversant force and then looking to 
discover which kinds of beings possess those abilities. The 'boundary' only becomes 
visible when we see what is peculiar about conversant force. What is peculiar is that 
this force can direct itself 'at one and the same time' towards contraries. 62 Aristotle's 
point is easily lost. It has nothing to do with the flexibility of conversant forces, that 
they can be directed at a greater range of different goals than non-conversant force. Nor 
is it even a question of whether 'contraries play a role or not, ' whether the realm of non- 
conversant force can encompass contraries. Rather, the issue is whether the force as the 
force that it is, not as implying another force, is directed toward contraries. (AMT, 113- 
114/132-133) The example that Aristotle gives is warmth, which is directed only at 
making warm, whilst the art of doctoring is directed at one and the same time at 
sickness and at health. Not that it is directed at bringing both about. Rather, as the 
doctor traverses the realm of her ability she has both in view. Health as that which she 
hopes to actualise and sickness as the contrary which she is trying to avoid. What 
Heidegger is trying to draw our attention to is that there are not various forces at play 
here which simply contradict one another, e. g., the doctoring capability aiming at health 
and the living capacities, such as a virus acting contrary to the doctoring capability. The 
capabilities of the doctor are directed at an aversion of sickness which is at one and the 
same time a promotion of health. The direction towards contraries is possible because 
the realm of conversant force is, 'given to it necessarily and completely according to its 
62 Metaphysics 1046 b4-7 
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ownmost potentiality, ' whilst for force without conversance, 'its realm is completely 
closed off, it lies completely outside the possibility of being opened or closed off. ' 
(AMT, 114/134) That is not to say that it does not have a specific realm or range within 
which its force can operate or be withdrawn. Warmth operates only within a specific 
realm of ability, as do the diverse abilities of living beings. Ultimately, what 
conversance lends to force is the ability to explore the realm of its own ability, not 
through multiple traversals but in one and the same traversal. Exploration does not just 
illuminate and uncover the course which it takes, but it opens up a realm of possible 
courses which will not be actualised: 'This inner boundary belongs to conversance; the 
adopting of one course of exploring, and thus the simultaneous emergence of other 
courses which remain unexplored. ' (AMT, 124/145) 
We still have not answered the question concerning the capacities of living beings. The 
example provided by Aristotle seems to take us further away from this goal, contrasting 
as it does a material force of nature with a human skill. " Yet I would suggest that we 
63 This problem remains unsolved in an otherwise very illuminating essay on Aristotle's notion of 
potentiality by Giorgio Agamben. He comes to the following conclusion about these distinct realms of 
potentiality: 'Other living beings are capable only of specific potentiality, they can only do this or 
that. But human beings are the animals who are capable of their own impotentiality. The greatness of 
human potentiality is measured by the abyss of human impotentiality. ' Potentialities: Collected Essays 
in Philosophy, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999) p. 182. By 
bringing to the fore the essential part played by the finitude of potentiality, i. e, that in itself it involves 
'impotentiality', Agamben picks up a prominent theme in Heidegger's reading. Still, he leaves various 
points unexplained. Firstly, it remains unclear if there is anything distinctive about living beings. Why 
'other living beings' and not just 'other beings'? Secondly, Agamben remains somewhat unclear about 
the significance of the fact that, as we will see, all potentiality involves impotentiality or finitude and 
thus the conversant direction towards contraries is a specific and significant taking up of this finitude, 
rather than simply finitude per se. 
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now have the resources to answer this question in the only satisfactory way. Recall that 
we were left with an uncertainty as to whether the realm of possible perceptions in an 
animal is really completely 'pre-circumscribed' or whether it leaves room for re- 
description and essential disruption. If we decide that the latter must be the case, as we 
must if the evolution of life is to be understood, then we can outline a threefold 
distinction of dynamis in the following manner. Force that is without soul is a force 
which has a completely pre-circumscribed realm or range to which it is neither open nor 
closed off. A living capacity has a realm which is pre-circumscribed, a closed ring of 
possible behaviour, but which is always open to re-circumscription. There cannot be a 
radical opening of the realm of capacity, a complete breakdown of its horizon of 
potentiality, since that would simply entail death for the living being. Nevertheless, 
capacities can be opened to re-circumscription. Thus we can only partially agree with 
the formula of Gilles Deleuze that: 'A living being is not only defined genetically, by the 
dynamisms which determine its internal milieu, but also ecologically, by the external 
movements which preside over its distribution within an extensity. "' The correct 
understanding of a living capacity entails that we come to the point where we see these 
dynamisms of 'internal' milieu and the 'external' movements as inseparable elements of 
capacity. They form the structure of one dynamism, the dynamics of living capacity. 
The ecological forces which open and redefine the realm of a living capacity are not 
'external' to the dynamisms of living capacity; they make those capacities what they are 
by circumscribing the terrain in which a living being can move. So there are not two 
realms of force mutually redefining one another in a living being. Rather, the structure 
of living capacity is the opening of a pre-circumscribed ring to re-circumscription. 
Finally, conversant force is force which is open to another dimension. It is open not only 
insofar as its realm can be re-circumscribed, but open to that realm itself as a force 
64 Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, trans. Paul Patton, (London: Continuum, 2004) p. 269 
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which is always traversing a course one way and at the same time a course which has 
the terrain of possibility in view. Thus, this other course within its realm of capability, 
one which is not that which it is taking, constantly informs that which it is taking. 
Dynamis belonging to conversance can be 'directed towards contraries'. Conversance 
does not in itself alter the breath of the terrain of potentiality that is to be traversed, but 
profoundly affects the manner in which the realm can be traversed. 
Having undertaken an analysis of how Aristotle understands human conversant force as 
production (Herstellen), which we are unable to pursue in detail here, Heidegger tries to 
set conversant force back within the broader context of the dynamic spectrum. At this 
point he gives us a clue as to how it might be possible to conduct a major departure 
from Aristotle's thinking of living nature. Not one more refutation, but precisely a 
departure, a thinking of the dynamics of ecology which finds its origin in Aristotle's 
thought, where certain possibilities of that thought have been covered over. Heidegger 
has already argued that Aristotle, 'achieves the division [of conversant force from force 
without conversance] by going back to the division of beings into apsyche (soulless) 
and empsychan (besouled). ' Now he returns once more to De Anima. In order to set 
conversant force back into the spectrum of dynamis he makes explicit for the first time 
Aristotle's fundamental commitment to an understanding of the soul as a striving after. 
The origin of movement in a besouled being is always a fleeing or pursuing. (AMT 
128/150 cf. De anima 09) The soul is always a striving soul and that striving always 
sets up something striven after: an orekton. This setting up of something striven after 
links animal striving and the striving of human production because both rest upon 
"representation" (Vor-Stellung) understood in a very broad sense. In production, 
according to Aristotle's famous analysis, we require an idea of what we are aiming at 
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and thus set-up something striven after. (AMT, 123/144) Yet this conversant production 
is now set into the context of the striving soul: 
To briefly clarify these connections: an orekton is something posited in a 
striving, through the striving as such set forth (Vor-gestelltes). Striving is 
inherently setting-after something and as such already setting-before; this 
comportment can however, set aside this setting-after and is then only 
setting-before. Everything that we call "representing" (Vorstellen) and 
"intuiting" is inherently this "bare setting before, this bare representing"; it 
is not, for example, the reverse: first represented and then striven after. 
(AMT, 128-129/150-151) 
This, it seems to me, is the fundamental account of the being of living beings which has 
informed practically the entire history of metaphysics whose origin can be traced back 
to Aristotle. Here we see the root of the metaphysics of life grounded in physics of 
impulse and inhibition. The representative capabilities of man are here seen as 
eminently natural, resulting from a mere restraint of striving, which has already set out 
the object to be striven after. Intellectual capabilities are thus the result of the restraint 
of the impulses of life, a genealogy which Nietzsche would later describe in detail. The 
range of dynamis is fenced into an enclosure and all possibilities are seen as more or 
less complex permutations of impulse and restraint, the effects of which can be 
calculated by the economy of nature. By pursuing this 'naturalisation' of human 
capabilities, rather than allowing the spectrum of different ways of negotiating the 
possible to become apparent, the thinking of life is already placed on the path that has 
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led to the economisation of nature. 
As always with these historical lecture courses it is difficult to separate out those lines 
of thought which can help us to undo the economy of nature from those which 
inaugurate and maintain it. Sometimes they are one and the same thought given a 
different inflection. Nevertheless, I think it can be plausibly argued that in this 
meditation on Aristotle's thinking of dynamiswe find both the origin of the economy of 
nature and the resources to begin a shift towards a true ecology. In setting conversant 
force back into the movement of a striving soul Heidegger hits upon that point in 
Aristotle's text which is responsible for covering over a completely different way of 
proceeding. That other procedure can, nevertheless, be glimpsed in his meditation on 
conversance. Instead of tracing conversance back into a striving soul which has always 
already set-up and set-before itself that which is striven after, could we not trace 
conversance into a broader logosof nature, one which would itself then be responsible 
for forming our understanding of living capacity, indeed, of the whole spectrum of 
dynamis. A logos that gathers the natural range of dynamics? Such a possibility does 
indeed come to light, where logos is understood as a gathering and joining of the entire 
spectrum and only secondarily as the realm to which human capacities belong. Whether 
this broader meaning is philologically secondary is difficult to determine, but that does 
not ultimately affect the philosophical point: 
Whether, then, in the history of the word logos the meaning of the gathering 
joining was immediately accompanied by the meaning of gathering saying, 
a meaning that language always already has assumed, and in fact in the 
manner of conversance; whether, in fact, originally language and discourse 
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was directly experienced as the primary and genuine basic way of gathering 
joining, or whether the meaning of gathering and joining together was only 
subsequently added over onto language, I am not able to decide on the basis 
of my knowledge of the matter, assuming that the question is at all 
decidable. (In any case, we already find within philosophy the multiplicity 
of the meanings of logos in Heraclitus). 
(AMT, 104/122) 
If conversant force is joined into the whole spectrum of dynamis it is no longer 
necessary to trace it back to a striving, primordially representative, soul. Rather, it 
would be possible to situate conversance in a range which is itself already gathered by a 
logos before language. For Heidegger it will never be a question of answering this 
historical and philological question in a decisive manner. Rather, all the force of his 
thought will be determined by an attempt to gather dynamis around the pole of this 
gathering and joining before and beyond discourse. The other side of this attempt will 
be a reflection upon the multitude of ways in which the opposite procedure is built into 
our way of thought. Rather than thinking living nature from out of this gathering- 
joining, we are habituated to thinking language from out of the striving representations 
of the animus. 
It has now become somewhat clearer what is at issue in our attempt at a shift from 
economy to ecology in our thinking of living nature. This attempt can only preliminarily 
be understood in terms of the etymology which we drew attention to at the beginning of 
this chapter, insisting upon a difference between the law and the word, which had been 
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covered over in favour of the etymological identity of oikosin ecology and economy. 
Pointing out this difference still leaves the matter indeterminate. What is at issue is not 
an attempt to return our thinking of nature to language, to produce for instance, a 
linguistically constructed understanding of nature. What is called for is not a 
constructivist conception of nature, nor the extrapolation of vital force and even reason 
from 'bare' physical systems. Rather, the call is for a reorientation of our thinking of the 
whole spectrum of forces which, taking its cue from considering conversant force, leads 
us to reject the view that there is anything like 'bare nature' from which complex vital 
structures and then structures of reason arise. This need not even be a rejection of all 
thought of 'law' or structure, but a shift in what we understand the root of natural laws to 
be. No longer patterns of rigid regularity nor categorisations of natural kinds under the 
rule of universals: 
Logos: the relation (die Beziehung), the relationship (das Verhältnis). The 
relationship is what holds together that which stands within it. The unity of 
this together prevails over and rules the relation of what holds itself in 
relation. Logos means therefore rule, law, yet not as something which is 
suspended somewhere above what is ruled, but rather as that which is in 
itself the relationship: the inner articulation and joining (Fügung und Fuge) 
of the beings that stand in relation. Logos is the ruling jointure (regelnde 
Gefüge), the gathering of these beings related among themselves. 
(AMT, 103/121- translation modified) 
In trying to think living nature from out of the relation between Dasein and the animal 
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in the previous chapter we were already making the first step away from the economy of 
nature in which laws are understood as regularities to be applied uniformally in all 
realms of nature, towards an ecology which allows the 'ruling' jointures to emerge only 
from out of the relations themselves. Ecology does not apply the rule of law to nature, it 
receives its ruling jointure from nature. 
Even as he first articulates this gathering jointure Heidegger notices the necessary 
duplicity which it entails. "Language, " understood as conversance and thus joined into 
the spectrum of force, rather than as a modification of the striving soul, entails a 
dispersal. Just as the spectrum of force, to be a spectrum at all, requires that 
fundamental differences be maintained between forces whilst they are gathered together 
in a spectrum, just as a word gathers multiple meanings (none more so than the word 
logos) whilst maintaining their essential equivocality, so this gathering is at the same 
time a dissemination: "'Language" is understood here in the broadest sense of logos as a 
conversant gathering, as a gatheredness of beings in "one"; in Dasein, which is at the 
same time a dissemination (Zerstreuung). " (AMT, 109/128) 
It is essential that the ecology of dynamics does not receive its determination from a 
focus on the particular and determinate relation which human capacities have to this 
gathering and joining, the relation which makes them conversant capabilities. That 
would be to collapse the spectrum into an identity with conversance and establish the 
most inappropriate kind of anthropocentrism. On the other hand, if we find ourselves 
able to follow up the suggestion that conversance receives its capability from elsewhere, 
from a realm which maintains a diverse range of possibilities, then we may be able to 
think of nature itself quite differently and in so doing free living beings from the 
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economy of drives and the striving soul. 
§10 Withdrawal from the Structure of Behaviour 
To conclude this chapter we turn towards an important phenomenon, or rather an 
important feature of the phenomenality or presencing of dynamis: withdrawal (Entzug). 
In a certain sense it is an anti-phenomenon. Yet it must on no account be understood as 
noumenon; it is rather withdrawal in and through appearance. Nor should we conceive 
this 'withdrawal' as a force which works against the phenomenon's drive towards its 
own appearance. Withdrawal is ultimately not a structural moment in the productive 
'force' of phenomenality, but what escapes from productive actualisation as appearance, 
whilst allowing what does appear to show itself.. It is not a counter-phenomenon, but 
allows phenomena to appear, force to take effect, potentiality to be actualised, whilst 
never making phenomena, effect and actuality constantly available as possibilities in a 
space of logical possibility. 
Withdrawal (Entzug) is the term which Heidegger chooses in 1931 to translate 
Aristotle's word steresis, which is more usually translated as 'privation'. It plays an 
absolutely crucial role in his understand of Aristotle. Although he does not say as much, 
Heidegger may well have already had in mind the concept of steresis when he insisted 
upon the animal's 'poverty' in world in The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics. 65 It 
65 Francoise Dastur has suggested this context for understanding the function of 'privation' in the 
1929/30 course. Heidegger et la Question Anthropologique (Louvain: Editions Peeters, 2003) p. 50. 
She also makes a helpful comparison with the 1939 essay on Aristotle's Physis. However, without an 
analysis of the 1931 course on dynamis, it remains unclear why Heidegger's development of these 
themes moves in the direction it does. Only then do the inadequacies of the earlier formulation 
become apparent. 
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would perhaps not go too far to suggest that Heidegger there attempted to give a 
'steretic' account of animality; to show that living nature 'withdraws' from us at the same 
time as drawing us in. The account of 1931 will make some of these connections 
explicit, but also force us to address some inadequacies of the earlier account. 
The subject of the 'withdrawal' of force is broached by Aristotle at the end of chapter 1 
of Book Q of the Metaphysics and is thus correspondingly dealt with at the end of the 
first main section of Heidegger's lecture course. One should bear in mind that by 
returning to this earlier point in the argument we are not returning to a description of a 
more primitive kind of force, as if, for example, force in general were best exemplified 
by the 'forces of material nature' and the capacities of living nature and capabilities of 
human beings could be thought as modifications or developments of this bare force. 
Rather, every kind of dynamis has to be thought of as having a particular relation to the 
'guiding meaning' of dynamis, set out in this first chapter as the 'from-out-of-which of 
change'. So having gained a perspective on the peculiarities of living capacity, it is 
appropriate that we now return to the guiding meaning to pin point exactly what 
Aristotle discerns in dynamis, force-being, which draws all of the particularities together 
as different modes of dynamis. 
At the end of chapter 1 Aristotle makes two famous points with regard to dynamis, 
which have appeared to some commentators to have little to do with the guiding 
meaning and are thus thought to be superfluous to the main point of this chapter. Yet 
Heidegger insists that they are key points and that they show that Aristotle is not simply 
out to elaborate different kinds of force with regard to a universal type, but to grasp the 
essence of dynamis or 'force-being', which can then inform our understanding of the 
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entire spectrum. The first point is the distinction between 'active' and 'passive' force; the 
second is the inner connection of force with 'unforce', the privation or withdrawal of 
force. 
Now with regards to the distinction between what is usually termed 'active' and 'passive' 
force, Heidegger translates dynamis poiein as a force of doing or production and 
dynamis paschein as a force of bearing or toleration. Now the question which we are 
compelled to address, according to Heidegger, is whether one can properly speak of two 
forces here at all. Aristotle explicitly claims that in some sense the two are not two kinds 
of force but are gathered together in the being of force itself, are one, his mia. What the 
distinction thus pertains to, according to Heidegger's interpretation, is not two kinds of 
force 'present at hand' and acting in tandem as the subject and object of force, but a split 
between 'ontic' and 'ontological' concepts of force; two dimensions of force itself, which 
nevertheless form an 'inner cohesion. ' Force itself is 'divisive': 'Thus force does not 
consist of two forces, but rather, if force-being is in a being, then that being is split into 
two forces. ' (AMT, 91/107) The divisiveness of force is not a difference between kinds 
of force, but the unification of the being of force (ontological) which necessarily 
disperses itself into the spectrum of force (ontic). 
If we follow this line of interpretation then it becomes clear why Aristotle then goes on 
to speak of force in relation to 'unforce' or the withdrawal of force. This is not simply 
another disconnected comment about force, but is an attempt to pursue the ontological 
concept of force-being. As we have seen, every force has its own range or scope, a 
circumscribed terrain which is not present-to-hand and mapped out before hand, but 
waiting to be discovered as it is negotiated. This terrain may or may not be open to re- 
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circumscription and may or may not be manifest in itself as range of possibility, 
depending on the kind of dynamis we have in view. 'Unforce' or withdrawal has exactly 
the same scope as the force to which it forms the flip side and all of the distinct kinds of 
traversal are negotiations of a terrain which withdraws itself from view. It does not 
withdraw 'over the horizon, ' as it were, but is itself undiscovered terrain. Now we saw 
that 'conversant force' is a force for which the range it traverses can itself become 
manifest. Yet that does not mean the whole scope of possibility is mapped out by reason 
as human beings traverse the terrain of their capabilities. They too have a particular 
relation to the withdrawal of force which matches the range of their capabilities. 
Blindness for a human being is not a complete absence of visual capability even if one 
is born blind, but a specific range of incapability which matches precisely the range of 
the capability of sight. On the other hand, part of what it means to 'possess' a capability 
is to be able hold it in reserve and remain reticent. If we can speak we can remain silent. 
That is not a further capability, but part of what it means to be able to speak. If we can 
see we can become blind; and even if we do see we can remain blind to what is in front 
of us. Our capabilities are forces which are not only 'inwardly bound to loss and 
withdrawal, ' but can incapacitate themselves on this basis, becoming incapable or 
remaining reticent. Living beings can also be incapacitated within their range of 
capacity, a range which we have seen to be necessarily circumscribed but never fixed in 
its boundary. This perhaps does not amount to reticence, but neither does it require an 
inhibition of drives. Any traversal of a range of living capacities is in itself the 
withdrawal of other capacities within the range, even if this withdrawal is never present 
to the animal. If a 'gene' in the widest possible sense, the capacity to generate any living 
phenomenon, whether behavioural or morphological, is 'switched on, ' it traverses the 
range of capacity in a way which necessarily involves the withdrawal of other possible 
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traversals. If that is true of individual living beings, it is also true of living beings as a 
whole and living beings as they relate to their 'organic and inorganic environments. ' In 
that case we must challenge the basis of many attempts to understand living nature, 
including Heidegger's earlier understanding of captivation as a 'disinhibiting ring' of 
drives. 
What this inner connection to its own withdrawal ultimately entails is that all dynamis is 
finite. It has a range or scope which exactly matches the range of its own withdrawal. 
Hence, although conversant force has a particular relationship to this finitude which 
allows it the 'duplicity' of being directed at once towards opposites, at the end of his 
discussion of chapter 2 Heidegger returns to the inner finitude of the entire spectrum of 
dynamis: 
With this is not meant the thrusting up against external boundaries and 
constraints and advancing no further, or the simple eventual failing; rather, 
the essential finitude of every dynamis lies in the decision over this way or 
that required from out of itself and indissociable from its enactment. Where 
force and power, there is finitude. Hence God is not powerful, and 
"omnipotence, " considered properly, is a concept which dissolves, like all its 
companions, into thin air and is unthinkable. 
(AMT, 135/158-159) 
What the recognition of this finitude and inner divisiveness of all force entails is the 
unsettling of a persistent vitalism which continues to haunt even the most ardent anti- 
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vitalist interpretations of living nature. If vitalism is at its core the attribution of a 'force 
of life' to living beings, which is in itself mysterious and inexplicable, then vitalism is 
not overcome by the disowning of any 'force of life' in favour of bare material forces, 
nor the disowning of the concept of force altogether in favour flat and featureless spaces 
of 'possibility'. If force-being is not adequately grasped in itself then there is no reason 
to think that material 'forces' are less mysterious than a 'life-force'. All of that assumes 
that force-being is itself transparent. Perhaps in the end there is necessarily something 
'mysterious' about'force, ' if everything which withdraws and is not open for inspection 
present-at-hand before us is a mystery. Vitalism thought essentially is not the attribution 
of a mysterious force to living nature, but the unwillingness to acknowledge the inner 
finitude of living capacities. Spinozism would thus be the highest form of vitalism; the 
identification of God's "omnipotence" with the naturing of nature. 
Heidegger has himself constantly been working against vitalist ontology in his analysis 
of 'impossible' source of Dasein's possibility. One of the primary aims of this analysis 
was to withdraw our understanding of human being from the 'biological' context in 
which Heidegger thought it has been placed by Max Scheler. In 1925, in the lecture 
course History of the Concept of Time, Heidegger had discussed Scheler's ontology of 
'impulse' and 'resistance' Scheler manages to move beyond an understanding of human 
beings as a merely thinking things, yet remains in fundamental error when it comes to 
thinking how Dasein is 'in the world' by trying to maintain an analogy to living beings: 
Thus the conception of beings in the world as resistance coheres in Scheler's 
case with his biological orientation, that is, with the question of how the 
world in general is given to primitive forms of life. In my view, this path, 
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which seeks to explain primitive forms of life all the way down to one- 
celled animals, is fundamentally askew. 66 
Against the 'isolated encountering' of an impulse which meets with the resistance of the 
world, Heidegger develops the notion of 'Care' as the most fundamental and basic form 
of Dasein's encounter with the world. 67 For Scheler the structure of behaviour, 
ultimately all behaviour, is an impulse which meets resistance. But Dasein cannot be 
understood by analogy to or extension of the driven impulses or strivings of living 
nature. Nevertheless, this criticism seems to leave the idea that living nature itself can 
be properly understood within this framework completely intact. 
Sure enough, in The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics Heidegger still thought 
animality at least partially in terms of instinctual drives. The environment of captivation 
is described at one stage as a 'disinhibiting ring, ' which the living being encircles itself 
66 GA 20 p. 305. David Farrell Krell discusses these passages and sets them in the wider context of 
Heidegger's relation to 'life-philosophy' in Daimon Life: Heidegger and Life-Philosophy pp. 78-84. 
What he does not do, perhaps because he does not take account for the developments in the 1931 
lecture course, is to pin point how these arguments must be directed against lleidegger's own 
conception of animality of 1929-30. 
67 For my discussion of these two positions see §2 above. In the present context a helpful comparison 
could be made with Ted Toadvine's attempt to lay out the framework for an ecological 
phenomenology. Toadvine identifies the fundamental character of nature as 'resistance phenomena' 
These are comprised of "blind spots" in classical constitutional phenomenology, phenomena which 
resist constitution and are thus closer to what we have, following Heidegger, called withdrawal than 
they are to a vitalist 'resistance' to striving. Nevertheless, the problem with this formulation is that it 
tends to suggest a resistance of certain constituted beings to later comprehension, rather than a 
resistance or withdrawal which works within the constitution or coming to presence of all beings. See, 
Ted Toadvine, 'Naturalizing Phenomenology', in Philosophy Today, SPEP Supplement, 1999. 
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with. This 'disinhibiting ring' is in fact the range of its capacities, the range of its 
dynamis. This ring is a range of capacities which can release 'instinctual drives'. 
Peculiarly, this formulation of the structure of behaviour reverses our usual 
understanding of the inhibition and restriction of drives. Are not drives precisely 
'uninhibited' in themselves, only to be inhibited when they come up against some 
obstacle to their fulfillment? 
Yet if the instinctual drives are precisely characterised by their 
uninhibitedness, then why should the instinctual drive have to be 
disinhibited in the first place? Should we not rather say that it is the other 
which the animal comes upon which inhibits its instinctual drive? We speak 
with a certain legitimacy of the uninhibitedness of instinctual drives when 
we consider the results of such activity as it were, what these drives drive 
towards and what they are driven to do, and especially when we also relate 
these things to our own possible comportment in and toward them- the 
question of control and so on. But if on the other hand we reflect upon the 
instinctual drive intrinsically as such- rather than upon the instinctual 
activity into which it can be released- and consider the instinctual structure 
itself, then we can see that the instinctual drive precisely possesses an inner 
tension and charge, a containment and inhibitedness that essentially must be 
disinhibited before it can pass over into driven activity and thus be 
'uninhibited' in the usual, ordinary sense of the word. 
(FCM, 254/370) 
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What Heidegger has in mind here in distinguishing between the drive in itself and the 
activity into which it can be released is already the Aristotelian distinction between 
potentiality and its actualisation. It is important to note that Heidegger allows a certain 
legitimacy not only to an ethology which takes its cue from activity into which drives 
are released, but even by analogy to a view of our own comportment as a psychology 
concerned with how drives are released and inhibited. Yet he argues that if we look at 
the instinctual drive in itself we will see that it is not always already released into its 
activity, it is not already on the way to actualisation, only to be stopped if it comes up 
against an inhibiting factor. When we come to consider the structure of instinctual 
drives themselves there is a certain reversal in the structure of behaviour. The 'inner 
tension' which characterises the animal's capacity needs to be disinhibited in a 
dimension prior to its uninhibited activity and any resistance which that activity might 
meet with. 
Nevertheless, is Heidegger not still thinking animal capacities on the basis of a model 
provided by the activity into which they can be released? If a drive in itself displays an 
'inner tension' it still seems to be straining against itself to be released into activity. The 
'disinhibiting ring' reverses and internalises the structure of behaviour if that structure is 
thought as a set of activated drives which may meet with resistance. Yet the drive itself 
still seems to be thought on the model of a 'play of forces, ' whereby one force would 
always imply another counter-force and the ring of self-inhibiting capacities requires 
disinhibition. The animal is still thought on the basis of a metaphysics of drive and 
inhibition, even if Dasein has been released into the structure of Care and its ownmost 
possibility. 
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What the 1931 course on Aristotle's concept of dynamishas achieved is to release living 
nature itself from the vestiges of vitalism and the economic exchange of driven 
behaviour which it implies. This is done not by disowning the concept of force 
altogether in favour of something like structures of meaning; what Merleau-Ponty will 
call 'planes of significance' or 'forms of unity'. 68 Rather, force is found to be in itself and 
not only in its relation to conversance, a range which always coincides exactly with a 
range of withdrawal. Living capacities are finite in themselves and thus do not require 
inhibition, whether by external resistance or by internal structures of restraint. The very 
path which a living being negotiates across the terrain of its capacity excludes other 
paths and requires that the terrain itself is provisionally circumscribed. What Heidegger 
now achieves is a withdrawal from the structure of behaviour itself. Not a disowning of 
all structure but a discovery of a withdrawal within force-being. This withdrawal is 
immanent to living capacities, even those without the remarkable relation to their own 
range of possibility which results from conversant force or capability. Living capacities 
are not always already on their way to actualisation, nor is the range of capacity itself an 
68 Merleau-Ponty was perhaps too quick to disavow the concept of force in his discovery of the 
structures of behaviour. His 'transcendental naturalism' is also built upon a division of various 'orders' 
or levels of behaviour which almost exactly mirrors the systematic divisions made by Husserl in Ideen 
H. As 'planes of signification' these orders are then all to be understood upon the basis of final 
'completed form' in human consciousness, see. The Structure of Behaviour, trans. Alden L. Fisher 
(Pittsburg: Duquesne University Press, 1983) p. 201. Merleau-Ponty's analysis already supposes a 
reversal in the order of explanation, but one which fails to open the dimension of 'force-being' Thus, 
whilst the elaboration of 'vital structures' works against the possibility of comprehending living nature 
completely in terms of laws or as an 'absolute economy, ' it does not do so on the basis of opening the 
dimension of 'living capacity' as the being of living beings. Whether Merleau-Ponty later moves closer 
to Heidegger's view, for example in the The Visible and the Invisible is open to debate. The influence 
of Husserlian 'orders' of nature is certainly still to be discerned in many of his later works. 
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'actual' range mapped out in advance of the traversals themselves. They do not have the 
kind of conversant reticence which the manifest range of capability can rely upon, but 
capacity itself is finite and does not need inhibition to prevent it from explosively 
actualising its entire range of capacity at once. 
The need for the discovery of the withdrawal within living capacity is just as necessary 
today, when general dynamics has made nature as a whole into the bearer of a drive into 
the 'adjacent possible' of greater and greater complexity. If nature itself is driven to an 
ever greater development of itself from out of itself with no capacity to bear these 
developments, to withdraw from actualisation, then it will no longer be able to bear and 
sustain its own infinite productions. If, on the other hand, the forces of nature are 
enveloped in a withdrawal which is negotiated by actualisations at the same time and 
precisely because they are developing and actualising themselves, then perhaps life can 
be borne by nature as it is born within nature. This withdrawal is only discovered in the 
whole spectrum of dynamis when that spectrum itself is opened up by a logos which is 
no longer the exclusive property of Dasein, although Dasein maintains a peculiar and 
specific kind of capability through its conversance. When this ecology of force is made 
visible in all its diversity by a gathering and enjoining logos, then the withdrawal and 
finitude of a dynamic ecology can begin to be appreciated. An ecology which would 
make possible the withdrawal that remains unheeded in the always already actualised 
productivity and exchange of the economy of nature. 
Finally, Heidegger's spectrum of dynamis gathers the forces of nature, the capacities of 
life and the capabilities of human beings together with the force of art, violent force and 
divine power. It escapes the threefold structure of the constitution of the physical, 
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animal and spiritual, an order and structure of nature which Husserl imported into 
phenomenology in Ideas II, and a pattern also reproduced by the early Merleau-Ponty in 
The Structure of Behaviour as `Physical, Vital, and Human Orders'. The spectrum of 
dynamisis not held together by analogy, nor is it a hierarchical order constituted in a 
transcendental consciousness. The spectrum is held together by a logos that is not a 
universal or general concept that subsumes particulars under its rule. Dynamis is at once 
dispersed and gathered together by this logos. All force adheres to it in its own 
withdrawal and inner finitude. Thus the discovery of this spectrum, which frees living 
nature into a finitude denied to it by its captivation in the economy of nature, now 
brings us directly to the questions of domination and power over nature which will quite 
naturally become one of Heidegger's central concerns throughout the coming decade. 
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Chapter 3 
The Power of the Earth and The Technicised Animal 
Wir müssen nicht nur die Erde, sondern auch Thiere und 
Pflanzenfür den Übermenschen bereit machen. 69 
Friedrich Nietzsche 
We have moved from a phenomenological encounter with living beings into what may 
appear to be far more abstract reflections on Aristotle's metaphysics of life. This 
became necessary because Heidegger's initial attempt to develop a phenomenology of 
living beings left him with a set of problems revolving around the concept of dynamis, 
suggesting a return to Aristotle's thinking of living force. It may still seem unlikely that 
Heidegger would be able to fully address these problems by turning to the concept of 
dynamis as presented in the Metaphysics. A more straightforward course would run 
through those Aristotelian which deal explicitly with animality and living nature. 
However, I think it has been shown that Heidegger has those texts, particularly De 
Anima, fully in view during the course of the 1931 lectures on force. He uses them to 
illuminate passages from the Metaphysics, but more importantly he shows through his 
interpretation of the first three chapters of book O that Aristotle's phenomenology of 
life is far more powerful than a simple taxonomic categorisation of living beings would 
69 Kritische Studienausgabe, Vol. 10, p. 202 
"We must make not only the earth, but also 
animals and plants ready for the overmen. " 
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suggest. 
Nevertheless, although this return to the Metaphysics initiates an attempt to tackle the 
problems that were thrown up by the phenomenology of living nature, the results have 
not been unambiguous. Heidegger hints at an understanding of life that will provide a 
path of withdrawal from life understood as the striving of actualised drives. Yet his own 
understanding of living nature seemed to remain faithful to Aristotle at the moment 
when the realm of dynamis is reinserted into the realm of life understood as instinctual 
drives. Whether or not Aristotle's thinking of life can ultimately be employed to address 
the problems of evolution and genesis which were thrown up in 1929/30, Heidegger 
certainly shows that Aristotle's texts remain on a crossroad when it comes to the modern 
relation to living nature. They are embedded in the constant struggle of actualised drives 
but they can also provide us with possibilities for another beginning for living nature. 
After a decade of intensive engagement and interpretation Heidegger now began to 
move away from Aristotle. There are undoubtedly a multitude of reasons which could 
be provided to account for this. Between 1931 and 1935, the point at which we will now 
pick up the tread of living nature again, what had not changed? Rather than provide any 
detailed biographical or historiographical account I will continue to pursue the question 
which occupies us here: Once our thinking of the capacities of living nature has been 
located within the spectrum of dynamis, how does the more extreme range of the 
spectrum, the violent force, power and domination which are also to be found within the 
spectrum come to bear upon and transform life itself? In that question historical and 
political terrors do not remain a troublesome contextual concern, but must be 
immediately confronted in our thinking of ecology. 
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We have reached a point at which Heidegger abandons a project which had sustained 
his philosophy and thus this thinking of living nature at the end of the Twenties. He 
abandons this project or perhaps he is abandoned by it. I already mentioned that his 
immersion in Aristotle's philosophy becomes less encompassing. He now departs from 
his 'phenomenological decade'. Most importantly for our purposes however, he 
abandons a project which Being and Time left us with, a project which only lasted a few 
crucial years but which opened his philosophising to a necessity that it may otherwise 
never have come upon. It is the project which he occasionally named 'Metontology'. 
That was the attempt to begin fundamental ontology, an ontology of the understanding 
of being, with an interrogation of beings, an interrogation which Dasein makes possible 
but which is not completed in the analysis of Dasein. It is this project what allows 
Heidegger to attempt a revitalisation and radicalisation of metaphysics in The 
Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics and above all it is this project which allowed 
metaphysics to turn towards a phenomenology of living nature. 
We cannot and must not simply abandon metaphysics. Without it the question of living 
nature cannot be posed in its philosophical dimension. But at the crucial moment 
metaphysics may abandon us. Not simply leaving us with problems which its 
conceptual frameworks cannot but perpetuate, but worse still, leaving us with no 
problems and succeeding in dissolving all its own problems. At the moment we are 
abandoned by metaphysics- by the questioning of beings as such and as a whole, which 
Heidegger comes to name the 'guiding question, ' an interpretation of being which takes 
its lead from beings- then we are left with a decision. To abandon ourselves and any 
question of an appropriate relation to living nature in turn, or to retrieve the question 
which metaphysics posed in the midst of our abandonment. 
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If metaphysics has been the metaphysics of life, when our thought is abandoned by 
metaphysics, can we still think living nature? Can we begin to think living nature, 
perhaps not for the first time, but beginning otherwise? 
§11 What Does it Mean to Orientate Oneself in Thinking the Earth? 
Nature thought otherwise, another nature rather than a second nature, that is what is at 
stake in Heidegger's return to physis and his development of the concept of earth. 
Despite the abandonment of metaphysics, it can still lead us to a point at which we can 
launch this other project. One of these leads is the spectrum of dynamis which we began 
to analyse in the previous chapter. So far I have concentrated on the juxtaposition of the 
first three bands of the spectrum: forces of nature; capacities of living beings and 
capabilities of human beings. Yet in order to gain a full understanding of what 
Heidegger brings into play here we should now turn towards the final three bands: art, 
violent force and power. This will not lead us away from our chosen inquiry since the 
spectrum, it will be recalled, is not a table of categories. Each band in the spectrum is 
held in a unity, not bound by a general definition, but in a joining which is played out 
between the bands. Thus, in order to fully understand the place of living capacities we 
must present the entire spectrum. In any case, it may already appear somewhat strange 
that human 'capabilities' should be distinguished from art or violent force, as though 
they did not also pertain to man. Or that divine power should be left out on its own, as 
though such power does not work through all the other bands of the spectrum. In fact, 
Heidegger has no wish to deny that art or violent force pertain to man, although they 
may not be possessions of man in any straightforward sense. Nor does divine power 
remain at the end of the spectrum, working a singularly creative or retro-active power 
over the earthly powers. Art (Kunst), violent force (Gewalt) and power (Macht) form a 
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triad of dynamis driven to the extreme, dynamis which threatens to shatter the domains 
or horizons which natural force (Kraft), living capacity (Fähigkeit) and human 
capability (Vermögen) inhabited each in their own way. It is on these forces, brought 
into play within nature yet driving it beyond itself, always threatening to push them 
beyond their own possibility, that Heidegger concentrates all his effort in the late 
Thirties. 
To begin with, there are two key texts delivered as academic and public lectures in 1935 
and 1936, concerned with art and with violent force. The Origin of the Work of Art 
brings the concept of earth to the forefront of Heidegger's thinking for the first time. 
The lecture course Introduction to Metaphysics provides an interpretation of the Greek 
Physis in terms of the prevailing (walten) of nature, the violent force (Gewalt) of this 
prevailing and of the human encounter with this violence. " Both of these texts have 
70 I begin with the potentiality of art and the power of the earth as this follows the line of presentation of 
the dynamic spectrum set out in the previous chapter and because the concept of 'earth' allows us to 
orientate ourselves with regard to the range of issues which are now at stake, before moving on to a 
more detailed analysis of the violence of physis and of human being. The precise date of the first draft 
of The Origin of the Work of Art' is unclear, but its seems to have been written just after Introduction 
to Metaphysics in 1935. Jacques Taminiaux, basing his reading on a second draft from 1935 that was 
published in an unauthorised edition in France in 1987, argues that there is already a considerable 
move away from the violent tone of the 1935 lectures, that echoed the Introduction to Metaphysics, in 
the final published version in 1936. See, Jacques Taminiaux, Heidegger and the Project of 
Fundamental Ontology, trans. and ed. Michael Gendre (Albany: State University of New York Press, 
1991) pp. 213-226. For a reading which sees all three versions as attempts to wrest the thinking of art 
away from rechne, poiesis and a logos modelled on human language, but does not see a move away 
from the 'strife' which pertains to the truth of the work of art itself, see Miguel de Beistegui, Thinking 
with Heideggger: Displacements (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003) pp. 126-138. In what 
follows I make no attempt to settle this debate. I concentrate on the final version of the lectures, which 
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provided rich material for commentators wishing to draw out the potential of 
Heidegger's work for environmental philosophy. On the other hand, both have raised 
concern amongst those who feel that Heidegger deals in a cursory way with living 
beings. I think it can be shown that what may appear to be dogmatic statements 
concerning the 'worldhood' of plants and animals are better understood as a 
recapitulation of the previous thinking of animality in terms of a captivating ring of 
capacity, which is now driven beyond its own possibility at the extremes of the 
spectrum of dynamis. 
Although the earth first gained prominence as a counterpoint to world in The Origin of 
the Work ofArt, its presence can be felt'towering through' the world much earlier. " The 
immediate context for the development of the concept of earth in 1935 is the thinking of 
physis in Introduction to Metaphysics and the role played by earth in Hölderlin's Hymns 
"Germania" and "The Rhine, " which Heidegger interpreted in a lecture course from 
1934/35. But the earth made an important appearance more that a decade before this in 
his course on The Fundamental Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy (1924). There the 
earth is not so much a 'counter-concept' to world, but forms part of an exploration of 
Dasein's Being-in-the-World as a 'natural world'. The 'natural world' is not a part or 
region of the total world, but is the whole world itself as it appears under a particular 
I think should be seen as part of an ongoing attempt not to move away from the overwhelming 
experience of violence described in the Introduction to Metaphysics, but to overturn it and reorientate 
it at root. 
71 In his introduction to the essay Hans-Georg Gadamer recalls that the original lectures caused a 
'philosophical sensation' as the counter-concept of earth came to prominence alongside the familiar 
concept of world. Yet for Gadamer himself, familiar as he was with Heidegger's early courses on 
Aristotle, it should perhaps not have come as such a surprise. Hans-Georg Gadamer'Zur Einführung' 
in Martin Heidegger, Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes (Stuttgart: Reclam, 1960) pp. 93-114 
149 
aspect. The characteristic aspect of the 'natural world' is that it appears as 'always- 
already-there' (Immer-schon-Da). The world always appears within an environing- 
world under its natural aspect of 'always-already-there' and at the same time can 'also 
always be other' (GA 18,266). It is at this point that Heidegger introduces the earth: 
The properly-always-in-being (Eigentlich-immer-Seiende), which does not 
need to be sought for long in the natural orientation of the world is the sky. 
The Greek sky and world must be understood as a vault on which the sun 
comes up and goes down. The practical concerns of men are played out in 
the centre, in the meson. The earth is the centre of orientation in the world. 
Such orientation does not yet need to be at all theoretical, nor pertaining to 
natural science. This system of orientation is something absolute. There is 
nothing from whence my Dasein could be relative. There is only a Dasein, 
that Dasein on the earth as the absolute centre of orientation. 
(GA 18,266) 
The sky is a world of natural beings always already there. The earth allows Dasein to 
orient itself in the world. Together they form an absolute system of orientation which 
orients us as beings in the world. It need not pertain to natural science, but any 
theoretical practise must also orient itself around the earth. Heidegger attributes this 
concept of the earth to Greek Dasein and uses it to explain certain aspects of Aristotle's 
cosmology. Nevertheless, we may well be reminded of various attempts to develop a 
phenomenological concept of the 'earth, ' in particular that of the later Husserl. Husserl 
famously suggests that phenomenologically speaking, in contrast to the entire 
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orientation of modern astronomy and physics, perhaps the earth does not move after all. 
Perhaps the orientation of modern physics is only possible if the earth does not move. 
Then, of course, the 'earth' cannot be identified with the planet earth. Nor is it some 
other being besides the planet earth. The earth moves and does not move. It moves 
because it stays in place. " 
Certainly the concept of earth which appears in Heidegger's Hölderlin lectures and then 
in the work of art essay is very different to that earlier hybrid of the Greek and 
phenomenological earth. It is very far indeed from an 'absolute centre of orientation'. 
Nevertheless, the earth does still provide and in turn require a certain orientation for 
Dasein. In fact, the introduction of an earth which is no longer simply to be reached 
through the world, or world under a particular aspect, but is rather in constant strife with 
the world, requires a re-orientation of Dasein, which can no longer rely upon any 
absolute centre of orientation. Heidegger still holds on to the thought that the earth 
cannot appear in its own right, it must appear in and through a world. But the earth now 
gains a certain density of its own, it appears in a world, but as a counter-movement to 
all worldly appearance. Thus, the work of art allows the earth to appear in a world, and 
not only form an invisible background or point for orientation, but it appears as earth, 
refusing to give itself up completely to the world: 'The work moves the earth into the 
open of a world and holds it there. The work lets the earth be an earth. ' (OBT, 24/35) 
72 Edmund Husserl, 'Foundational Investigation of the Phenomenological Origin of the Spatiality of 
Nature', trans. Fred Kersten, in Husserl, Shorter Works, ed. Peter McCormick and Frederick Elliston 
(Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981) pp. 223-226. See also Martin Heidegger, What 
is a Thing? (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1967) p. 85. See also, Juha Himanka, 'Does the earth move? A 
search for a dialogue between two traditions in contemporary philosophy' in The Philosophical Forum 
Vol. XXXI, No. 1,2000 pp. 57-83 
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What then is the earth, if it is no longer the centre of orientation in the natural world? In 
his important study The Song of the Earth Michel Haar identifies fours 'senses' of the 
earth as it appears in the The Origin of the Work of Art and other texts of this period. " 
Firstly, the earth is associated with lithe. That is, the earth participates in truth 
understood as aletheia, as the concealed which is unconcealed in truth. Secondly, the 
earth is associated with nature itself, or more accurately with what the Greeks called 
physis, the coming-forth and standing-forth of beings as a whole. Thirdly, the earth as it 
appears in the essay on the work of art is associated with what might be called the 
'material' of the work. Fourthly, the earth is understood as the 'homeland earth' 
(heimatliche Erde). Finally, Haar suggests that all four 'senses' can be seen as unified 
under the thought of a 'foundationless foundation'. This then becomes the key thesis of 
Haar's work: the earth seems to offer itself as a kind of foundationless foundation which 
can found all of the epochs of history which Heidegger develops as the 'history of 
beyng'. It is not so much a trans-historical principle as a nonhistorical groundless 
ground. 
Haar's analysis provides an invaluable starting point for any attempt to understand the 
significance of the earth in Heidegger's later thought. However, I think that we can pose 
a set of questions on the basis of this analysis, not amounting to a refutation, but 
pointing towards areas in need of further exploration. These questions are formulated on 
the basis of texts which form the context of The Origin of the Work of Art. In 
Contributions to Philosophy (From Ereignis) in particular, many reflections which were 
spurred by ideas first formulated in the work of art essay, were not published until after 
Haar completed his study. The following questions, then, seek to bring those reflections 
73 Michel Haar, The Song of the Earth, trans. Reginald Lilly, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
1993) pp. 57-64 
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to bear upon Haar's formulations. 
The earth has a quality of darkness and self-enclosure, opposed to the openness of the 
world, which puts it in league with the lithe of aletheia. In fact, one is tempted to 
suggest that the strife of world and earth as presented in The Origin of the Work of Art 
maps directly on to the dis-closure of a-letheia. Yet, we have already seen that when the 
earth comes into the open in a work of art it is not fully disclosed in that openness, but 
is held there as earth. In Contributions to Philosophy Heidegger will develop this 
sheltering of the earth into a distinguishing feature of truth in 'another beginning'. That 
truth would be truth which is prepared by a retrieval of truth as a-letheia, but it would 
not itself be the truth of the Greeks. A-letheia as dis-closure has already decided upon a 
certain path for truth: 
a-letheia means unconcealment and the unconcealed itself. This already 
shows that concealing itself is only experienced as that which is to be 
abolished, what must be taken away (a-) 
(CP, 245/351) 
Lethe is a concealing and self-enclosure, but one which has already been prepared for 
disclosure, which stands ready for its own abolition. In this way truth has already been 
set on the path towards the annihilation of the enclosure which stands in need of 
disclosure, the natural light which attempts to penetrate to the very core of the earth. 
The truth of 'another beginning' would be, 'an essentially different projecting-open than 
aletheia, although this projecting open belongs to the remembering of aletheia' (CP, 
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245/351). That truth would be a 'clearing for concealing' (my emphasis). No longer a 
lithe which stands ready for unconcealment, but a clearing which is experienced as the 
sheltering of concealment. Thus the 'grounding' of another beginning is experienced as a 
'sheltering-concealing' (Bergung). The world is not swallowed up into the darkness of 
the earth, but the world is re-orientated towards the earth. If this reorientation is not 
taken into account then the identification of earth with lithe could be misleading. 
Our reservations concerning the second sense of the earth, the sense of physis, run along 
similar lines. Certainly, the notion of earth is introduced in the closest proximity to 
physis. In The Origin of the Work of Art Heidegger writes: 'Early on, the Greeks called 
this coming forth and rising up into itself of all things Physis. At the same time physis 
lights up that upon which man bases his dwelling. We call this the earth. ' (OBT, 21/31) 
The earth, like physis, contains the sense of all being as a coming forth from out of itself 
and standing forth into a world. The concern is that nature thought in such a way would, 
like the lithe of aletheia, be implicitly understood as that which always only awaits its 
own unfolding and bringing-forth into the light of a world. The earth would then be in 
danger of becoming that which awaits its own abolition in a world. Admittedly, 
Heidegger is always at pains to point out that the 'strife' of world and earth is of mutual 
necessity to each. The earth could not do without world. In the Introduction to 
Metaphysics he already writes that: 'Physis is the event of standing forth, arising from 
the concealed and thus enabling the concealed to take its stand for the first time. ' (IM, 
16/12) Physis, the movement of unconcealing, allows the concealed the stand forth for 
the first time. We can see here that a complex relation between aletheia and physis is 
being working out, which complicates the 'senses' of the earth. The earth could not, for 
example, simply be identified with lithe or with physis. Lethe, the concealed, plays its 
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own role in Heidegger's understanding of physis. The way that this role is now played 
out can only confirm our suspicion that the movement of physis appears to be orientated 
towards the the standing-forth of beings. Physis is predominantly the unfolding of itself 
into the world. It may also fold back into itself, but this would seem to come as a 
secondary and derivative moment of decay in the physis of the first beginning. It could 
all too easily become simply a 'condition' of unfolding. To think the earth would not 
simply be to think physis amongst other things, but to reorient ourselves towards physis 
and even to reorient physis towards itself. The question from which such a re- 
orientation would set out thus reads: how can the concealed take a stand for the first 
time in the standing forth of physis, without ultimately becoming the standing reserve of 
concealment, awaiting only its own abolition in truth? 
Furthermore, Heidegger makes a claim which should give us further pause before 
straightforwardly ascribing physis to the 'senses' of the earth: 
World is 'earthy' (of the earth), earth is of the world. Earth is in one sense 
more originary than nature, because it is bound to history. 
(CP, 193/275) 
It is true that Heidegger also frequently argues that what the Greeks understood by 
physis was 'more originary' than everything that came later under the sign of 'nature'. 
Yet he usually argues this point on the basis that physis never referred to a particular 
region of beings, physis, never stands over against grace, or history, or technology. In so 
far as all of these dichotomies are formed by contrast to nature, nature still holds a 
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certain 'priority, ' but has forgotten the realm in which these distinctions must be 
formulated. (PM, 183-184/309-311) That the 'earth' should now be characterised as 
'bound to history' does not mean that in this notion a reconciliation or even 
contamination occurs between nature and history. The earth is not historical in the sense 
that we come to realise that what appeared to a be natural landscapes or habitats have 
been shaped by a history, which almost inevitably includes the influence of man upon 
the environment. The earth is historical because it is a concept which can only appear 
from out of the midst of and at the end of the 'history of beyng, ' the history of the 
forgetting and abandonment of being. Physis could never be historical in this way, 
because, as the Greek experience of nature naturing, it stands at the origin of the 'first 
beginning'. Physis is not only unhistorical because it is nature before nature splits itself 
into nature and history. It is unhistorical because it stands at the origin of the history of 
nature. 
The third 'sense' of earth, according to Haar, can be characterised as that which would 
previously have been called the 'material' of a work of art. The material is the source of 
the potentiality of the art work. It is into this sense of the earth which we would need to 
inquire in order to discover precisely how art comes into its own in the spectrum of 
dynamis. It is not my intention to pursue this question in detail here, since I am now 
concerned only to investigate how the breadth of the spectrum impacts upon 
Heidegger's understanding of living nature and Dasein's relation to living beings. 
However, certain questions would have to be addressed by an investigation attempting 
to place the specific potentiality of art within this spectrum. Firstly, does the earthy 
character of the work, its 'materiality, ' restrict the potentiality of the work within a 
certain range or horizon? We saw in the previous chapter that material force, living 
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capacity and human capability are all held within a specific, although not fixed and 
unchanging, horizon. Does the materiality of an art work hold the work within a specific 
horizon and if so, what relation does the work hold to its own horizon? Secondly, does 
the horizon of 'artistic force' vary according with the material of the work? If so, does 
the variation follow the lines of common taxonomies, or could it be the case, for 
instance, that the material aspect of a certain language could hold a poem within an 
horizon of force which was closer to that of a wood carving than the carving itself was 
to a statue shaped from marble? Finally, what sense are we to make of the 'materiality' 
of the work, in the context of an essay which sets out to dismantle the metaphysical 
dichotomy of matter and form, hyle and idea? However much we insist that the earth is 
not the empty or indeterminate potentiality which is usually ascribed to hyle, are we not 
in danger of re-inscribing this pure indeterminacy into the materiality of the earth? What 
is the sense of 'materiality' beyond matter and form? What is the sense of this material 
'sense' of the earth? Only by addressing these questions in detail could the place of art in 
the spectrum of dynamis be determined. With that, the 'strife of world and earth' might 
be found to be only a starting point for the determination of artistic force. 
The fourth sense of the earth is perhaps its most treacherous territory. The earth as 
homeland is also the sense which Heidegger most directly appropriates from Hölderlin. 
Yet from the very moment that he takes up this theme Heidegger gives it an unexpected 
meaning: 
Homeland (Heimat)- not simply as the place of birth, nor as the familiar 
landscape, but rather as the power of the earth (Macht der Erde), upon 
which man at each time, each according to his historical Dasein, "poetically 
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dwells"... The land lies full of expectation under the stormy heavens, the 
whole of homely nature lies in the surrounding shadows that have 
descended. In such a homeland man first experiences himself as belonging 
to the earth. He does not make it serviceable to his attunments in accordance 
with empathy, but rather the other way around: from here he can first 
experience that his individual I-ness (Ichheft), which first of all sets itself 
over against everything, so that it only takes it as an object of its own grace 
and to fill out its lived experiences, comes to nothing. 
(GA 39,88) 
The experience of the power of the earth as homeland might be an experience of 
belonging to a particular stretch of land, as in this case the overpowering storm marks 
out a stretch of shadowy land with which Dasein is now attuned in expectation. But this 
means that I never belong to one stretch of land once and for all. Through the power of 
the earth I can become attuned to any landscape in a multitude of ways, not only 
through a bare familiarity. Through the power of the earth my homeland is not 
indeterminately 'the whole world, ' but through my homeland I belong to the earth and 
not just a stretch of territory. 
Not only that, but the power of the earth can be overpowering. It can explode even the 
horizon of my 'ownmost possibility'. The homeland earth (heimatliche Erde) will not 
allow us to rest peacefully in the security of our own enclave upon the earth, but 
demands that we encounter what is most strange and alienating. Heidegger's 
interpretations of Hölderlin's poetry will continue to emphasise this theme, especially in 
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the 1942 lecture course Hölderlin's hymn: "The Ister", where the movement of 
Hölderlin's 'river hymns' is understood as a 'becoming homely, on the ground of being 
unhomely, ' a movement which binds the being of the river and being of man in their 
mutual attunement. Haar himself is well aware of the uncanny aspect of a 'homeland 
earth' and he is also quite clear that this homeland does not amount to anything like 
place of birth or nationality. The final chapter of The Song of the Earth is a brilliant 
development of this theme, putting Hölderlin into dialogue with Saint-John Perse. 74 
Nevertheless, it remains questionable whether Haar is correct to emphasise the 
'adoption' of the earth as homeland, even if it is a dwelling which, 'keeps asking to be 
chosen, adopted. "' One does not appropriate the native earth to oneself. Rather, as 
evidenced by Heidegger's thinking of the homeland earth above, the earth appropriates 
us, bringing the 'I' which would prefer simply to enjoy its earthly lived experience 
whilst trying to secure it and make it its own, to nothing. 
We are left with the final 'unifying' sense of the earth as 'foundationless foundation'. 
Here it is not so much a question of doubting the decisive importance of such a notion. 
The 'abyssal ground' is a notion at the heart of Heidegger's reflections in and 
surrounding Contributions to Philosophy. What is questionable is whether abyssal 
ground can be taken as the unifying sense of the earth. Any 'unifying sense' is in danger 
74 Unfolding the full political and philosophical implications of the 'homeland earth' would take us 
beyond our current concerns. For further reflections on the topic see for example, Miguel de Beistegui 
Heidegger and the Political: Dystopias, (London: Routledge, 1998), Chapter Four "The Free Use of 
the National" and William McNeill, 'Heimat: Heidegger and the Threshold' in Heidegger towards the 
Turn: Essays on the Work of the 1930s ed. James Risser (Albany: State University of New York Press, 
199) pp. 319-349 
75 Michel Harr, The Song of the Earth: Heidegger and the Grounds of the History of Being, trans. 
Reginald Lilly (Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1993) p. 63 
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of reinstating a taxonomic procedure which it is unlikely that the earth can bare. As with 
the dimension of thought which I have named the 'spectrum of dynamis, ' the unity must 
arise from within the dimension of sense, not from a unifying sense. At most a 'guiding 
sense' can lead us into the dimension which is to be held open and explored. A 
definition will only close that dimension in on itself, but will not shelter what remains 
concealed, since it claims to open up every possibility for our inspection. 
In the context of Heidegger's 'history of beyng, ' we may need to reconsider Haar's 
central claim. If the earth as 'foundationless foundation' is the abyssal ground of all 
historical epochs, then the earth is indeed in a sense 'bound to history'. In another sense, 
as Haar suggests, it is itself nonhistorical, although it only comes into its own in history. 
What Haar may indirectly be pointing us towards is a re-orientation of man towards the 
earth and above all of beyng towards its own earthiness. The earth would then not only 
stand as the abyssal ground of the history of the abandonment of beyng, but could be 
reorientated towards another history. A history which is truly of beyng as that which 
withdraws and not only the history of withdrawal. A history of the earth perhaps. 
In pursuing this set of questions concerning Haar's interpretation of the earth we have 
mapped out some of the essential features in the terrain of the turning in beyng, a 
turning through metaphysics towards preparation for 'another beginning'. Before 
returning to the main question of this thesis, the place of animality and living nature in 
this terrain, we can now pursue the spectrum of dynamis into its final phases. The force 
of 'art' finds its place in the earth. The earth has the character of a power; the power of 
the earth attunes human existence. The characterisation of this power is now of utmost 
importance. We are led from the earth into the last two bands in the spectrum of 
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dynamis: violent force (Gewalt) and power (Macht). I suggested above that what 
characterises these forces is that they are overwhelming. Violent force overwhelms that 
which it comes up against, but it also overwhelms itself as force or potentiality, it 
overwhelms itself and its own horizon. It is now time to see precisely what his entails. 
§12 The Nature of Violence and the Violation of Nature 
The violent tropes in Heidegger's thinking of the work of art are well known. World and 
earth are in strife, the world opening the earth into unconcealment, the earth 'towering 
through' the world, showing itself as that which refuses to be entirely disclosed. The 
'ground plan' or sketch of the work (Riß) is at the same time a rip or tear (Riß), by 
virtue of which truth as unconcealment is set into the work. In order to uncover the roots 
of this violence and to see precisely how it has been acted out against living nature we 
must depart from this orientating sketch of the power of the earth and the 
transformations which it initiates and return to Heidegger's interpretation of the first 
choral ode in Sophocles' Antigone in 1935.76 
76 There has been considerable debate over the significance of the differences between Iieidegger's first 
reading of this ode in 1935 (GA 40) and his second reading in 1942 (GA 53). Miguel de Beistegui 
offers a comparison of the two readings in which he highlights the shift towards a more purely 
'ontological' reading in 1942. This shift, whilst tending to alleviate some of the more disturbing 
aspects of the first reading, also seems to have a tendency to prevent the concrete reflection on acts of 
violence which the more onto-ontological reading kept alive. The second reading nevertheless still 
presents us with a confrontation between technical mastery and a strifely poetic thinking. See, Miguel 
de Beistegui, Heidegger and the Political: Dystopias (London: Routledge, 1998). Clare Pearson 
Geiman, on the other hand, suggests that an even more radical break takes place between the two 
readings. She argues that in his second reading Heidegger has left behind the 1935 thinking of poetry 
as part of an essentially violent opening of the world for precisely the opposite, a responsibility that is 
'fundamentally non-violent'. Interestingly, the crux of Geiman's interpretation is the thought that 
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Introduction to Metaphysics sets out to recover the fullest sense of physis, as the 
prevailing of being itself. Heidegger opens the course by attempting to find something 
disconcerting in the familiar question of metaphysics: Why are there beings at all 
instead of nothing? He then discusses the etymology of the word 'being' and considers 
whether there is an 'essence of being' which prevails throughout all the vastly diverse 
meanings of this word. The second half of the lecture course is then used to trace what 
he describes as a 'concealed history' of being (IM, 97/70). This is in fact the first draft 
of many attempts to tell this concealed history. Here the history takes the form of 
between the two readings Heidegger has come to rehabilitate spatiality and locality as fundamentally 
irreducible to temporality and is thus no longer able to identify being with power. See, Clare Pearson 
Geiman, 'Heidegger's Antigone's' in A Companion of Heidegger's 'Introduction to Metaphysics' ed. 
Richard Polt and Gregory Fried (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001) pp. 161-182, p. 174. It 
seems to me, however, that Geiman goes too far when she sees in the more elaborate discussion of the 
three meanings of to demon in the second reading only a 'nod' towards the first reading. Power and 
violence are still central meanings here, even if they are not as all pervasive as in 1935 (See footnote 
80 below). There is a great deal of truth in the idea of a move away from violence, but it is more of a 
move through an experience of overwhelming violence and the disempowerment of physis. One 
cannot simply extract oneself from violence and assert non-violence when being itself has been bound 
to violence. As Geiman acknowledges, we can and must move towards responsibility, but we cannot 
do that without renewed reflection on the experience of the overwhelming and of violence. In this 
experience Heidegger does not seek to eliminate from philosophical understanding the potential for 
violence and even the potentiality of violence. He seeks to move through this overwhelming 
experience and reorient us within it. For further contributions to this debate see, Stephen Davis, The 
Path of Thinking, Poetizing and Building: The Strange Uncanniness of Human Being on Earth', in 
Heidegger and the Earth: Essays in Environmental Philosophy, ed Ladelle McWhorter (Kirkville: 
Thomas Jefferson University Press at Northern Missouri State University, 1992) pp. 37-50 and 
Timothy Clark, The Poetics of Singularity: The Counter-Culturalist Turn in Heidegger, Derrida, 
Blanchot and the later Gadamer (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2005) pp. 40-48 
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various 'restrictions of being, ' as being is marked off over against some other concept in 
various dichotomies. These are: being and becoming; being and seeming; being and 
thought; being and the ought. By far the longest of these chapters is that concerned with 
'being and thought'. Heidegger here struggles with the saying of Parmenides: to gar 
auto noein estin to kai einai, 'thinking and being are the same. ' Quite suddenly in the 
midst of his commentary Heidegger breaks off. He asserts that it is difficult to approach 
this saying directly and that he will take a circuitous route through the first choral ode of 
Sophocles' Antigone, in order to introduce us to the Greek poetic-projection of being- 
human. 
What follows is a very unorthodox interpretation in three stages. An interpretation 
which, as Heidegger himself claims, steadily increases in violence. It is a violence 
which the interpretation itself does not seek to justify, but to render almost inevitable. 
For the reading of the choral ode places being-human in the midst of an 
overwhelmingly violent nature as the 'violence-doer'. Sophocles' vision of being-human 
is inseparable from his projection of physis as the Overwhelming. In the midst of the 
manifold of the uncanny man appears as the 'most uncanny'. 
If we compare Heidegger's reading of the Antigone ode with one which appeared 
several decades later, it will become apparent just how unusual Heidegger's reading is. 
Hans Jonas was a student of Heidegger's during the Twenties. In 1933 he fled Germany 
and from 1955 lived in the United States where he taught philosophy for many years. 
From early work on the Gnostic tradition, Jonas developed a philosophy which was 
critical of Heidegger's early thinking, claiming that it failed to deal adequately with the 
philosophical questions raised by biological life. Jonas went on to develop an 'ethics of 
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responsibility' in his book The Imperative of Responsibility: In Search of an Ethics for 
the Technological Age. This book was influential in the development of ecological 
philosophy, especially in Germany, during the Seventies and Eighties. It is therefore 
appropriate that we consider what Jonas has to say at a point of particular proximity to 
Heidegger, so that we can gain some further context for the present investigation and 
see precisely where Heidegger's thought can be joined to a central strand of ecological 
thinking and where its breaks away from and demands a reorientation of that thought. 
In The Imperative of Responsibility Jonas sets out to explain the need for a completely 
new approach to ethics. He does so by suggesting that previous ethical thought has been 
unable to encompass the idea that the human relation to nature is subject to change and 
that it has therefore generally thought ethical principles as, in principle, eternal. If it can 
be shown that the human relation to nature has been subject to fundamental changes, 
then an ethics must be developed which can respond more adequately to the current 
situation. In his very first chapter Jonas gives an example of the human relation to 
nature in antiquity which has been left behind: the first choral ode of Sophocles' 
Antigone. 
Neither Heidegger nor Jonas situate this choral ode in the context of the tragedy as a 
whole. " Rather they take it to be exemplary of the Greek understanding of human being 
and the then prevailing relation of man to nature. Famously this ode tells of man's 
relation to an inhospitable nature. It tells of his adventures on the sea and his taming of 
the earth. It goes on to tell of the building of cities and the institution of laws. The ode is 
77 Although in his second reading of 1942 Heidegger does take some pains to show that Antigone herself 
is the authentic embodiment of the 'uncanny, ' in accordance with his usual reading practice this is 
based on a close reading of a few lines. 
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frequently taken as an account of how man arose from out of nature to a state of 
civilisation. As such it is a narrative which puts a fundamental ambiguity at the heart of 
'civilisation, ' because it shows its contiguity to and continuity with the violence 
employed to arise from out of nature with the institution of the laws of the city. As 
Jonas puts it, The raping (Vergewaltigung) of nature and civilising of man go hand in 
hand. 08 
At times it is almost impossible to believe that Jonas does not have Heidegger's lecture 
course in mind when he turns to Sophocles. 79 The two readings frequently seem to be in 
close proximity to one another. Certainly the two thinkers are motivated to turn to the 
choral ode by similar concerns, not primarily historical or literary, but with the 
conviction that in these lines of poetry we find a clue as to man's primordial relation to 
nature and a point of departure for understanding our contemporary ecological 
condition. However, upon closer inspection the two readings diverge at crucial points. 
By tracing these points of divergence we will come to see that the readings as a whole 
are in fact very different and appreciate just how Heidegger's diagnosis of our 
ecological condition differs radically from widely accepted interpretations which 
broadly follow Jonas' reading. 
The points of divergence correspond to what Heidegger names the three points of 'inner 
integrity' of the ode. These are the points at which Heidegger's own reading is most 
controversial, but which hold together his understanding of being-human for the Greeks. 
78 Hans Jonas, The Imperative of Responsibility: In Search of an Ethics for the Technological Age, trans. 
Hans Jonas with David Herr (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1984) p. 2 
79 This may even have been the case, as Introduction to Metaphysics was published as a separate edition 
before its appearance in the Collected Edition and was widely read after the war. 
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The first point of inner integrity is broached in the first two lines of the ode. Heidegger's 
translation reads: 
Manifold is the uncanny, yet nothing 
uncannier than man bestirs, rising up beyond him. 
(IM, 156/112) 
Here man is from the very start placed in a position of ambiguous affinity with nature as 
a whole, whilst at one and the same time being distinguished from it. Nature is uncanny, 
but man is the uncanniest. Our whole understanding of this ode and consequently of 
human being relies upon an adequate appreciation of the uncanny. Heidegger 
elaborates: 
The deinon is the terrible in the sense of the overwhelming sway 
(überwältigenden Walten), which induces panicked fear, true anxiety, as 
well as collected, inwardly reverberating, reticent awe. The violent, the 
overwhelming is the essential character of the sway itself (Das Gewaltige, 
das Überwältigende ist der Wesens-charakter des Waltens selbst). When the 
sway breaks in, it can keep its overwhelming power to itself. But this does 
not make it more harmless but only more terrible and distant. 
(IM, 159-60/114-115) 
In that final characterisation of the sway of physis we hear an echo of the reticence 
166 
which Heidegger has been trying to recover in his interpretation of dynamis. The 
overwhelming power of physis need not come into effect. In stark contrast to, for 
example, the God of Spinoza, the power of physis is overwhelming, yet it is a wave 
which does not break on the world of beings by any natural necessity. Its power is not a 
power always already actualised. 
On the other hand, man seems compelled to violence. This is not simply a matter of 
survival against the odds, in the face of the overwhelming violence of nature. Man is 
compelled to act out violence as the violence-doer to hold his own, in his very affinity 
with nature. Rather than having violence at his disposal, Heidegger argues that man has 
violence not as a trait of his 'doing' but of his very Dasein. It is not simply a matter of 
the various violent deeds we perform, they are only indicative of the violence which 
makes up our very existence. This is how Heidegger understands humanity as the 
'uncanniest'. Humanity is deinon -uncanny- in a double sense. Firstly because 
it, 
'remains exposed to the overwhelming sway, because it essentially belongs to being. 
But secondly, 'because it is violence doing in the sense we have indicated. [It gathers 
what holds sway and lets it enter into an openness. ]' (IM, 160/114) Humanity is violent 
from the ground up, because it belongs to the overwhelming sway of being and because 
it uses violence to open up that sway to itself. These are not two violent characteristics 
which join in man, natural violence and violence against nature, but two facets of our 
violent nature which meet in our very being, making us the most uncanny. This 
characterisation of our being, according to Heidegger, does not simply pick us out as a 
particularly intense example of natural violence, but articulates our unique character as 
those who take up, govern and manage the overwhelming. Yet in doing so do not 
dominate it or bring its finitude to the fore. Human violence does not seek to tame 
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nature, but to goad it to ever greater expressions of its own overwhelming violence, 
which man can manage and channel into further provocation. 
The 'uncanny' is a translation of demon which Heidegger claims is not meant to cover 
over the terror and violence of nature and humanity. 8° Rather, this translation is meant 
to point us towards the condition in which this terror and violence arise. That is the 
80 In his second reading of this Antigone choral ode in the 1942 lecture course Hölderlin's Hymn: The 
Ister Heidegger offers an interpretation which builds upon but also significantly differs from that of 
1935. In particular he offers a more complex reading of the vaious meanings of to demon rather than 
focusing so quickly on human being as to deinoteron. The usual German translation is 'das 
Ungeheuere'- the terrible, monstrous or extraordinary. In the 1935 course Heidegger does not eschew 
this translation (which is that given in 11ölderlin's own translation of Antigone) but he already prefers 
'das Unheimliche'- the uncanny- as more encompassing. In 1942 a set of essential ambiguities are 
located in the uncanny itself, preceding the interpretation of human being as the most uncanny: 
To summarize, we can more or less delimit the range of the defnon as follows. It 
means three things: the fearful (das Furchtbare), the powerful (das Gewaltige), the 
inhabitual (das Ungewöhnliche). Each time it can be determined in opposing ways: the 
fearful is that which frightens, and as that which is worthy of honor; the powerful as that 
which looms over us, and as that which is merely violent; the inhabitual as the 
extraordinary, and as that which is skilled in everything. 
(GA 53,64/78) 
In the central ambiguity between the powerful as that which looms over us and the merely violent we 
may hear the echo of the passage in 1935 in which the overwhelming is said to be no less terrible 
because it need not actualise its power in acts of violence. In the final opposition we already hear 
intimations of the uncanny as it lies at the. ground of being human. All of these oppositions are 
brought together as the 'uncanny', which is not meant as another meaning, but as the essence of deinon 
where these oppositions belong together without reconciling them with one another, nor resolving the 
inner tension in each meaning. 
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condition of beings which are thoroughly 'unhomely' (unheimlich): 'The unhomely does 
not allow us to be at home. Therein lies the over-whelming' (IM, 161/116) Nature does 
not allow us to live within our own limits, the horizons of our own capabilities, our 
natural talents and familiar customs. It overwhelms us. Strangely and terrifyingly, as we 
harry nature we are harried and torn away from ourselves, driven beyond our own 
nature. But in doing so we become most natural, for nature itself is overwhelming. 
Rather than a narrative which relates how humanity carved out a peaceful home for 
itself in the midst of a hostile nature, Heidegger perceives at the heart of this ode the 
being of a humanity which is ultimately unable, however hard it tries, to make itself at 
home in nature. 
Jonas too has a sense of the overwhelming power of nature which pervades the choral 
ode. He presents it as the unarticulated background against which all of man's 
spectacular acts of daring remain just that. Nature as a whole will bear any assault. In 
contrast to Heidegger, however, Jonas understands the violent acts of man to be 
precisely the preliminary assaults which will eventually lead to a definitive domination 
of nature at the hands of man's relentless inventiveness. Intent upon presenting a 
coherent picture of an ancient relation to nature which has been outstripped, Jonas 
remains unable to grasp the point of transition in the choral narrative, from daring 
assault to the institution of law, as already implied in the ambiguity of human being 
thought as the most uncanny. The constitutive ambiguity of the most uncanny is at once 
the very being of humanity and the almost unthinkable transition which gives the lie to 
any narrative of progressive domestication of nature followed by domination. 
This leads us to the second prominent phrase and point of inner integrity. Having 
169 
described various forays and adventures which man makes into nature and his coming 
into his own in language and the laws of the city, Sophocles turns towards the limits of 
this resourcefulness: '[R]esourceful in all, he meets nothing that is to come resourceless. 
A single onslaught, death, he was unable to resist by any flight. ' Heidegger here 
reiterates the duality which man as the uncanniest has displayed in his translation of this 
line: 'Everywhere trying out, underway; untried, with no way out he comes to Nothing. ' 
(IM, 157/113) Rather than laying further emphasis on man's resources, Heidegger's 
translation thus directly links that resourcefulness to its own integral finitude. In his 
being underway man comes to Nothing and in coming to Nothing he gets underway. 
Thus, whereas most interpretations understand Sophocles to be picking out death as the 
one exception against which man has no resources, Heidegger has already brought 
man's finitude into the very core of that resourcefulness. Death is the inner horizon of a 
resourcefulness which appears to have no outer limits. Through death, the capabilities 
of man are joined to the overwhelming sway of nature. Death does not set the final limit 
to man's resourcefulness but is the source of all his resources. In this way, Heidegger 
claims, we can come to read, 'Everywhere trying out, underway' as an interpretation of 
man as the most uncanny. 
Later it becomes clearer what this interpretation of humanity's resourcefulness entails. 
In the second strophe, at the point which conventional readings identify as the crux of 
the entire ode, when humanity turns from assaults upon nature to its own domain in 
language and the laws of the city, there is no real transition and everything decisive has 
already come to a head. If we fail to realise this we are led, according to Heidegger, to 
the kind of misinterpretation in which the entire ode is understood as the tale of 
humanity's transition from a primitive to a cultivated state: 'The fundamental error that 
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underlies such ways of thinking is the opinion that the inception of history is primitive 
and backward, clumsy and weak. The opposite is true. The inception is what is most 
uncanny and mightiest. ' (IM, 165/119) In such a remark we find perhaps the 
culmination of what is most disturbing in Heidegger's reading. It sounds a note of 
primitivism which is all too easily identified with the dominant ideology of the time. 
Yet this disavowal of modernity's superiority is perhaps in the final analysis not a 
moment of counter-point to enlightenment, but to be found at its very inception. Perhaps 
there is no crisis of modernity, but rather modernity itself is a condition of crisis that 
calls thought to make fundamental decisions and to renew again and again the thinking 
of what is truly decisive. If that is the case, then despite all protestations to to contrary, 
Heidegger remains the most modem of thinkers and nowhere more so than in his 
reading of Sophocles. 
Be that as it may, what is essential for Heidegger is that the transition to be made here is 
not from primitive beginnings to civilisation, but a turning which already takes place 
with the the being-human of humanity. When it comes to the resources which are 
supposed to 'belong' to humanity above all, we are asked to concede that they are not 
our sole and absolute possession, that we do not control and dominate them, even as 
they are our own and make us out as those who we are: 
The extent to which humanity is not at home in its own essence is betrayed 
by the opinion human beings cherish of themselves as those who have 
invented language and understanding, building and poetry. 
How is humanity ever supposed to have invented that which pervades it in 
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its sway, due to which humanity itself can be as humanity in the first 
place?... The word edidaxato does not mean "human beings invented" but 
rather: they found their way into the overwhelming and therein first found 
themselves- the violence of those who act in this way. 
(IM, 167/120) 
Thus the 'inventions' of humanity are no less a part of the violence of the overwhelming 
than the sea, earth and animals. There is no transition from nature to culture, but a 
turning within nature in which man disposes of overwhelming violent forces. The 
reason that this remains unrecognised is nothing to do with the pride or hubris of 
humanity, but with the very consequences of this same dispensation of violence. As it 
creates routes in the overwhelming it, begets in itself its own un-essence (Un-wesen). 
This poetic projection of being sets limits for itself from which it then has no way out. 
(IM, 169/121) Thus, ironically, human beings reveal themselves as the most uncanny 
just at that point when they feel themselves to be most in control of their own clever 
'inventions'. 
For Jonas the transition from 'man in nature' to 'man in the city' remains the real turning 
point of this poetic projection. Not only that, but this turning marks a decisive turning 
away from nature, which then formed a background from out of which man could carve 
out his own domain of laws and change, under the apprehension that this would never 
harm the eternal and unchanging order of nature: 
The immunity of the whole, untroubled in its depth by the importunities of 
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man, that is, the essential immutability of Nature as the cosmic order, was 
indeed the backdrop to all of mortal man's enterprises, including his 
intrusions into that order itself. " 
Thus, for Jonas, nature was thought to be essentially invulnerable until only very 
recently. We are now finally beginning to realise that our power of domination has 
reached such a height, through the ever extended influence of our technological acts, 
that nature as a whole might be vulnerable after all. A new ethic of responsibility is 
required to curb our ever increasing domination of nature, whereas before the domain of 
ethics remained safely locked inside the city. 
Heidegger's understanding of this history is in stark contrast to Jonas'. For him the 
physis of the Greeks was never an eternal cosmic order, but an overwhelming sway of 
violent forces. The city was not carved out against the overwhelming, but was 
something which humanity instituted by shattering itself against the overwhelming. 
Thus, the condition of ecological crisis in the literal sense is not something which we 
come to by means of a wayward and shortsighted pride, but rather it has been inscribed 
in our being-human right from the inception of this first beginning. 
Finally, Heidegger's third significant phrase can now be understood in this light. 
Towards the end of the fifth strophe man is said to dwell high in the city if he obeys the 
laws of earth and gods and to be cast out of the city for his daring if he does not. 
However, Heidegger again takes up the juxtaposition of opposites in an interpretation of 
humanity's position not between contrasting moments or results, but as in itself 
thoroughly ambiguous: 
81 op. cit p. 3 
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Between the ordinance of the earth and the 
god's sworn dispensation (Fug) he fares. 
Rising high over the site, losing the site 
is he for whom what is not, is, always, 
for the sake of daring. 
(IM, 157/113) 
Heidegger highlights the juxtaposition of hypsipolis apolis, which would usually be 
understood as 'rising in the city' and 'without city'. He refuses the translation of polls as 
city. Rather, the 'site' is said to be the gathering point of the historical force of humanity, 
that is, of all creators, as creators do violence as dispensators of the overwhelming 
violence of nature. Dike, which is usually understood to mean justice and as such the 
highest achievement of the city, becomes a 'fitting dispensation' (Fug). Dike as fitting- 
enjoining, a fugue or joint, and the site at which this takes place is led back into and 
found in the inception of nature, something which will have become even more strongly 
emphasised by the time of Heidegger's second reading of the ode in 1942. In fact, this 
interpretation of dike will feature heavily in many of Heidegger's readings of the 
Greeks, especially the Pre-socratics, in the following years. Everything of importance is 
already lost if we fail to take from Heidegger's reading of Sophocles the point that the 
resourceful 'arts' of techne and the justice of dike are not inventions of humanity and in 
the end they do not belong to human beings, but human beings belong to them from the 
inception of this particular turning in the overwhelming of nature itself. Techne and dike 
are in strife in the being of physis: 
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Thus, the demon as the overwhelming (dike-) and the demon as the violence- 
doing (techne) stand over against each other, although not as two present-at 
-hand things. This over-against consists, instead, in the fact that techne 
breaks out against dike, which for its part, as fittingness, has all techne at its 
disposal. The reciprocal over-against is. It is, only insofar as the uncanniest, 
Being-human, happens- insofar as humanity essentially unfolds as history. 
(IM, 171/123) 
There is thus a strife of techne and dike in being which prefigures, but does not match 
exactly, the strife of world and earth which will break out'in lectures on the work of art 
in the following year. Justice is not the highest achievement of a canny cleverness, but 
in violent strife and only in this strife does it come to be. This justice only comes into its 
own in this poetic projection of being. Thus, there is no easy 'ecological' reading of this 
text which could champion the justice of nature against the violence of technology. 
Nevertheless, this thinking of violence in and against nature forms a launch pad for a 
line of thought which, I contend, will indeed offer much to ecological thought. The 
violence of this projection cannot simply be left to one side in the pursuit of a more 
congenial self-image. Even if Heidegger himself comes to rethink his understanding of 
this inception of history, it is because he sees here both the configuration which has 
produced this violence at the heart of nature and the possibility for another projection. 
But another history cannot simply turn a blind eye to the history of violence. The first 
step is to face the full implications of that history as something that has happened to 
nature and to man, rather than continuing to maintain the true hubris of thinking 
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ourselves as the only instigators of this violence and as those who have now brought 
themselves and nature under such complete control as to be able to manage our own 
violence as well as that of nature. 
It must be added that historiographically and philologically Heidegger clearly takes 
some great chances in his reading. In all likelihood Jonas will frequently be found to 
come closer to the mark by these measures. I have followed Heidegger's reading and 
contrasted it to Jonas' in order to provide a sense of how Heidegger now broaches 
questions of ecological significance, of humanity's originary relation to nature and the 
violent force of a nature which overwhelms our own powers and their innermost limits, 
but to which he provides no easy solutions and positively rejects the founding myth of a 
significant proportion of environmental thought. What remains so thought provoking 
about Heidegger's reading, in contrast to Jonas' more conventional interpretation, is the 
idea that the history of ecological destruction is precisely not one in which human 
beings carved out there own niche against the forces of nature and then went on to be so 
successful that they dominate the earth by way of technology. Human beings may have 
joined themselves to the violence of nature in such a way as to 'dispose' over it, but 
technology is something that has happened to nature and to man in and through this 
joining. Another beginning might be prepared by those who are on the look out at the 
junction for ways to disjoin and refit that apparently fatal configuration, but is cannot be 
instituted by a simple decision to turn away from or restrain technology by those who 
feel that they have technology under control. Jonas goes on to make many intricate and 
illuminating analyses of the current situation, but his search for a new ethics remains 
caught in the illusion that we can simply institute a new ethics of responsibility if we are 
made aware of the essential vulnerability of nature, an illusion which stems from the 
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initial illusion that humanity dominates nature by means of technology, rather than 
nature overwhelming itself in and through the violence of the 'violence-doers'. For all 
the glorification of violence and 'decisionism' that Heidegger's reading in Introduction 
to Metaphysics is often accused of, B2 it is really Jonas' assessment of the situation which 
lends itself of a decision for change, for those who see technology as an extension of the 
human grasp inevitably feel that this grasp can be loosened or withdrawn at will. It is 
not restraint as a self-imposed limit that is called for but a turning in the very dynamic 
of nature. If responsibility becomes a survival imperative then it has already lost its 
responsiveness. 
What, then, has happened to living beings in the midst of this overwhelming power of 
nature? Have we not left them behind as the the spectrum of dynamis turned from the 
horizon of their capacities into a violent force which seems to refuse such limits? At the 
very least, have not living beings been carried away in an all consuming tide which no 
longer provides space for a more specific inquiry into the relation between Dasein and 
living beings? This would certainly appear to be the case. 
Indeed, philosophers who wish to show that Heidegger is unable to give a satisfactory 
account of animality and living beings in general frequently cite passages such as the 
following from Introduction to Metaphysics: 
What does "world" mean, when we speak of the darkening of the world? 
World is always spiritual world. The animal has no world (Welt), nor any 
82 See, for example, Timothy Clark, The Poetics of Singularity: The Counter-Culturalist Turn in 
Heidegger, Derrida, Blanchot and the later Gadamer (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2005) 
p. 41 
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environment (Umwelt). 83 
(IM, 47/34) 
Such formulations can indeed seem like dogmatic assertions when they are made, as 
here, without significant elaboration in the course of an argument which is intended to 
strike a very different mark than that of giving a full blown account of animality. The 
same is true of the following passage from The Origin of the Work of Art: 
The stone is world-less. Similarly plants and animals have no world; they 
belong rather to the drivenness of given surroundings (Umgebung), into 
which have been fitted. 
(OBT, 23/33-4- translation modified) 
Although in a sense summarising the conclusions he had reached in his previous 
investigations of animality, these formulations have the effect of covering over much 
that was questionable and significant in those investigations. We can hardly even 
understand what Heidegger is trying to say from these remarks made out of context. 
The living being is in a sense sacrificed to other, perhaps overwhelming, certainly more 
83 See Jacques Derrida, Of Spirit: Heidegger and the Question, trans. Geoffrey Bennington and Rachel 
Bowlby (Chicago: The University of Chicago, 1989) pp. 58-72 and Matthew Calarco, 'Heidegger's 
Zoontology' in Animal Philosophy: Ethics and Identity, ed. Matthew Calarco and Peter Atterton 
(London: Continuum, 2004) pp. 18-30 
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pressing, concerns in these texts. Nevertheless, there are moments in which the text 
reveals that the peculiar cries of those beings have not been entirely drowned out by the 
rising storm and swell of the overwhelming sway. Indeed, those cries may be heard 
anew through the vast phonographic apparatus which Heidegger will now erect in order 
to detect the slightest echo from being as it fades always further in retreat. The work of 
art, for example, is no instrument of natural history or biology, but it does seem to have 
the power to articulate the cries of birds and beasts: 
The steadfastness of the work stands out against the surge of the tide and, in 
its own repose, brings out the raging of the surf. Tree, grass, eagle and bull, 
snake and cricket first enter their distinctive shapes and come to appearance 
as what they are. 
(OBT, 21/ 31) 
By standing out against the power of the earth, the work allows a world to appear in 
which living beings too can show themselves. The Greek temple, as a work, allows 
living beings to come forth and remain within the light which it sheds around it. The 
world allows living beings to stand out in their singularity. Yet we should not imagine 
the beings which belong to the earth are thus held in a static image before us, nor are we 
presented with a 'holistic' vision in which all differences are erased, flattened out and 
blended together. Rather the powers of living beings and of the earth are brought forth: 
All of the things of the earth, the earth itself in its entirety, flow together in 
reciprocal harmony. But this confluence is no blurring of outlines. What 
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flows here is the self-sustaining stream of boundary-setting, a stream that 
bounds everything that presences into its presence. 
(OBT, 25/36) 
So the power of the earth as brought forth in the work of art can also afford us an 
entrance way into the ecological dimension which I discussed in chapter 1, where the 
horizons of capacity are neither fixed nor erased, but are constantly being circumscribed 
and re-circumscribed, intersected and interwoven. 
Yet we may object that art works do not always simply concede a space for living 
beings and the earth to appear in this way. The power of art can also be and has often 
been yoked to violence, not as something coming from an absolutely unnatural outside, 
but as a kind of dynamis which can break in and drive forward the stream of capacities 
flowing from the earth, breaking open the dynamic horizons of living things. The results 
of this violence towards living nature are yet to be measured. Heidegger comments in 
1935 on those passages in the Antigone ode concerning the breaking of living capacity 
by way of violence: 
The living thing, lightly dreaming, whose cycle of life reverberates in itself 
and its environs, constantly renews itself, streaming out over itself in ever 
new forms, and yet it remains in its own single route, it is familiar with the 
place where it spends the night and roams. As a living thing, it is fitted into 
the sway of the sea and the earth. Into this life that revolves within itself, its 
ambit, structure, and ground unfamiliar to them, humans cast their snares 
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and nets; they tear life away from its own order, enclose it in their paddocks 
and pens, and force it beneath the yoke. In one arena, breaking forth and 
breaking up; in the other, capturing and subjugating. - 
(IM, 164-5/118) 
So we have not lost track of our elusive quarry altogether. The powers which unhinge 
possibility, which overflow their own range and break the horizon of living capacity 
have a palpable effect upon the essence of animality and living beings. Living beings, 
once this violence is in their midst, cannot remain flowing within the ambit of their own 
capacities. Nevertheless, the compulsion which tears them from the earth and sea, 
breaking them with acts of violence and thoroughly subjugating them is perhaps only 
the necessity of one history. Thus we must once more plunge into the depths, as we 
come to the end of the range of dynamis in a power which surges back over the 
capacities and capabilities of the living, leaving them transformed in its wake. 
§13 Machination and the Disempowerment of Physis 
In Contributions to Philosophy (From Ereignis), written between 1936 and 1939, 
Heidegger conducts a series of reflections which draw together the threads which we 
have been following: the phenomenological determination of living nature and the 
metaphysics of dynamis as the overpowering power of the earth and the violence of 
physis. However, the convergence of these two streams marks a point at which we must 
now turn towards the question of human being once more, in particular towards human 
beings as themselves living. This is a question which Heidegger has suspended since the 
early Twenties, when he fused the phenomenology of Tactical life' into what he saw as 
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the broader and more primordial remit of the 'world'. 84 But now it is no longer a 
question of determining the human being as Dasein, as that being which is open to its 
own being, nor of determining the being of animality. Now all determination is deferred 
in a time of decision, a decision which is not made by human beings but rather made 
about them. 
The decision which is to take place shows a variety of faces, but these are not purely 
preliminary steps which can be decided outside the compass of the proposed 'turning' 
within beyng. They are decisions which themselves make up the decision concerning 
beyng. Heidegger describes a number of them, amongst which appears the following: 
whether nature is degraded to the realm of exploitation by means of 
calculation and ordering, degraded to an occasion for "lived-experience, " or 
whether as self-closing earth it bears the open of the imageless world- 
(CP, 63/91) 
If that is the decision of beyng then any narrowly conceived environmentalism becomes 
impossible. For precisely those victories which 'preserve' nature, which set aside areas 
of natural parks and wilderness, contribute most deeply to the degrading of nature to 
"lived experience" and set it up as a world of natural "images, " not as a result of a so 
called shallow and image obsessed culture, but as a consequence of the Platonic 
decision concerning truth as idea. Heidegger seems to leave us little room for 
manoeuvre, forcing a decision upon which everything hangs. In a sense this is indeed 
84 Phenomenological Interpretations ofAristotle, trans. Richard Rojcewicz, Indianapolis University 
Press, Bloomington & Indianapolis, 2001 pp. 61-66 
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the case, but this forced decision is intended not as a wild gamble in which nature will 
be recovered as a whole or lost forever, but as the open another space for manoeuvre in 
a dimension which remains outside the ken of these calculations. 
This is not a decision which human beings make, but one which they stand within. For 
we stand within nature, whether the decision falls one way or the other. The moment of 
decision itself stands within the history of a decision already made. Neither a natural 
history nor a history of nature, nor a history predetermined by a single arche, but a 
history always being decided because it unfolds between one beginning and another. In 
Contributions to Philosophy Heidegger claims that this history has been the history of 
the disempowerment of physis. This occurs at the same moment that beings seem to 
become most powerful, to be full of a productive power which has previously barely 
been intimated, now unleashed to hold sway over all beings: 
That something makes itself by itself and is thus also makeable for a 
corresponding procedure says that the self-making by itself is the 
interpretation of physis that is accomplished by techne and its horizon of 
orientation, so that what counts now is the preponderance of the makeable 
and the self-making (cf. The relation of idea to techneý, in a word: 
machination (Machenschaft). However, at the time of the first beginning 
when physis is disempowered, machination does not yet step into the light 
of day in its full essence. 
(CP, 88/126- translation modified) 
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'Machination' has become the being of beings, their beingness (Seiendheit), grown from 
the Aristotelian understanding of physis as that which arises from out of itself. In 
conjunction with techne understood not as something brought into being by human 
beings, but as an essential characteristic of being itself, physis is then understood as 
what is self-made. In machination (or 'manipulability') (Machenschaft) there is an 
absolute conjunction of power itself (Macht) and the power to make (machen). " As 
self-made it thus has the character of the makeable and can be made by any procedure 
which corresponds to that which takes place in the self-making of physis. Yet, at the 
inception of the first beginning machination does not come to its full power because the 
disempowerment of physis only begins here. Machination remains hidden within 
various metaphysical concepts such as entelecheia, act us and ens creatum. Only with 
85 Despite the similarity of appearance which allows Heidegger to link these two words there is in fact 
no etymological link between them. In her political philosophy, which follows Iieidegger's lead back 
to Aristotle's concept of dynamis, Hannah Arendt struggled to formulate a distinction between violent 
force (Gewalt) and power (Macht). Whilst she generally characterises violent force as a force which 
can produce and make changes from out of itself, she hopes to develop a concept of 'power' as a 
political arena which can only operate between and through multiplicity. Thus Arendt refuses the 
association of power (Macht) and making (machen), instead deriving it from mögen and möglich. 
Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition, 2' ed. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1998) 
p. 200. Volker Gerhardt confirms the falsity of an etymology which derives Macht from machen. He 
also helpfully summarises the distinction which Heidegger makes in his Nietzsche lectures between 
'overpowering' (Übermachtigung) and 'empowerment' (Ermächtigung). Although he makes some 
important suggestions as to how Nietzsche's concept of power falls outside the determinations which 
he finds in Heidegger's reading, Gerhardt is unable to push home his point because he only had the 
late publications of the Nietzsche lectures available at the time. So, for example, he points out that 
Heidegger sees in Nietzsche's concept of power a single power, 'Power has no contrary, ' but he does 
not see that machination may have no contrary but is able to encompass all contraries and indeed is 
constituted by contraries. Volker Gerhardt, 'Macht und Metaphysik', in Pathos und Distanz: Studien 
zur Philosophie Friedrich Nietzsches (Stuttgart: Reclam, 1988) 
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the full disempowerment of physis does the reign of machination reach its culmination. 
It may seem that much of what now comes to be thought under the term machination 
was already anticipated in Introduction to Metaphysics. That being itself is thought in 
terms of an overwhelming and all consuming power which contains within itself all of 
the 'skills' of techne. Technology is not a curbing of the violence of nature, nor is it 
simply another expression of that violence, but a turning and disposal of the violence of 
nature within and over itself. Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to think that the term 
'machination' simply takes over this earlier interpretation of the Greek 'first beginning' 
and brings it to a culmination in modernity. Certainly some of the elemental violent 
force from 1935 still exerts itself in the disempowerment of physis, expressed in 
ubiquitous machination, yet a great deal is also transformed as Heidegger moves 
between violent force (Gewalt) and power (Macht). 
In particular, violent force itself is now reserved as a word which speaks only of the 
force exerted by beings upon one another. Although Heidegger did previously suggest 
that the holding-sway of physis was a power which need not immediately express itself 
in acts of violence, that it held within itself the possibility of restraint proper to dynamis, 
that power is now fully integrated into machination. Violence occurs only between 
beings when beyng has withdrawn completely from the stage of power: 
Power (Macht) - the capability of safeguarding a possession from 
possibilities of violent force (coercion). As safeguarding, power always 
faces an opposing power and is therefore never an origin (Ur-sprung). 
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Violent force (Gewalt)- non-powered (ohn-mächtiger) capability for 
change which breaks unto beings, without leaping forth and without the 
prospect of possibilities. Everywhere where beings are to be changed by 
beings (Seiendes durch Seiendes) (not from out of beyng) violent force is 
necessary. Every act is an act of violence, such that here violent force is 
mastered with power as its measure. 
(CP, 198/282- translation modified) 
Power is strictly opposed to violent force. It is certainly not the sheer 'potential' for 
violence which may or may not express itself in acts of violence. Neither is it the source 
of violence, nor a possession which can be safeguarded with violence. Power safeguards 
against violence, not necessarily with a counter-violence, but always with some kind of 
counter force or resistance. Thus, power as that which safeguards, is forcibly drawn into 
the cycle of violence and machination which now constitutes the very meaning of being. 
Power masters violent force, can bridle it, restrain it and inhibit it. But it does not thus 
escape the sphere of violence, it becomes its very measure. And we should not 
underestimate what Heidegger is saying here: every act is an act of violence. 
Is this not a terrible conflation and a trivialisation of violence? Certainly that is a great 
risk, but there are also reasons to take this thought seriously. We are forced to think 
again about the everyday acts of violence which we accept because they are so familiar 
and because they seem trivial in comparison to more spectacular atrocities. Of course, 
that should not lead us to conflate very different situations and kinds of 'act, ' but is does 
unsettle the notion that it is easy to discern what it is that makes an act into an act of 
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violence. Furthermore, Heidegger's statement is an important challenge to those of good 
conscience, all beautiful souls who think that they can easily unravel and undo their 
own complicity in acts of violence. Finally, Heidegger does not say that every action is 
destined to be an act of violence, but only that every act pure and simple, when it has no 
view toward the domain of action or the dimension of possibility, but wants only to 
effect change to beings through putting other beings to work on them, is an act of 
violence. 
What does the distinction between power and violence entail for the notion of the 
'disempowerment of physis'? It means that if physis did once have a power to safeguard 
beings from violence it has lost that power. If physis held within its power the power to 
restrain its own violence, it can no longer contain itself. All power is now drawn into 
the cycle of violence because it can only exercise restraint through resistance. The 
power of the physical, which was metaphysically grasped as a generative power 'from 
below', or the power of a God which ruled 'from above' are both drawn into a field of 
force which operates only between beings and in effect only 'is' when it comes into 
effect between beings. Machination represents the ultimate triumph of Megarian 
metaphysics, a field in which there is no dynamis that is not in operation. Does this 
mean that another beginning would require a 're-empowerment' of physis? Would a 
proper relation between human beings and living nature then be restored in some way? 
Would that not entail a return to the world of the Antigone choral ode? Even if physis 
were restored with a power to safeguard living beings against violence, would that not 
simply be a retreat from violence back into the overwhelming power that bore it? 
In fact, Heidegger soon reconsiders this formulation. In Besinnung, a manuscript written 
between 1938 and 1939, just after he had completed the large majority of Contributions 
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to Philosophy, Heidegger returns to the thought that machination as the very being of 
beings means that being is now inevitably thought as power. If this did entail a 
'disempowerment' of physis that follows directly from a decisive empowerment of 
physis: 
In our earlier reflections ("Contributions") we spoke of the disempowerment 
of physis. Thus it was inceptually and properly "power"- to what extent? 
Where does this dis-empowerment come from, if not simply empowering, 
but not of physis as such, but indeed of ousia to actus? 
Power- the capability to be effective (Wirken), securing and calculating and 
arranging of successes. The effect as effective, without immediately 
effecting! Power from out of "effect" (Wirkung) - precisely not from out of 
possibility! 
(M, 166-167/189- translation modified) 
The disempowerment of physis follows directly from its empowerment as the 
empowerment of being thought as the actuality and effectiveness of ousia. One could 
then follow a direct line to the thinking of being as the power of manipulation in 
machination. Power has been thought primarily in terms of its effect, rather than its 
possibility. That is why Heidegger turned to the thinking of dynamis in Aristotle's 
metaphysics, and as we saw, opened a spectrum of force, attempting to reclaim it from 
the apparently inevitable prevalence of immediate effectiveness. It was within this 
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spectrum, I argued, that we can locate the beginning of a thinking of the capabilities of 
living nature outside the drive of instinct and its inhibition. We then came to a point 
where dynamic was seen to explode its own range or horizon, in the overwhelming 
violence of physis. This overpowering violence has been disempowered, not as Jonas 
would suggest, through the rise and rise of human dominance through technology, but 
through the empowerment of the being of beings as machination. 
A re-empowerment of physis, even one which attempts a reorientation of dynamis, 
towards 'possibility', would now fail to produce another relation to living beings. 
Indeed, that failure would also be measured against the power to secure success. 
Perhaps such a relation cannot be 'produced' at all. The relation from out of which living 
beings unfold in their essence would still ultimately move within the cycle of violence 
and power. Above all it is important for us to think the disempowerment of physis as an 
opportunity, not to install protective mechanisms which would forcibly conserve a 
nature which has become vulnerable, but to think nature outside of its power or in its 
powerlessness to safeguard against violence. Nature in another beginning would not be 
'vulnerable', as Jonas suggests nature has become in the age of technology, because it 
would be neither powerful nor without power, but outside of power. In Besinnung 
Heidegger makes a distinction between Unmacht, non-power, and das Machtlose, the 
power-less or power-free. 86 Nature thought as power-free would be neither secure nor 
vulnerable. It would be released from its own overwhelming power. 
86 Zrzysztof Ziarek suggests the translation of das Machtlose as the'power-free' on the basis that it helps 
us to make the distinction which Heidegger is trying to make between that which has no power and 
that which is outside the sphere of power. The suffix 'los' also has a suggestion loosing or releasing. 
Zrzysztof Ziarek, 'Radical Art: Reflections after Adorno and Heidegger', Adorno: A Critical Reader, 
ed. Nigel Gibson and Andrew Rubin (Malden, Mass: Blackwell, 2002) pp. 341-360 
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In attempting to think the relation of human beings to life in another nature, beyond or 
outside the second nature of machination, it will be important to identify what that 
relation has become as it is held within the scope of machination and then to seek for 
clues as to its possible transformation. 
§14 The Technicised Animal 
The drive of animality and the drive of humanity's ratio become identical. " 
From the perspective of the reflections in Contributions to Philosophy (From Ereignis) 
the encounter which took place between Dasein and living nature in The Fundamental 
Concepts of Metaphysics can be repeated and transformed. Any such encounter can only 
arise within the thinking of beyng as 'Ereignis, ' the event of appropriation. As such, 
beyng creates a place for encounter and is itself an event of en-countering. Not, 
however, an encounter between beings forming an inter-dependent unity or forging 
independence from dependence. The event of appropriation is an en-counter in which 
Heidegger now places world in strife with earth on an axis with human beings and the 
'gods'. Within this 'fourfold' there is no encounter of the usual kind: 'Here there is no 
longer any "encounter, " no appearing of man, who already beforehand stands firm and 
henceforth only holds on to what has appeared. '$$ If there is an encounter from separate 
'sides' then it occurs only in a between that, ' surges over its own bank, a bank which 
always belongs to the stream of Ereignis and from this surging first lets the bank stand 
87 The End of Philosophy, trans. Joan Stambaugh (London: Souvenir Press, 1975) p. 106. Vorträge und 
Aufsätze, 9th edn. (Stuttgart: Neske, 2000) p. 90 
88 CP, p. 218/311 
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as bank.. "' This is an encounter which takes place from Ereignis, in its surge and wake 
rather than in a canalised route where all the terms already stand fast and the only 
question is how to erect the most stable means of crossing to the other shore. Any 
encounter will occur in the wake of a 'countering' which occurs not between beings nor 
even between being and beings, but within beyng itself: 
Countering (Ent-gegnung) is the ground of the encounter that is here not 
even sought after. 
Countering is rending open the "between" (Zwischen) unto which the 
over-against each other (das Gegeneinander) occurs as something needing 
an open. 
(CP, 320/454) 
This 'countering' is what is needed if there is to be an encounter. All seeking out of an 
authentic encounter between man and living beings will come to nothing if there is no 
place of encounter. Only when this "between" has been opened up can the encounter 
occur. 
At this point the objection may well arise that it is not a countering between man and 
living beings or man and animal that Heidegger speaks of here, but between man and 
gods. In attempting to read conclusions for ecological thought into what appears to be a 
quasi-religiosity, even a return to religion of nature, do we not come dangerously close 
to an insipid spirituality, one which will fail in the face of the concrete problems of 
ecological crisis? Even if that can be avoided, is it not the case that living beings are 
89 CP, p. 335/476-translation modified. 
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precisely excluded from this 'countering' event at the heart of beyng? Earth occurs in its 
strife with world; a strife, however, which is said to occur on the 'ground' of the 
countering of gods and man (CP, 337/479). Is it not the case that living nature will 
simply be washed up on the banks of the stream of beyng after the swell has subsided? 
We cannot enter into a full interpretation of the significance of the gods, their origin in 
Hölderlin's poetic trope of 'holiness, ' their connection to the figure of the 'last god' in 
Contributions to Philosophy and their later transformation into the 'divinities' countering 
the 'mortals'. \Ve can, however, offer some argument as to why the presence in 
withdrawal of the gods may not be a decisive objection to a projected transformation of 
living nature in Ereignis. 
It must be admitted that there is no priority given to appropriating a transformed relation 
to living nature in Heidegger's thinking of beyng as Ereignis. Yet there is no 'priority' 
given to any of the decisions which are here brought to the fore because each decision 
contains the whole and is in itself decided in the countering of beyng. Thus we can say 
that a transformed relation to living nature is not a priority but neither is it a secondary 
consideration. It is one decisive approach which can be made to the decision concerning 
another beginning. The countering is said to be between man and gods, but we know 
that it is a countering which first decides the two sides of the encounter. So 'man' as the 
counter to gods is not yet a being, not even an onto-ontological being, a being 
concerned with its own being. Neither can it be said that this 'man' is other than a being 
or an indeterminate being or in Nietzsche's phrase, 'a not yet determined animal'. This 
'man' is countered by the gods. We are given no clue as to which gods. 90 There is no 
90 To ascertain precisely why human beings are countered by the 'gods' in Contributions to Philosophy 
would require a lengthy examination in its own right. Suffice to say that many philosophers have 
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pantheon of beyng. Neither are these indeterminate gods, to be given attributes and 
powers through the decision of beyng. The gods are absent. Their very withdrawal is a 
drawing away from man which concedes the "between". There the world can come into 
strife with earth and the earth can come into its own, preserved by man. There too, 
living beings are given the space to renegotiate the terrain of their own 'life' and 'being, ' 
so long held fast by pre-determinations, or simply left indeterminate, in the first 
beginning. If they were to be brought directly into this countering and opening then the 
risk would be run that everything is already decided in the very conceding of the space 
of decision, since living nature would draw all of its drives and capacities, its niches and 
adaptations, into the moment of decision. 'Man' serves as a place holder in which either 
Da-sein can be appropriated or the 'technicised animal' can take precedence. A 'place- 
bolder, ' not simply as an empty term waiting to be filled, but one who holds open the 
place in which that decision can be made. 
The technicised animal appears in Contributions to Philosophy as a destiny towards 
which man seems headed. It is a possibility for man which has clear resonance with 
questioned the necessity and consequences of their fleeting but decisive appearance. David Farrell 
Krell suggests that there might be a suppression of living beings as the other counter to human beings 
here; what we might call man's 'other Othet'. Such a suggestion certainly calls for further reflection on 
the intimate'daimonic' nature of animals which could take up important leads, for example, from both 
Bataille and Agamben. Another direction of interrogation, which Eugen Fink allegedly once raised 
with Ileidegger, would be to ask why the counter takes place between 'man' (Mensch) and gods 
(Götter) and not between 'man' (Mann) and 'woman' (Frau). Such a possibility is explored in depth in 
the works of Luce Irigaray. However, it should be asked whether a similar problem does not occurs 
here, whereby the terms of the 'countering' would already bring with them specific determinations and 
possibilities. Whatever difficulties we may have with the countering of 'man' and 'gods' it seems that 
the intention with these terms for withdrawal and place-holding is to leave the manner in which this 
countering is played out as open as possible. 
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Nietzsche's thought of the 'Last Man'. Human beings are preparing themselves for the 
most banal and brutish animality in which biological instincts and the gigantic workings 
of technology are absolutely integrated. (CP, 68/98) The crossing over to a 
determination of man as 'technicised animal' is also a culmination of what was set in 
motion in the 'first beginning, ' in Aristotle's definition of man as zöon logon echon. 
There is a complete change in man's nature which occurs between this definition and the 
'rational animal, ' yet a change which was nevertheless prepared for in that prior 
inception, just as the rational animal is pregnant with the technicised animal. That 
simultaneous transformation and continuity reigns between all metaphysical 
determinations of man. 
The'technicised animal' is not a fixed determination of man, but neither is it meant to be 
one amongst a list of possibilities for man, as though we could elect and render 
ourselves in any shape we please. Such a thought would itself be one of the ultimate 
thoughts of the technicised animal. The technicised animal is not simply a re-orientation 
of our self-understanding towards our essentially practical nature, prior to any theory or 
pure contemplation. It is not homo faber, man with an orientation towards producing 
things and above all himself. It is already man gone beyond himself in technicity. 
How does Heidegger understand the technicity of the technicised animal? How does he 
understand its animality? Do the two form a simple conglomeration, or are they held 
together in a more essential manner? The beingness of beings as machination, the joint 
effort of production and power at the heart of the being of metaphysics is clearly at 
work in this conception of man. But what precisely is decided concerning man here and 
how does it relate to our central theme, the discovery of an appropriate relation to living 
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nature? 
What should technicity be? Not in the sense of an ideal. But how does 
technicity stand within the necessity of overcoming the abandonment of 
being, respectively, of putting up being's abandonment to decision, from the 
ground up. Is technicity the historical pathway to the end, to the last man's 
falling back into the technicised animal, which thus loses even the originary 
animality of the enjoined animal- or can technicity be above all taken up as 
sheltering and then enjoined into the grounding of Da-sein? 
(CP, 194/275) 
Any understanding of the figure of the technicised animal must grasp what is being 
asked here about technicity and animality and their joining in the technicised animal. 
Notice that the question concerning technicity is posed here in an apparently normative 
mode. What should technicity be? It is not simply a question of defining technicity. Nor 
is it only a question of asking where technicity comes from, of determining its causes 
and its final goal. Both of these questions are bound up with the questioning of 
technicity, but they cannot be satisfactorily answered if they remain in this form, 
because as such they remain technical questions. The essence of technology, Heidegger 
will famously remark, is nothing technological. The questioning which aims at this 
essence can all too easily fall back into a measure of a successful or unsuccessful 
determination and assessment if it grasps this point, but remains technical in itself. Yet 
the 'should' is said to be nothing to do with an 'ideal, ' so that we cannot understand this 
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question as normative in the usual way. Not only can it not point towards a 
technological perfectionism, it is not intended to ask what the best kind of technicity is 
at all. In this should is contained the question of what technicity could be, a technically 
impossible question, but a decision which must be made none the less. 
Technicity itself can be a site of decision. Here we see for the first time signs of 
Heidegger's later understanding of technology. Unbridled machination and a world in 
which the 'gigantic' has become a defining quality are one possibility. Yet technicity in 
this form only directs us back to the site where such a decision takes place. Technicity 
does not then take on a benevolent form contrary to its former malevolence. Rather, the 
site where the decisions concerning technology are made is to be taken up into 
technicity. That is what would occur were 'man' as the technicised animal to make Da- 
sein his own, to let himself be Da-sein. The 'not yet determined animal' is already 
overdetermined. Man can be a site of decision rather than the site of determination. " 
91 In order for that to occur there are three dangers which must be guarded against. Firstly anti- 
technologism and secondly pro-techologism both miss the point. The former can often appear to be 
the stance of any questioning of technology, precisely because the latter is taken as a basic 
assumption. The latter, including any attempt to 'rescue' Heidegger from an apparent pastoralism by 
finding in the danger a countering 'saving power" is just as pointless. The famous'saving power' of the 
1953 lecture The Question Concerning Technology is not to be found beside and despite the danger, 
but is absolutely coincident with it insofar as a site of decision is a site in which things can fall either 
way. An inquiry which is neither pro- nor anti- technology seems to point towards neutrality, a return 
to the neutral power of technological tools. This third danger is ultimately the most incidious. The 
neutrality of technology always conceals the decisions which have already been made with regard to 
it, so that the site of decision is reduced to decisions about how best to navigate the open sea of 
technicity. Technicity as a site of decision is neither neutral nor partisan. For a helpful discussion of 
how Heidegger questions technicity in Contributions to Philosophy through the thinking of its non- 
essence (Un-wesen) see, Miguel dc Beistegui, Thinking with Heidegger: Displacements 
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Returning to the passage cited above, there are two kinds of 'jointure' here which are to 
be carefully distinguished. We previously came across the idea of 'jointure' (Fuge) as a 
translation of the Greek dike. Now it becomes integral to Heidegger's thinking of beyng 
as Ereignis. The two jointures of man can be seen as belonging on the one hand to the 
dike of the first beginning and on the other hand to the 'fugue' of another beginning. 
Firstly, the technicised animal has lost even the originary animality of an 'enjoined' 
animal. The 'jointure' of such an animality can be understood on the basis of what was 
called 'captivation' (Benommenheit) in The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics. A 
joining of the animal with its environment prior to the determination of either organism 
or surroundings. The technicised animal loses such a jointure. It is an animal which, 
rather than circumscribing the range of new capacities for itself within jointure, is 
driven altogether beyond capacity. 
The second 'jointure' is the possible enjoining of technicity into the grounding of Da- 
sein. This would not be a recovery of the originary animality which was lost in the 
technicised animal. Rather, it would be another enjoining altogether, one in which man 
is precisely not joined to his environment, but is dis-placed from that jointure and 
enjoined in the the jointure of Ereignis. It is not a question of distancing ourselves from 
the immediacy of the environing world, but a shift or turning which creates another 
space, where a decision can be made concerning our own belonging and the belonging 
of living beings to the earth. 
If that is the case, then we have to face some difficult questions concerning the very 
meaning of an inquiry which hopes to discover an originary relation to living nature. 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003) pp. 98-101 
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What is to become of the jointure of 'original' animality if technicity is to be enjoined 
into the grounding of Da-sein? Can there be any recovery of living nature from the 
shock of technicity, that is, the accumulation of power within animality which drives it 
beyond its own capacity? The technicised animal is a possibility of man, but it could 
also describe the situation in which we now find other living beings. Their instinctual 
drives are shot through with rationality, whilst the process of rationalisation easily joins 
itself to the once 'irrational' behaviour of animals. Is an 'original' animality all but 
irrecoverable and would a recovery not signal simply a planned and rationalised return 
to our grounding in a more instinctual life? Was it not precisely a jointure of this kind, 
an attempt to recover an original animality for man, that bound together blood and soil 
for National Socialism? 
The fate of the technicised animal is the fate of both man and living beings. An inquiry 
into our relation to living nature cannot avoid questioning our own animality. But not in 
the way this interrogation is usually conducted, whereby our 'animality' is simply 
assumed as a known fact and as such used to determine our relation to living nature. 
Rather, we need to understand the multiple ways in which Da-sein appropriates 
animality. It may be that we then discover more about our own animality than was ever 
thought possible. Our own animality, an animality which is appropriate and 
appropriated to us. 
A further comparison with a recent interpretation of this situation will help us to 
understand Heidegger's position and the dilemma which we find ourselves in when 
faced with our own animality. As was briefly indicated in chapter 1, Giorgio Agamben 
claims that our encounter with the animal is always informed by the attempt to separate 
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our own animality from our humanity. The issue of animality is the issue of the animal 
'in us'. More precisely, any encounter which we have with animals and living nature is 
always already determined by the necessity to maintain a split within ourselves: 
It is possible to oppose man to other living things, and at the same time to 
organize the complex- and not always edifying- economy of relations 
between men and animals, only because something like an animal life has 
been separated within man, only because his distance and his proximity to 
the animal have been measured and recognised first of all in the closest and 
most intimate place. 
But if this is true, if the caesura between the human and the animal passes 
first of all within man, then it is the very question of man- and of 
"humanism"- that must be posed in a new way. In our culture, man has 
always been thought of as the articulation and conjunction of a body and a 
soul, of a living thing and a logos, of a natural (or animal) element and a 
supernatural or social or divine element. We must learn instead to think of 
man as what results from the incongruity of these two elements, and 
investigate not the metaphysical mystery of conjunction, but rather the 
practical and political mystery of separation 92 
Agamben reads the history of the Occidental engagement with animality as the history 
of the maintenance of this caesura within ourselves. The workings of that history 
amount to the machinations of an 'anthropological machine' which continually works 
92 The Open: Man and Animal, trans. by Kevin Attell (Stanford: Stanford Univesity Press, 2004) pp. 15- 
16 
199 
open the split within our own being. It is a split which has been articulated in 
innumerable ways and certainly in ways which defy any straightforward dualisms. 
However, when these bifurcations are made more complex this is all too often an oil 
which ensures the smooth working of the anthropological machine. Moreover, all of the 
well intentioned attempts at reconciliation and reunification simply exacerbate the 
problem. It is not a reunification of the elements of our nature which is required, a 
reunification which could only ever function upon the assumption of caesura, but a 
disruption of the anthropological machine itself, which has produced the various parts 
of the soul in the first place. It is only if such a disruption of these workings can be 
brought about that we can become open for a relation to other animals which would not 
be predetermined by the desire to maintain this caesura within ourselves. 
When it comes to Heidegger's insistence upon an essential distinction between Dasein 
and the animal, Agamben maintains that this can be read as a symptom of his continuing 
to work within the ambit of the anthropological machine. 93 Perhaps he is the 'last 
philosopher' to function here, although all things considered, that would seem to be 
unduly optimistic. Agamben even goes so far as to suggest that the strife between world 
and earth can be read as another symptom of the workings which engineer an abyss 
between the open world of man and the closed earth of animality. 
It is quite possible to see why Agamben comes to this conclusion. The world is from the 
start inseparable from Dasein's being-in-the-world, whilst the concept of earth does 
appear to hold the key to later attempts by Heidegger to think animality again and anew. 
Nevertheless, this identification of the strife within truth, the strife between world and 
earth, with the caesura between Dasein and animal cannot be maintained. As we saw 
93 Ibid p. 75 
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above, if the earth is in strife with world it cannot come into its own as earth without 
this strife. Animals are, for Heidegger, closed out from this strife altogether. He did 
draw a distinction between the animal being 'open' to its surroundings, an openness 
which allows the horizon of its environing ring to be re-circumscribed, and the manifest 
openness of Dasein, which brings forth the opening itself. Now in Contributions to 
Philosophy, Da-sein is not straightforwardly identified with man, but is an opening 
which man can make his own. It is certainly the case that Heidegger maintains access to 
the strife of truth as a ground for distinguishing man from the animal, but that does not 
necessarily hold them apart or separate them. It is a distinction maintained in the hope 
of appropriate encounter. 
Furthermore, we must not leave Heidegger's thought aside if we hope to disrupt the 
workings of the anthropological machine, for he is intimately familiar with its workings 
and effects. It is important to realise that this anthropological machine works at all 
levels. The distinction which Agamben makes between the metaphysical 'mystery' of 
conjunction and the practical and political machinations of separation is a distinction of 
'level' which is thoroughly rooted in the metaphysical tradition. That metaphysics, 
according to Heidegger, inevitably separates 'regions' of beings and arranges them at 
various levels. The very same paragraph of Contributions to Philosophy in which the 
technicised animal appears as the last possibility of the last man is entitled 'The levels of 
beyng'. Here and in the following paragraphs the attempt to think the sheltering of the 
earth and an originary animality is contrasted to the order of a metaphysics which puts 
the regions of being into a leveled system. The distinction of practical and political 
machinations from metaphysical 'mystery' feeds into the order of this metaphysics. 
When Heidegger maintains that 'machination' has become the very being of beings, we 
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are no longer entitled to say that political necessity can take over from some 
metaphysical mystery, since both 'levels' are determined by the conjunction of making 
and power which has sprung from the first beginning. Replacing wonder at the mystery 
of conjunction with a critical analysis of the machinations that produce separation is a 
necessary task, but will not in itself disrupt the anthropological machine. 
Moreover, whilst it is true that any mysterious conjunction within human beings relies 
upon the prior separation of elements, the anthropological machine does not only work 
open these separations. It also works in reverse, conjoining elements of body, soul and 
spirit, folding and sealing them together so that any birthmarks of separation are healed 
over. There is a unity of man which does not rely upon the conglomeration and 
articulation of properties and faculties. This unity is the unity of the technicised animal, 
whose ratio has become an instinctual drive and whose instinct has become rationalised. 
There is no longer any separation nor conjunction here but a simple unity of man in 
machination. The technicised animal no longer feels the eternal punishment of 
Prometheus, tearing it apart and healing it again day after day. Innumerable separations 
and conjunctions are now integrated into the primary unity of machination itself. Might 
this not even turn out to be the originary meaning of fascism? A binding which binds 
together all of the faculties of man and the capacities of life and bundles them together 
as a symbol, an enjoining, of power. That binding binds tight and tries to erase the 
disjointure which accompanies joining, giving it space to play out its range of 
possibility. 
Agamben is aware that no conjunction of elements will disrupt the process of 
separation. In The Open he draws upon passages from Foucault and Benjamin to try to 
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step to the side of this play of inclusion and exclusion, founded upon the ambiguity of 
man's animality. Benjamin, for example, calls for a'mastery of the relation between man 
and nature' which Agamben interprets as a relation which would no longer be the 
mastery of one by the other, but a constant intercourse between the two which is not 
subject to the law of separation. " 
Yet what Heidegger calls 'jointure' can also be seen as an attempt to step aside from the 
machinations of the anthropological machine. It is a countering and joining in an event 
which does not thereby produce various faculties and make them available for further 
processes and procedures. There is an 'articulation' which remains essential to this 
encounter, but an articulation which is in itself simple. The event of appropriation 
(Ereignis) articulates man in and through beyng. Yet there is expropriation (Enteignis) at 
the heart of this event which is a necessary part of the very jointure. There is no oint' 
without this room for manoeuvre created by expropriation. It dislocates the joint of 
beyng, but in so doing allows it to articulate itself anew. This disjunctive jointure is, we 
must admit, in the closest proximity to the separations and conjunctions of machination. 
So close that the distance could not be measured. The whole difficulty then, will be to 
fathom this proximity as we hope to step back from the anthropological machine. There 
could be no sure sign or measure that this has taken place. Only vigilance against being 
drawn into the hermetically sealed unity of the technicised animal. 
§15 Biologism and Anthropomorphism 
Life is not left behind in the event of appropriation. Rather, as living beings are set free 
from machination man made freed for Da-sein. This is not a setting free from 
94 Ibid pp. 81-84 
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domestication back into the wild. As Heidegger puts it in his lectures on Nietzsche's 
second Untimely Meditation in 1939, the thinking of the essencing of beyng from out of 
truth requires that: 'the essence of human beings is ripped free from animality; not in 
order to make them harmless and civilised and satisfied, to make from the beast of prey 
a pet in the house of unquestioned driving onwards, but rather to show man the 
completely other summit of his essence as Da-sein. ' (GA 46,218) In particular there are 
two shackles which have held man bound, which we can now understand more fully in 
their joint operation: biologism and anthropomorphism. 
Heidegger's own attempts think what is at stake in 'biologism' can only be approached 
through his ongoing engagement with Nietzsche and Nietzsche's appropriation by 
biologism. It is perhaps true to say that Heidegger both takes these biologistic readings 
seriously and initiates a thorough critique of the conceptual field in which they arise. 
Simply identifying the perpetrators as 'ideologues' and their readings as biologistic may 
suffice to dismiss many of the more crass readings, but it will not suffice in the end 
because it does not penetrate to the metaphysical underpinnings of biologism, nor the 
truth of Nietzsche's biologism. 
The extent of Heidegger's engagement with this issue has not been fully appreciated 
because commentators have until recently been confined to the two volume version of 
Heidegger's Nietzsche lectures which appeared in the 1960s. There we find only a much 
reduced version of the section on 'Nietzsche's alleged biologism' from the lectures on 
The Will to Power as Knowledge'. " If we turn to the volume which gives an 
95 David Krell's comments in Daimon Life: Heidegger and Life-Philosophy, for example, although 
extremely helpful are confined to this published version. A translation of the later two volume edition 
edited by Krell is the only text available in English at present. 
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approximation of Heidegger's original lectures, along with other lectures concerned with 
Nietzsche of the period, we are able to appreciate Heidegger's changing views on this 
matter in their broader scope. 
It may be surprising to discover how far Heidegger is concerned to establish the strong 
sense in which 'biologism' is an appropriate title for Nietzsche's thought. Nietzsche's 
thought is of course shot through with a concern for life, to such an extent that he even 
claims life to be the only way in which he can understand "being": how could this 
thought not be biologistic? (GA 47,58-59) 'Biologism' does in a sense hit upon the 
kernel of Nietzsche's metaphysics and is not to be thought away as the 'outer shell' of his 
thought which can be discarded upon closer examination. (GA 47,60) Nevertheless, 
Heidegger argues, this not incorrect identification of biologism may still turn out to be 
the primary obstacle to our understanding if we do not examine what this title really 
proclaims. 
What 'biologism' usually means is the transference and extension of the concepts and 
results of biological science into other areas of investigation or regions of being. The 
transference of biological research onto history for example. (GA 6.1,. 472, cf. GA 47, 
65) As such 'biologism' would hardly face many objections in the age of inter- 
disciplinarity. If this is what it signifies then biologism may be precisely what is 
scientifically required, together with a corresponding 'historicism', 'psychologism' and 
so forth. The only objection would arise if biology were seen to take priority and not in 
its turn submit itself to the results of other fields. This common sense of biologism 
amounts to a kind of metaphorics of life, a transference from out of the region of 
biology facilitated by the acknowledgement of the fluid and insecure boundaries of 
205 
scientific disciplines. Yet, is it not the case that some decision concerning compatibility 
has to be made in order that such transferences can occur? Biologism in the ordinary 
sense, according to Heidegger is only the consequence of something more essential. 
Even when biological research remains within its own boundaries it is a 'biologism' so 
long as it does not recognise as such the metaphysical decisions concerning the 
determination of life upon which this research rests (GA 47,85). Such decisions make 
the transference of biological results into other areas of research possible, producing a 
'biologism' prior to any actual transference: 
Nietzsche determines beings as a whole as life, not as a result of an 
expansion of the biological way for thinking about plants and animals to the 
whole world. It is the other way around: in the course of the traditional and 
in its historical cycle pre-determined metaphysical guiding question, what 
beings as a whole are, he comes to the conclusion: beings are will to power. 
Will to power however is the essence of life, if life means: becoming as 
overcoming (werdendes Übersteigen). 
(GA 47,86) 
Biologism and anti-biologism alike think that what is at stake is the legitimacy or 
illegitimacy of conceptual transference between regions of beings and both fail to 
recognise that any such debate already presupposes a metaphysics, a doctrine 
concerning beings as a whole and their divisibility into regions. If we once recognise the 
metaphysical character of biologism, then we can identify a much more intractable 
'biologism, ' the metaphysics of life itself. A field is established in which the 
metaphorics of life can take root, the powerful results of which become evident in 
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Nietzsche's thought. In Nietzsche's hands this metaphysics of life becomes a 
metaphysics of sur-vival. Life, not continuing on the basis of a bare minimum as bare 
life, but living only insofar as it constantly outstrips itself. 
However, it is in his seminar-lectures concerning Nietzsche's Second Untimely 
Meditation, held in the previous semester to those on 'The Will to Power as Knowledge' 
that Heidegger makes one of his most pregnant suggestions as to how we are to 
understand Nietzsche's own metaphysical biologism. Will to Power characterises the 
life of plants and animals as it characterises the 'life' of beings as a whole, if and only if 
life is a becoming which constantly overcomes and overwhelms itself. Life is life- 
enhancement. Yet Heidegger argues that even such a conception, one which makes its 
earth shattering power felt throughout metaphysics, still remains within the field which 
was opened up by Aristotelian dynamism: 
"Biologism"- if we are to use such an empty term- is the necessary result of 
"Dynamism", dynamis is understood as force (Kraft) and force as power 
(Macht). 
(GA 46,86) 
Force and power: the two extremes of the spectrum of dynamis. At once encompassed 
in and overlooked by this dynamism is the entire spectrum of living capacity, 
conversant capability, art and violence. There are two criticisms which can be made of 
such a dynamism. It fails to bring into view the different kinds of dynamis adequately 
and thus fails to distinguish the 'life' of different beings, especially animals and human 
beings. The distinction is inevitably led back to what they can do rather than how their 
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various capabilities are enabled and possessed as capabilities. Furthermore, dynamism 
of this kind becomes an ultimate metaphysical principle, a first philosophy. The 'other 
beginning' which Heidegger attempts to initiate would, on the other hand, think 
dynamis as participating in the essencing of truth and the event of appropriation. Not as 
themselves first principles, but as openings which allow each phenomenon to appear on 
its own terms, terms which are appropriate to it because they are articulated in 
appropriation 96 
Anthropomorphism, apparently the very opposite of biologism, now turns out to be its 
mirror image and a participant in the same logic. "' Anthropomorphism too appears at 
96 To what extent Heidegger ultimately holds Nietzsche to this 'dynamism' is of course debatable. Often 
it appears that Heidegger cannot or will not make this decision. In Contributions to Philosophy, for 
example, having set out three points in which Nietzsche's thinking of the relation of life to truth is 
question worthy, he goes on to suggest that Nietzsche's philosophy 'renders life free in its 
unsurpassable possibilities', and that what makes Nietzsche's thought so difficult for Nietzsche himself 
to think is precisely his insight into the essencing of truth: Da-sein. (CP, p. 254/364-365) 
97 1 use the term anthropomorphism here because it is the concept which Heidegger uses most frequently 
in his critique of the phenomenon in question at the end of the Thirties. Environmental philosophy 
has often identified 'anthropocentrism' as the greatest contributor to environmentally destructive 
attitudes. 'Anthropomorphism', on the other hand, is a movement in the opposite direction, although 
one grounded on the same conviction that we have been able to be pin down what is essentially 
'human': it is not a concentration on the human beings to the detriment of others, but a making human 
of others. 
In reply to those who accuse Being and Time of anthropocentrism Heidegger claims in a 
footnote to 'On the Essence of Ground' that it is incomprehensible to make this accusation of a text 
whose central claim is that Dasein is 'ex-centric, ' always outside of itself and in the world. (Pathmarks, 
p. 371, n. 66) This may appear somewhat insensitive to the point of the criticism, which surely wants to 
ask as Heidegger himself will do, if beginning with the analysis of Dasein does not plough the 
question of being back into the field of metaphysics. Nevertheless, I think this reply has to contain the 
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first as a transference from out of one field of research, anthropology, into fields outside 
the human, thus as a'metaphorics of man'. In Besinnung Heidegger turns his attention 
towards this phenomenon: 
Anthropomorphism is the explicit or implicit, acknowledged or 
unacknowledged conviction, that beings as a whole are what they are and 
the way they are, through the power of and in accordance with the 
representations which pass by in human beings, i. e., in the animal 
endowered with reason as one life-process amongst others. What are named 
and recognised as beings are something made by man. 
(M, 137/159- translation modified) 
The problem of anthropomorphism thus encompasses every philosophical debate which 
moves back and forth between 'subjectivism' and 'objectivism, ' between the world as 
kernel of any Heideggerian response to such accusations. 
It may be that the term 'anthropologism', adopted by Francoise Dastur, gets to the root of the 
phenomenon in question, 'The critique of anthopologism in Heidegger's thought', Appropriating 
Heidegger ed. Faulconer and Wrathall (Cambridge University Press, 2000) pp. 119-134. Nevertheless 
anthropomorphism captures more of the sense of the phenomenon as here understood, that is, the 
apparent 'humanisation' of what is not human. Silvia Benso, on the other hand, suggests that rather 
than anthropocentrism it is 'anthopologocentrism' which is to be guarded against. The point seems to 
be that we cannot avoid the fact that anything we think is thought by us as human beings so we could 
not escape anthropocentrism pure and simple, but the 'logocentrism' of metaphysics has coloured and 
tainted this necessity. Silvia Benso The Face of Things :A Different Side of Ethics (Albany: SUNY 
Press, 2000) p. 44. It seems to me that Heidegger wants to argue the opposite point, that thinking is not 
a property belonging to human beings and that it is our thinking of logos that has been distorted by our 
convictions about anthrdpos. 
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something which is played out in human representations and human representations as 
part of a life-process which takes place amongst all other beings, a process like any 
other. Anthropomorphism, as the 'humanisation' of beings as a whole can break out at 
any time within this conceptual field, so that it is in no way ameliorated by the equal 
and opposite assertion that beings as a whole are not human or are independent of the 
human. The space for the affirmation or denial of anthropomorphism is thus one which 
metaphysics has long since conceded. The humanisation of beings as a whole is 
possible on the basis of a decision concerning being, that being is representative and 
corresponds to representation. 
Nevertheless, Heidegger argues that the humanisation of beings as a whole and the 
metaphysical decision concerning being is not what is most essential in 
anthropomorphism. At its heart is the 'resistance to any possibility of a fundamental 
transformation of man. ' (M, 137/159) In order for other beings and beings as whole to 
take on the shape of the human, the shape of humanity itself must be set fast. That is not 
to say that we are unable to recognise changes which may take place within the life- 
process to which human beings belong. But precisely because we are so sure that they 
belong there and nowhere else, what is essential about human beings is held in place. 
The animality of human beings can be understood through their representative 
capabilities or their representative capabilities through their animality. So long as 
human beings do not belong anywhere else but to this beingness of beings, 
representation and life-process of beings, the humanisation of beings will roll onwards. 
Anthropomorphism is at heart the humanisation of man, not his production in any 
particular shape or form, but the casting of the mould for man in one form or another. 
To free thought from anthropomorphism it is not enough to assert that beings as a whole 
are or are not moulded to the form of man. What is needed is the ability to find in what 
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appears everywhere as the humanisation (Vermenschung) of beings the possibility for a 
radical dis-humanising (Ver-menschung) of man. 98 
In the late 1930s, rather than simply report about the condition of man and the desolate 
situation of living nature, Heidegger brings man and nature into crisis. A crisis from 
which we cannot rescue ourselves because it is not to be resolved by a choice between 
various self-representations. The crisis of humanity is at one and the same time the 
crisis of the earth and the crisis of living nature. The crisis, unlike most of those which 
human beings constantly find themselves hemmed in by, can easily be avoided or 
concealed. Neither is it a crisis which would yield to the economy of crisis, which 
demands an efficient solution and return to the business at hand. 99 But it is a crisis not 
yet totally outside our ken. It is a crisis which provides us with a space for thought in 
which human beings and living beings can belong together in a way which was never 
before possible, because it lies beyond possibility and actuality as determinations of the 
being of beings. 
If biologism and anthropomorphism are really to be avoided then we will not be able to 
take refuge in any middle ground between the two. The ground itself must be removed. 
Nature as the ground of life and language as the ground of man must be broken from 
their habitual runs and joined into an event which articulates itself but refrains from 
98 Parvis Emad and Thomas Kalary bring this reorientation to the fore by rendering Vermenschung as 
'dis-humanization'. However, the movement between the two orientations in the text then becomes 
difficult to discern. 
99 See, Jacques Derrida's critique of the 'economy of crisis' in Negotiations: Interventions and 
Interviews, 1971-2001, ed. and trans. by Elizabeth Rottenberg (Stanford University Press, 2002) and 
Of Spirit: Heidegger and the Question, trans. by Geoffrey Bennington and Rachel Bowiby (Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, 1989) pp. 60-61 
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fully expressing itself. The echo of the earth must be heard in physis so that living 
beings can be set free from the possibility of life understood as its own persistent self- 
overcoming. Language, that which has held out between nature and man, inventing him 
and being itself his invention par excellence, may just hold the key for bringing this 
crisis to a head: 
Language, whether spoken or silent, is the first and most widespread 
humanisation of beings. So it appears. But precisely language is the most 
originary dehumanisation of human beings as extant living beings and the 
"subject" and everything heretofore. And with that the grounding of Da-sein 
and the possibility of the dehumanisation of beings. 
(CP, 359/5 10- translation modified) 
If we are able to take up this suggestion from the final paragraph of Contributions to 
Philosophy, then perhaps we will be able to prepare the way for a living nature which is 
neither cast in the shape of the human nor driven beyond the bounds of its own capacity, 
but released into the unique freedom of those capacities. 
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Chapter 4 
Natural Languages 
Like a poet hidden, 
In the light of thought, 
Singing hymns unbidden, 
Till the world is wrought 
Percy Bysshe Shelley, 'To a Skylark' 
How can we speak appropriately of nature? Or rather, if it is not simply a question of 
our deciding to speak in a certain way, how can language be appropriate for nature? 
This is surely a question of the utmost importance for environmental philosophy, for if 
nothing else the philosophising which goes under that name is a thinking which brings 
language to bear upon nature. To employ one of Heidegger's favourite forms of 
expression, it 'brings nature to language'. It speaks of nature, but perhaps also brings 
that which is spoken of into the very midst of language. Mindful of the possibility that 
the very language which we use to speak of nature may perpetuate the annihilation 
which stimulated its philosophising in the first place, environmental thought attempts to 
initiate another way of speaking of nature. It takes care of nature in caring for language. 
This question of a language appropriate for nature often finds an all too ready answer. 
On the one hand, the question is found to be unnecessary, since language itself is 
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understood as a quite natural phenomenon. The supposed gap to be bridged between 
language and nature is quite illusory. On the other hand, the constructivist approach 
insists that nature is subject to language and that not only our understanding of nature 
but nature itself is created and constructed in and through language. Either language is 
brought home to nature or nature to language; language is naturalised or nature is 
logicised. What the idea of appropriation seeks is not such an identification, but a 
thinking of language and nature which speaks from the point prior to their coming to 
occupy specific and rigorously delineated regions of being. 
As we saw in the previous chapter, language seems to spread what is proper to man over 
the whole world. As such it appears to be the very root of the humanisation of the 
world. It is also in the search for the origin of language that we find the constant refrain 
of metaphysics, the refrain which calls man away from his own animality and in so 
doing confirms the primacy of that animality. So, however unlikely it may seem at first, 
it is in the thinking of language that we find the inescapable juncture at which 
environmental philosophy and the thinking of animality must meet. 
We have already had occasion to partially trace the development of Heidegger's 
understanding of logos. In chapter 2 we saw that the reading of Aristotle in the 1931 
lecture course on the Metaphysics develops the notion of conversance (Kundschaft) as 
that which informs all human dynamis. Conversance is the milieu of all man's natural 
and cultural capabilities. At the same time we came across an important hint at a logos 
that precedes and informs conversance, an Heraclitean logos which traversed and 
unified the entire spectrum of dynamis in nature. There is a logos which informs human 
nature, but logos is also of nature as such. In the final analysis, however, these are not 
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two distinct logos, for it is the very ability to orientate our explorations by means of the 
logos of natural phenomena as such which takes place in conversance. 
If we are to move further into the midst of this milieu of questions and develop the 
thought of a language which takes the ground from under the humanisation of the world 
and bears with it the possibility of an appropriate relation to animality and living nature, 
we should first take a step back. Returning once more to the lecture course on The 
Fundamental Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy we find an analysis of Aristotle's 
distinction between logos and phone in the first chapter of the Politics. Whilst the 
strength and originality of this interpretation allows Heidegger to side step some of the 
more obvious criticisms which could be made of his contention that animals are'denied 
language, ' it can still be shown that insofar as Heidegger remains caught within this 
conception he will fail to do full justice to the phenomena of animal language. With this 
in mind, I will follow up on the hint from Contributions to Philosophy that it is in 
language itself that we might be able to displace the humanisation of the world, whilst 
showing how that project can be taken up in the light of an attempt to find our way into 
an appropriate being in the midst of living nature. 
§16 Animal Cries and Political Speech 
A great deal in the history of philosophical questioning of animality has turned around 
the question of language. Even if we recall Bentham's plea for recognition that it is not 
reason, nor speech, nor anything of the sort that is to the point in our ethical relations to 
animals, but their capacity to suffer, the issues raised by the question of language 
stubbornly remain. For is it not ultimately Bentham's inability to distinguish carefully 
enough between different kinds of pleasure and suffering which leave his reasoning, and 
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ultimately perhaps all utilitarian calculus, open at a decisive point, at the point of 
decision itself? The very indifference which utilitarianism shows in the face of such 
differences, the indifference which allowed it to break free of entrenched metaphysical 
prejudice and in the Twentieth Century bring the suffering of animals to the forefront of 
at least a marginal ethical and political agenda, cannot be sustained if we are to preserve 
the differential ecology of living capacities. '°° 
The concern with this constellation of ideas about language and animality, which seems 
to have formed a sediment even in the midst of the whirlpool of Heidegger's 
fundamental ontology and beyond, is perhaps best exemplified by Michel Haar's far 
reaching worry: 
The absence of speech in animals is more radical than the absence of the 
world. It is not a question of an impoverished but an absolute privation of 
speech. On this point the break between human beings and animals becomes 
the most unbridgeable. "The leap from living animals to humans that speak 
is as large if not larger than that from the lifeless stone to living being. " 
Despite the absence of articulated language, one could object that 
Heidegger's phenomenology has taken into account neither the cries, 
moaning, nor the grimaces, mimicry, gestures, and postures which are 
100 Derrida also gives decisive importance to Bentham's question 'can they suffer? ' in the context of 
questioning concerning animal language. Jacques Derrida, 'The Animal That Therefore I Am (More to 
Follow)', trans David Wills, Critical Inquiry 28 (Winter 2002) p. 396 For another discussion of 
Bentham's question in this context see, John Llewelyn, The Middle Voice of Ecological Conscience: A 
Chiasmic Reading of Responsibility in the Neighbourhood of Levinas, Heidegger and Others 
(Basingstoke: MacMillan, 1991) pp. 49-50 
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irrefutably modes of expression among, for example, mammals. "' 
This short passage raises a plethora of questions. Firstly, is it the case that the animal's 
supposed lack of language can be raised as a question distinct from and moving beyond 
its environmentality? In particular, can the difference between these questions rest upon 
the 'impoverishment' of the animal world on the one hand, and the absolute lack of 
language on the other? If our reading of The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics and 
the part played by the notion of 'poverty' in that text in chapter 1 was correct, then we 
have reason to doubt that this is the case. Secondly, although it is undoubtedly the case 
that the phenomenology which Haar is referring to, that of the 1929/30 course, does 
show a distinct lack of attention to what would usually pass as 'animal language, ' is it 
the case that Heidegger never paused to consider these phenomena? 
In fact, we do find such a meditation, hidden in the thicket of a close reading of 
Aristotle's Rhetoric and unavailable to Haar at the time of his study. It shows decisively 
that the question of the animal environment and the question of animal language cannot 
be raised separately. That rather than the question of language moving beyond that of 
environment or posing as an axis around which everything in the environment revolves, 
the question of language, whether human or animal, only enters its proper milieu when 
it is posed in terms of the question concerning environment and world. At the same time 
the issue of animal suffering is also placed squarely back into this milieu, from which 
utilitarian calculus has attempted to extract it. And finally, environmental politics is 
shown to be not simply another branch of endlessly proliferating specialisations in 
moral and political theory, but rooted in our conception of the political per se. 
101 Michel Haar, The Song of the Earth: Heidegger and the Grounds of the History of Being, trans. 
Reginald Lilly (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993) p. 29 
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Whilst commenting on a variety of Aristotle's texts in The Fundamental Concepts of 
Aristotelian Philosophy, Heidegger aims at regaining the very 'milieu of conceptuality'. 
He turns to a well known passage near the beginning of the Politics, where Aristotle 
gives a brief indication as to why the social arrangements of animals are not to be 
regarded as political in the proper sense, and in so doing makes a number of distinctions 
which will be absolutely crucial for Heidegger's understanding of human Dasein and of 
animal life. The primary distinction around which Aristotle's argument turns is, of 
course, that between logos and phone, speech and voice, vocal 'call' and articulate 
language. The passage in question is the Politics 1253a 8-19. Aristotle has made the 
claim that man is by nature a political animal. Yet he is political in a sense which differs 
from the sociability of other animals, because he has speech rather than simply voice. 
Voice allows animals to communicate their pleasure (hedy) and pain (lyperon) to others, 
whilst speech allows man to indicate what is beneficial (sympheron) and harmful 
(blaberon), as well as what is just and unjust. Now it is often assumed that speech is 
something added to voice, that man retains an animal voice with which he cries out in 
pleasure or pain, but to which is sometimes added an extra sense, the sense which 
allows him to speak of the beneficial and harmful, the just and the unjust. Furthermore, 
the basis of a great deal of linguistics and semiology has been constructed on the 
assumption that in an individual 'speech act' the voice and the speech, natural sound and 
sense, sign and signified can in principle be distinguished, if not actually separated. 
Every act of speech is an animal cry endowed with sense. Heidegger's reading, on the 
other hand, upsets the idea that the animal voice retains in principle its natural identity 
in human speech. Rather, voice and speech point to two different ways of being alive: 
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In phöne just as in logos a determination of being-in-the-world appears, a 
determinate way in which the world comes up against life, in the first case in 
the character of hedy and lyperon, in the second case in the character of 
beneficial and harmful (sympheron, blaberon)- fundamental determinations: 
namely that the world in natural Dasein is not a factual situation which I can 
come to know, no actuality or reality, but rather that the world is for the 
most part there in the way of the beneficial and the harmful, of that which 
raises life and that which sends it into discord. And these ways of access are 
found first of all in 'vocal expression' and then in 'speech', in phöne and in 
logos. 
(GA 18,47) 
It is striking that here and elsewhere in this text Heidegger speaks of an animal Dasein 
and the determinate way in which animals are in the world. Clearly these terms are 
reserved for human beings in Being and Time, but not so as to exclude the question of 
the determination of animal environmentality. Rather, only for the reason that Dasein, 
the manifestation of being, is precisely the determination of our 'being-in-the-world'. 
This may come as a surprise to those who assume that Heidegger had always used these 
terms in a technical manner which excluded 'mere living beings. ' 
What can the animal voice tell us? Is it simply a natural part of pleasure or pain felt by 
the animal, a cry which naturally and spontaneously erupts from the animal as it 
undergoes these conditions? Does it indicate nothing, have no sense? That is, after all, 
what Aristotle's remarks have seemed to many to be saying. For Heidegger, however, it 
is a question of attending to what the animal cry indicates about the whole manner in 
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which the animal is in an environment and in it with other animals: 
The encountering of the world in the character of hedy is for the animal, e. g. 
a good place to feed and not a symphony. It is always something which 
there is in the environment (Umwelt) of the animal. These existents 
(Daseiende) in the character of coming-up-against-the-animal are indicated 
(angezeigt), the animal gives a 'sign', semeion. It indicates (zeigt an) 
existents with the character of hedy. It does not make a report about the 
presence (Vorhandensein) of pleasant things outside in nature, but rather this 
indication and crying out is in itself a enticing call (Locken) or a warning. 
The indication of existents is enticement or a warning. Enticing call and 
warning have in themselves the character of addressing-oneself-to... 
Enticing call means: to bring another animal into the same disposition 
(Befindlichkeit); warning: to urge it out of this disposition. Enticing call and 
warning as urging out and bringing in themselves lie upon the ground of 
being-with-one-another. Already in enticing calls and warnings it is shown 
that the animal is with another. This being-with-one-another is clearly 
precisely in this specific character of being of the animal as phöne. It is not 
shown (aufgezeigt) nor announced (Kundgegeben) that something as such is 
there. The animal does not come to the point of stating something as present 
(vorhanden), it indicates it only in the surrounding circle (Umkreis) of its 
animal having-to-do-with. Through this, that the animal indicates the 
threatening and fearful etc., it gives an indication of the being of the world 
and at the same time it announces its being in it. The world is indicated as 
hedy and at the same time it is an announcement of being, being-threatened, 
having-found etc. 
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(GA 18,54-55) 
Animal cries of enticement or warning are never simply outward expressions of the 
state of mind in which an animal finds itself. That is because there is no case of finding 
itself in a physiological or psychological state which is not at one and the same time a 
state brought on in the face of an encounter with its surrounding circle and an urging of 
its fellows into or out of certain dispositions in the face of those encounters. The calls of 
animals are indicators and inducers of dispositional transposition in the animal which 
calls out, calling those that hear to follow it into this disposition. They never indicate a 
state of affairs to which they could subsequently take up one or another disposition. The 
same will be true of the dispositions which play such a crucial role in the analysis of 
Dasein in Being and lime. The animal voice indicates an entire mode of existence in the 
face of a surrounding circle and being with others in those surroundings. It is not a 
hollow cry, a potential vehicle of sense, but it has its own sense. If logos has another 
sense then it will not be a supplement to the voice, but a displacement of the voice. 
Despite certain appearances to the contrary, it is not Heidegger's intention to describe a 
level of human existence in this description of the animal voice. In particular, we should 
not take the claims that the animal voice does not indicate anything 'present', or'present- 
at-hand', as a claim that the circle with which the animal 'has-to-do' is anything like the 
'ready-to-hand' everyday world of Dasein. On the contrary, it is precisely in terms of 
that world of circumspection that Heidegger will go on to describe the world indicated 
by the logos where man speaks of what is beneficial and harmful. Indeed, it seems 
likely that part of the reason that Heidegger dropped this description of animal 
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environmentality in contrast to Dasein's being-in-the-world was the difficulty of 
rigorously distinguishing the two modes of encounter in a discourse which itself 
announces a difference. This is precisely the problem which we saw taken up again in 
The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics in terms of a 'deconstructive' understanding 
of animality. 
What interests us here is the specific problem of animal language and this early passage 
does offer a tantalising sketch of how we might understand those phenomena which 
Haar is concerned are ignored and marginalised by the assertion that animals lack 
language. Even so, on this reading we might have to accept the conclusion that "voice" 
would always have to be written in quotation marks. If it referred to calls of animals, 
then we could understand these perhaps if we learn to hear what is being said and 
transpose our disposition in the required way. Yet such a project would precisely take 
place for us in a world in which there is a circumspective and projective understanding, 
within a project of 'understanding the cries of animal. ' Similarly, if the 'animal' voice 
belonged to a human being, if we hear a spontaneous cry of pleasure or pain, we 
understand this all the more readily and spontaneously in a projected world opened up 
to the horizon of benefit and harm, even justice and injustice. 
Nevertheless, it might well be asked whether all of the phenomena which appear as the 
'language' of animals can be fitted into the categories of 'enticing call' and 'warning'. 
This may seem to be a somewhat restrictive characterisation. The types of call are 
indicative of a quite formal conception of animal behaviour as bringing into and urging 
out of particular dispositions. This would not necessarily be a reductive understanding 
of animal cries, since such a conception could quite well deal with the huge variety of 
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grimaces, imitations, moans, which Haar reminds us of, together with less vocal animal 
language. Heidegger seems to adhere to the view that this formal conception of a 
double-aspect of animal behaviour will be able bear an adequate understanding of 
animality right up to the time of The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics. However, 
just as the notion of 'disinhibiting-ring' seemed finally to lock his understanding of 
living nature into a set of historical configurations of force and power which living 
beings are indeed 'captivated' by if we are unwilling to repeatedly question the notions 
which have informed it, so too even this highly original treatment of Aristotle's 
conception of animal voice and human speech will require a deconstruction if we are 
really to hear everything which living nature has to say to us. The question is not 
whether we can understand all animal voices as enticing calls and warnings, but 
whether in doing so we do justice to those voices and hear them in a way that is fitting? 
With that question animal voices are granted entry into a polls for which, according to 
Giorgio Agamben, they have played a foundational metaphysical role as 'bare life. ' For 
Agamben, Aristotle's foundation of politics on the separation of animal voice from 
human speech points towards the 'bare' animal life of man as an 'inclusive exception' 
and state of exception which founds the city and its laws: 
The question "In what way does the living being have language? " 
corresponds exactly to the question "In what way does bare life dwell in the 
polis? " The living being has logos by taking away and conserving its own 
voice in it, even as it dwells in the polis by letting its own bare life be 
excluded as an exception within it. 1°2 
102Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, trans. Daniel Ileller-Roazen 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), p. 8 
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Here we seem to reach a point at which animal voices cry out for recognition within the 
walls of the city. They are ultimately our own cries of pleasure and pain, which are 
included only as an exception and thus inclusively excluded. Yet if, as we have insisted 
and Agamben repeatedly tries to show, 'bare life' is the result only of certain 
metaphysical machinations and need not be thought as the substrate of life upon which 
the polis is built and which modernity has allowed to take centre stage in the realm of 
the political with disastrous results, then the strict correspondence between the question 
of the language of living beings and their dwelling in the polis must take on an entirely 
different character. It is no longer a question of trying to recover our own voice from the 
state of exception to which it has been subjected, nor of teaching animal voices to speak 
the language of the city, but of learning to hear all that those voices might have to say if 
nature were to be recovered and freed into the language which is not the property of any 
one set of beings, the language at the source of that discursive speech which human 
beings imagine they have invented for themselves alone. 
§17 Herder: From the Origin of Language to Hearkening in the Clearing 
In the long history of thinking animality and language which has positioned itself on the 
site laid out by Aristotle, a site where the foundations of the city have been continually 
repositioned, where human beings and animals have been separated and re-conjoined 
within the continuum of nature, there are points at which, within this continuum, 
another language and another relation to living nature can be glimpsed. It is Herder's 
Treatise on the Origin of Language which provided Heidegger with some of the most 
promising hints at the reconfiguration of this particular metaphysical constellation. 
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In 1939, in the semester following his seminars dealing with Nietzsche's second 
Untimely Meditation, Heidegger held a graduate seminar on Herder's treatise. His 
preparatory notes and student reports on the meetings have been published under the 
title On the Essence of Language: The Metaphysics of Language and the Essencing of 
the Word. Johann Gottfried von Herder was a one time student of Kant's and has been 
extremely influential in various philosophical fields, but perhaps most especially in the 
development of the study of language. In 1772 he wrote a treatise on the origin of 
language which won the Berlin Academy prize. That inquiry into language was now 
orientated towards a question of origin had a significant effect, as we shall see in what 
follows. An Aristotelian metaphysics, which feel into the habit of simply positing 
language as the fundamental attribute of human beings and generally failing to draw out 
Aristotle's own phenomenological viewpoint, is supplemented and reorientated around 
this question of origin. It is no longer a question of seeing and understanding the distinct 
voice and speech of animals and human beings, but of raising the question of the 
crossing over from one to another, the genesis of the second in the first. Thus, the 
question of the origin of language is fundamentally wedded to the relation of human 
beings and animals. The origin of language, so understood, had recently preoccupied the 
French Enlightenment and Herder replies explicitly to the theses of Condillac and 
Rousseau on this topic in his treatise. Of there respective attempts to bridge the 
explanatory gap of 'origin' Herder complains, 'the former made animals into human 
beings, and the later made human beings into animals. i1°3 It is Herder's attempt to resist 
103Johann Gottfried Herder, Abhandlung Über den Ursprung der Sprache' in Herder Werke, Frühe 
Schriften 1764-1772, Vol I (Frankfurt a. M.: Deutscher Klassiker, 1985) p. 711 (hereafter 
Abhandlung). I have consulted Michael N. Forster's English translation throughout. Although I have 
made frequent modifications to this translation I give page references to it following the German 
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these two alternatives whilst remaining open to the question of origin which in 
Heidegger's eyes gives his treatise the power to prepare a crossing over into and within 
language that will reorient the whole question of origins. 
i) Besonnenheit and Benommenheit: Reflective Awareness and the Animal Economy 
Herder begins his treatise on the origin of language with a claim which at once confirms 
its orientation towards a long metaphysical tradition and throws up a labyrinth of 
difficulties for that very same tradition: 'Already as animal the human being has 
language. "" The human being is thus, from the start, understood as animal. Yet this 
comes in the wake of an Aristotelian metaphysics, which understood language to be the 
distinguishing feature of the human being, that which marks us off from other animals. 
If human beings had language already as animals, then were they not already human 
beings and as distinct from animals as they would ever be? And if there is a general 
language of animality, of which human language is only one form, then how can it be 
language that properly distinguishes human beings from animals? 
Herder treads the line between man and animal with great subtlety, but he also falls into 
the inevitable difficulties betrayed by his opening statement. He wishes to locate human 
language within a general language of animality and nature, developing from a language 
of cries and immediate expressions of pain and feeling. Those who place emphasis on 
this part of Herder's project may take exception to Heidegger's location of the treatise 
within the 'metaphysics' of language. Herder's great achievement, it will be claimed, 
reference. Johann Gottfried Herder, 'Treatise on the Origin of Language' in Philosophical Writings, 
cd. Michael N. Forster (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002) p. 77 (Hereafter Treatise). 
104Abhandlung p. 696, Treatise, p. 65 
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was to wrest the study of language away from the metaphysical and theological ground 
upon which it had been conducted hitherto. Herder gave us a naturalist, perhaps even 
materialist, account of the origin of language which paved the way for its proper 
scientific investigation. Why then, does Heidegger insist on locating the treatise within 
the 'metaphysics' of language? It cannot be denied that Herder takes a great deal of 
trouble to argue against the theory of the divine origin of language and that in this sense 
his account is not 'metaphysical. ' Yet Heidegger has always argued that naturalist, 
materialist and generally 'scientific' philosophical accounts do not fall outside the realm 
of metaphysics. On the contrary, those explanatory accounts take their initiative from a 
metaphysical understanding of language. 
The difficulty of placing Herder's project stems, according to Heidegger, from an 
ambiguity in our understanding of 'origin, ' which was also present in the Greek word 
arche. The origin is both the origination (Entstehung) and the essence or nature (Wesen) 
of something. Metaphysics exists between these two origins, whilst scientific research 
tends more and more to subordinate essence to origination. Heidegger refers to Jacob 
Grimm's 1851 address 'On the Origin of Language' as an example of the grounding of 
the linguistic sciences upon precisely this one-sided development of the metaphysical 
question of origin. 115 This research now takes the historical and even experimental 
reconstruction of the origination of language in human beings to be the only rigorous 
approach to the question of origin. According to Heidegger these research programs, 
however successful, could never ultimately tell us anything about language which we 
did not in a sense already know. The result, known in advance, can only be confirmed, 
because the essence of language has been determined in advance. For example, we 
undertake an experiment (one which Grimm discusses but determines to be immoral): 
105 OEL, pp. 87-89/103-106 
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'Two children abandoned in solitude, mute servants looking after them, would find 
some kind of communication, a kind of language. In this observation, we would see 
confirmed what we already know before, namely that language is denotative 
announcement. " 0' 
Herder's treatise thus prefigures and initiates the research of the linguistic sciences. This 
is perhaps particularly true of the second division of his essay, where he attempts to 
outline four 'natural laws' which condition the development of language in human 
societies. But Heidegger's interest does not lie here and he all but ignores this second 
division. Heidegger is primarily interested in those points at which Herder's thought 
remains most thoroughly embroiled in its metaphysical heritage, where origin retains its 
ambiguity between essence and origination. It is there that we can see the continuing 
effect of this ambiguity in the metaphysical no-man's land between the animal and the 
human. In positioning human language within a more general animal language, Herder 
has nevertheless subscribed to a metaphysics which attempts to understand the human 
in terms of language and language in terms of the human. This becomes clear when 
Heidegger juxtaposes Herder's opening statement that, 'Already as animal the human 
being has language' with the statement following only a little later that: 'Human beings 
are for us the only creatures endowed with language that we know... they distinguish 
themselves precisely through language from all animals. i1°7 The circularity generated by 
understanding language as originating in a general language of animality and at the 
same time as that which distinguishes the human being from all other animals is in no 
way to be understood as a flaw in Herder's approach. Rather, by bringing to light and 
refusing to elide this circular grounding at the heart of the metaphysics of language, 
106 OEL, p. 172/211-212 
107OEL, p. 3/3-4, cf. Abhandlung, p. 711, Treatise, p. 77 
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Herder is driven to search out its origin in a more essential way than was possible in all 
the subsequent achievements of linguistic and natural science, because he raises a 
question about what origin itself means. It is here that Heidegger sees the possibility of 
thinking language otherwise and in so doing inaugurating another relation between man 
and animal. 
For Herder there had been something lacking in the thinking of animality and thus in the 
thinking of the origin of language, a topic which obsessed the French and increasingly 
the German Enlightenment. What was lacking was a basic point of view, from which 
animality in general could be thought and understood in relation to those animals which 
have language. Herder names the point of view which he puts forward the doctrine of 
'animal spheres': 
Every animal has its circle, to which it belongs from its birth onwards, 
enters immediately, in which it remains lifelong and dies. But now it is 
strange, "the sharper the senses of the animal, the more wonderful its works 
of art (Kunstwerke) are, the smaller is its circle: the more specific and 
limited its works for art. 1' 
The term 'works of art' is to be taken in its broadest etymological sense. Kunst (art) 
derives from the same word group as können (to be able to), so we should understand 
Herder to be positing an inverse correlation between the breadth of an animal's sphere 
and the specificity and wonder of its abilities. Every animal has a circle which it is 
bound to throughout the course of its life, not after the fact of its being alive, but as the 
primary fact of its being alive. Within this circle the animal can sense certain things and 
108Abhandlung, p. 712, Treatise, p. 78 
229 
perform certain actions. The circles of animals can be larger or smaller, they can 
encompass more or less. The suggestion is that there is an inverse proportion between 
the breadth of the environing circle and the relative strength of the affects and effects 
which circulate within it. We can begin to think of this in terms of what are today 
understood as degrees of 'specialization' of living beings or the volume of their 
ecological niche. A bird of prey, for example, has a relatively enclosed circle and its 
sight and grip are proportionally sharp and strong. A scavenging bird may be able to 
kill, but its circle will be broader and its 'killer instinct', a phrase which could now be 
translated in terms of the specificity of the affective and effective circuitry of killing, 
relatively weak. 
The basic point of view whereby living beings are understood in terms of their spheres 
of life is thus grounded in an understanding of life in general as forming a 'household of 
nature' or what Herder goes on to call a 'general animal economy. " "Heidegger himself 
finds the origin of this idea in Leibniz, and he argues that Herder is frequently less 
consistent than Leibniz in following through the implications of this point of view. 
However, one of the guiding principles of this view is captured in Herder's perfectly 
equivocal phrase, 'Nature gives no powers gratuitously. ' (Die Natur gibt keine Kräfte 
umsonst. )"' She gives no powers for free, but also nothing needlessly. 
In chapter 21 discussed the idea of an economy of nature and claimed that the law of 
economy has become a guiding norm for the metaphysics of nature and ecological 
science. I contrasted this economy to the open possibility of a true ecology which would 
not constantly subordinate living nature and the language by which we speak of it to the 
109Abhandlung p. 716, Treatise p. 82 
11OAbhandlung p. 769, Treatise p. 127 
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economic law of growth. We saw Heidegger's attempt to recover an aspect of the 
metaphysics of dynamis which would not be accounted for in this way, and thus a 
dynamic life which at the same time would resist economisation. In the following 
chapter we saw the spectrum of dynamis which was thus uncovered culminate in the 
extreme forms of violence and power. Finally, we turned to language and in particular 
the language with which we speak of and perhaps with and within living nature, as a 
possible site at which life can appear otherwise than as subjected to the self- 
empowering of power coupled with the humanisation of the world. It now appears that a 
simple appeal to ecology beyond economy is not enough because the metaphysics of 
language can and has enabled the subordination of the logos to the economy of nature. 
Nevertheless, within Herder's treatise it is not only this fateful possibility that comes to 
light but also other possibilities which are often overlooked by those intent on finding in 
Herder the origins of the scientific study of language and modern linguistics. 
How does Herder think that the basic point of view of a general economy of animal 
spheres can help us to understand the origin of language? According to the law of 
inverse proportion the broader and more manifold the sphere of an animal, the weaker 
its abilities will be. Now human beings occupy a peculiar place in this economy: 
Man has no uniform or narrow sphere, where only a single kind of work 
awaits him: - a world of occupations and determinations surrounds him- 
His senses and organization are not sharpened for a single thing: he has a 
sense for everything and therefore for any one thing naturally a weaker and 
duller sense- 
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The powers of his soul are spread over the world; his representations are not 
directed towards a single thing: and with that he has no artistic drive 
(Kunsttrieb), no artistic readiness (Kunstfertigkeit)- and, one thing which is 
more especially relevant here, no animal language. "' 
The language which man already possessed as an animal was not the language of 
human beings. Within the economy which makes up the animal realm there is a 
language of cries which are emitted, but there is also a, 'dark sensual agreement of an 
animal species amongst themselves, about their determination, in the circles of their 
efficacy. "" The circulation within the animal economy may well include cries and 
gestures, but these are only particular expressions of a general dark communication. The 
circle of the human being, on the other hand, is so broad it comes to a point at which it 
is removed from animal language and requires a language of its own. 
It may seem strange that Herder attributes no 'artistic drive' nor 'artistic readiness' to 
human beings, since the argument is precisely concerned to establish the natural 
conditions in which human beings are driven to invent a language beyond the language 
of animality. This would include the natural conditions for the production of any 
'artificial' language along with all that we more usually understand as art and artifice. 
But if we recall the broad sense of the term 'art' that Herder used to write of animal 
'works of art', then we can make more sense of this claim. If the 'arts' in question are 
precisely the abilities which are sharpened to a greater or lesser extent in proportion to 
the scope of the animal sphere, then Herder's claim is that because human beings have 
II lAbhandlung, p. 713, Treatise, p. 79 
112Ibid 
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the widest possible sphere, a whole 'world' of relations and tasks, they have no 
instinctually driven or ready-made abilities. Human beings stand within the general 
animal economy, but they also stand out in it. 
This thought is captured in Herder's claim that human beings are creatures of 'reflective 
awareness' (Besonnenheit). He insists upon the need for this new terminology in order 
to avoid any confusion with determinations of the human species through the attribution 
to it of particular 'powers of reason' and so forth. Reflective awareness is not a particular 
human ability, it is the essence of the human relation to its surrounding world and as 
such the ground of all human abilities. Although the term sounds as though it refers to a 
particular conscious act or ability which can accompany and have an effect upon 
consciousness, reflective awareness does not refer even to any particular type of 
awareness or consciousness which appears within the human sphere. Rather, the reverse 
is the case. Every kind of awareness and conscious act which belongs to human beings 
is such because it appears within the realm of reflective awareness. The so called 
'higher' faculties down to most 'animal' motor reactions show up in the realm of 
'freedom and clarity' designated by reflective awareness, the likes of which has never 
been seen before in the animal economy. 
That this is Herder's unusual claim for reflective awareness becomes clear throughout 
the course of the treatise. He argues that even in his most sensual condition the human 
being still inhabits the realm of reflective awareness, whilst even in its least sensual 
condition the animal is always still animal and knows nothing of the clarity of reflective 
awareness. 1' Furthermore, human infants do not begin in the position of animals and 
gradually develop into beings with reflective awareness. Rather, even babies are 
113Abhandlung, p. 721, Treatise, p. 87 
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creatures of reflective awareness. "' Clearly this does not mean that they have developed 
powers of reasoning and oration. But reflective awareness does not require that one has 
developed or can exercise any particular ability. It is the realm of freedom and clarity 
which the child already inhabits, a realm which, if it did not already inhabit, it would 
not be able to develop any of those particular abilities of reason and oration traditionally 
associated with language. Finally, Herder explicitly distinguishes between particular 
reflective acts (Besinnung) and the realm of reflective awareness (Besonnenheit). "s It is 
only because human beings inhabit the realm of reflective awareness that they can 
develop particular reflective abilities and that they can and must develop language. 
Human beings, Herder frequently insists, are built to invent language. God does not 
teach them language, for how would they understand his lessons if they were not 
already in possession of language? Nor does our language develop directly from the 
dark communications of the animal economy. Human beings invent language for 
themselves. Yet they do not simply invent language from nothing or from some sheer 
force of will or cleverness. The invention of language would then encounter similar 
difficulties as the learning of language from some divine source. Heidegger finds the 
problem succinctly posed by Wilhelm von Humboldt, a major inheritor and developer 
of the Herdian tradition: "The human being is only human through language; but in 
order to invent language he would already have to be human. "6 Clearly human beings 
learn languages and they also invent languages. But to invent language per se, this 
would be a task beyond any being which did not already inhabit language. So Heidegger 
suggests that we must understand this invention in a particular way. We find a clue in 
114 Abhandlung, p. 719, Treatise, p. 85 
115 Abhandlung, p. 771, Treatise, p. 128 
116 OEL, p. 29/35-36 
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the word itself. In the German word for invention, Er-findung, Heidegger sees a root 
which suggests a discovery or finding: 'The Herdian expression "inventing" means: to 
find oneself into ones essence. "" We could add that the English 'in-vention' denotes a 
'coming into, ' in this case, entry into the realm of reflective awareness. Not that human 
beings simply discover language ready-made. Rather, human beings find their way into 
and find themselves inhabiting the dimension of language, which coincides with the 
dimension of freedom and clarity that Herder names reflective awareness. 
Certainly, for many, reflective awareness will still sound too much like a mode of 
consciousness to be compared to Heidegger's thinking of human being. "' Nevertheless, 
Heidegger reads reflective awareness as a dimension of freedom and clarity that human 
beings inhabit, which could well bear some comparison to what Heidegger earlier 
understood as Dasein's being-in-the-world, although of course the connotations of 
distanced reflection are very different to Heidegger's insistence upon involvement and 
care. The difficulty for Heidegger, at this stage, is not so much Herder's understanding 
of the being of human beings, but his attempt to maintain in parallel both his insight into 
the law of inverse proportion governing the economy of animal spheres and the idea 
that human beings inhabit a realm which proves to be completely different in kind. 
117OEL, 171, GA 85,210. We should recall that this had been Heidegger's understanding of the 
'invention' of specifically human abilities since at least 1935, when he interpreted Sophocles' term 
edidaxato not as, 'human beings invented' but that they, 'found their way into the overwhelming and 
therein first found themselves' See § 13 above. Grimm's German Dictionary tells us that early users 
made no sharp distinction between the verbs to invent (erfinden) and to discover (entdecken), Grimm 
Deutsches Wörterbuch, vol. 3 (Leipzig: Hirzel, 1862), p. 798 
118This is where Charles Taylor, for example, locates the major parting of ways between Herder and 
Heidegger. 'Heidegger, Language and Ecology', in Heidegger: A Critical Reader, ed. Hubert L. 
Dreyfus and Harrison Hall (Cambridge, Mass: Blackwell, 1992), 256 
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Herder is clear that it is a difference in kind which is at issue: '[... ] the human race does 
not stand more or less above the animal in terms of level, but in kind. "" Yet if the law 
of inverse proportion is supposed to function as some kind of explanatory principle for 
the development of human language in the realm of reflective awareness, how does this 
fit with the idea that the human sphere is different in kind? Is the human world an 
animal circle broadened to the point of breaking? And if it breaks open, how are we to 
understand the event of that break or in-cision in the animal economy? Perhaps without 
being aware of it Herder has already prevented us from understanding this incision 
properly. As Heidegger suggests in one of his classes: 'If essential distinction means: to 
be a different kind, which cannot be determined through that of the animal, one could 
say, then Herder should not start with "small circle"- "big circle, " but should pose the 
distinction: circle- no-circle. ' 120 
Heidegger's line of questioning can perhaps be better understood if we compare this 
reading of Herder with his own attempt to think the essence of animality in The 
Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics. There Heidegger had drawn upon contemporary 
biological research to try to broach the question of animality. Above all, it will be 
recalled, he was influenced by the radically ecological standpoint of Jakob von Uexküll. 
Very much along the lines of Herder's animal spheres, Uexkiill maintained that biology 
needs to take as its fundamental point of view the Umwelt, the surrounding-world, 
which every living being weaves around itself. Different species of animal inhabit 
completely different surrounding-worlds because their affective-effective circuit of life 
is different. However, this is not a purely physiological circuit which relays meaningless 
impulses. What is important is the carrying of a mark throughout the entire circuit of 
119Abhandlung, p. 716, Treatise, p. 81 
120 OEL, p. 146/174 -translation modified. 
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perception and behaviour. This turns out to be a semiotic biology, understanding 
stimulus as meaningful mark or sign, which only gains its full meaning in the context of 
the entire circuit. Herder seems to anticipate this theory in rough outline with his 
description of the general significance of 'dark animal communication' for 
understanding not just part of animal life, but life as such. For Uexküll, although we 
know little directly about the surrounding-worlds of animals, it is the task of the 
biologist to try to think her way into those alien worlds. Human beings also inhabit 
surrounding-worlds and it is partly the specificity of our own world which makes the 
task of thinking our way into those of other animals so difficult. 
Yet for Heidegger, Uexküll had still not discovered the real difficulty of the situation. It 
is not simply that our own specific functional circle of interests blinds us to those of the 
animal. It is because we do not inhabit an environment in this sense at all that thinking 
the life of living beings is so difficult. In fact, it is inappropriate to attribute a 
surrounding-world (Umwelt) to animals. The surrounding-world is, for Heidegger, the 
world of Dasein in its everyday appearance. For within the animal environment there 
are no beings 'as such and as a whole, ' as there are undergirding the human world even 
when that world makes itself known to us. There is no manifestation of beings at all. It 
is not simply that different kinds of beings show up for the animal, but beings are not 
manifest as beings at all. The temptation, if not the utter inevitability, is for us to try to 
think of the animal sphere in terms of the beings which appear in it. This would then be 
the deepest root of an 'anthropomorphism' which is not simply an insidious self-regard. 
It is not the preoccupation with our own circle of interests and projection of them on to 
the animal which lies at the root of the problem, but the fact that the very ground for all 
human ability to 'transpose' ourselves into other worlds is our inhabiting a world of 
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utterly different character to that of animals. 
We are now in a position to shed some further light on Heidegger's disputed thesis that 
the animal is 'poor in world', in the context of Herder's inception of the fundamental 
point of view of animal spheres. As we saw, Heidegger's thought is easily 
misunderstood and indeed, taken for the very opposite of its intended break with a 
general animal economy. The misunderstanding arises because Heidegger takes the 
determination of animal worlds as 'poor, ' a term which is used by both Herder and 
Uexküll, but understands this thesis in an utterly different manner. Although Herder 
does not appear by name in The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, it is instructive 
to compare his own determination of animality as 'poor' with that of Uexküll and 
Heidegger. Herder argues that it is man that is the 'poorest' of animals in both instinct 
and ability, since his life circle is so wide his instinct is weak and full of gaps and 
shortcomings. "' It is in this very poverty of instinct that we find the origin of language 
in the compensating gift of reflective awareness. Since they do not leave the economy 
of nature altogether, even if they dwell in a light beyond of the darkness of animality, 
human beings require language as a kind of compensation for their poverty of instinct. 
Here, poverty refers to the relative weakness of the affects and effects in the human 
being's life sphere compared to that of animals. Uexküll, on the other hand, uses the 
reverse designation, describing the world of the tick as necessarily poor, yet in a way 
which clearly betrays his adherence to an economy of nature almost identical to 
Herder's: 
The whole rich world around the tick shrinks and changes into a scanty 
framework consisting, in essence, of three receptor cues and three effector 
121Abhandlung, pp. 714-715/ Treatise, pp. 80-81 
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cues- her Umwelt. But the very poverty of this world guarantees the 
unfailing certainty of her actions, and security is more important than 
wealth. " 
Here poverty refers to the relative limitedness of the animal world, which is 
compensated for by what Herder would have called 'strength of instinct: This 
designation of poverty is simply the inverse of Herder's, resulting from an identical law 
of inverse proportion between breadth of environment and strength of instinct. 
Heidegger's understanding of animal 'poverty' is very different. Here it is not a question 
of designating the relative strength or breadth of the animal circle, but of indicating that 
the animal world is utterly different in kind to that of the human being. The 'poverty' in 
question now exists between man and animal, not as a relative proportion, but as an 
attempt to indicate a relation which can exist between the two only as an abyssal 
difference. Poverty still determines the animal just as much as human beings, because it 
marks an attempt to open and maintain our thought in the abyss which lies between 
them. Yet poverty no longer marks a position within the general economy of nature, but 
a relation removed from that economy altogether. 
Despite his grounding of the doctrine of animal spheres in a general animal economy 
122Jakob von Uexküll, 'A stroll through the worlds of animals and men: A picture book of invisible 
worlds', Semiotica 89-4: 325. Although this book was originally published in 1934 and therefore had 
not yet appeared when Heidegger wrote The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, it is one of the 
most readily available and clearest introductions to Uexkiill's thought in English. However, it should 
be noted that Giorgio Agamben has recently argued that some of Uexküll's later remarks might be 
used to call Heidegger's approach into question. Giorgio Agamben, The Open: Man and Animal, trans. 
Kevin Attell (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004), p. 47 
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and ultimately in the continuum of nature, Heidegger does think that we can find in 
Herder's treatise some intimation of a very different relation to animality, one which 
itself requires a reorientation in our thinking of the origin of language. Language would 
then no longer be maintained as the differentiating factor between man and animal. 
Hearkening to language as itself the abyss which opens between man and animal would 
allow it to serve as a site at which a more appropriate relation to the animal can take 
place. That cannot be done by beginning within the animal economy and then removing 
ourselves and perhaps attempting to drag the rest of living nature out behind us. Instead 
of looking for language's point of origination in a pre-established animal economy, if 
we hearken to language we may hear in it the silent origin of both language and the 
presencing of nature. By beginning with and attending to language itself, we need no 
longer understand language as compensation demanded by nature's economy, but as a 
gift, a true gratuity. We might then be able to hear in the gift of language the words to 
help us preserve the gift of nature. 
ii) From Hearkening to the Clearing 
At the point that Herder turns his discussion towards what takes place in human 
language, thus apparently turning away from animal languages, Heidegger thinks that 
he can discern the marks of a decisive incision into the general course of the argument 
which will turn out to have important implications for our understanding of the relation 
of human beings to living nature. Herder's thought moves towards something that he 
himself cannot comprehend in its full ramifications. This is the point at which he 
discusses the importance of the sense of hearing for the origin of language. 
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Hearing, Herder claims, is the sense which allows for the invention of language. It is 
through hearing that man can, 'sense the language of nature which teaches, and without 
this cannot invent language: so hearing has become in a certain way the middle of his 
senses, the proper door to the soul and the band which connects the other senses. ' 
123 
Herder goes on to explain that hearing is to be understood as the 'middle sense, ' the 
sense between touch and sight, in six distinct ways: Firstly, in its 'sphere of sensibility 
from the outside', that is, the range at which it can take things in; secondly, the clarity 
and distinctness of tones falls between the dull sensations of touch and the sharpness of 
vision; thirdly, the sensations of hearing are a median with respect to their liveliness; 
fourthly, with respect to the duration of their effect; fifthly, with respect to their need to 
find a means to express themselves and finally, Herder speculates, the sense of hearing 
develops in human beings between the sense of touch and the sense of sight. 
Each of these points can be challenged in various ways. Is it not the case, for example, 
that in a dark wood or at night the 'sphere' of the sense hearing is greater than sight? Or, 
as Heidegger remarks, when we hear London now on the radio, do we not hear 
something at a distance which we could never see? 124 This kind of criticism would miss 
the point entirely, because Herder is not making claims about the measurable distance 
involved, nor about that measurable clarity of sound or its actual development. What 
Herder is pointing us towards is, Heidegger argues, 'the kind of possession that 
perceives. In hearing a nearing. "" Thus, we should not be content to set to work 
clarifying and refuting each of Herder's points, but try to attend to what binds them 
together as a characterization and indication of something which itself binds together all 
123 Abhandlung, p. 746, Treatise, p. 108 
124 OEL, p. 104/121 
125 Ibid 
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our senses. This is the character of the 'in-between' which Herder senses is so important 
for understanding language: 'What Herder senses with the "middle" character of 
"hearing" is the in-between and in the midst of the clearing. "26 
Despite his clear insight that reflective awareness is not a particular ability, but rather a 
way of 'having' abilities, Herder remained entangled in the thought of origination which 
constantly tends to understand language as a particular ability which has its conditions 
of origination in other abilities. Thus he ascribes the experience of the middle, of being 
in the midst, to a particular sensory ability: hearing. Nevertheless, Herder did not 
remain the complete prisoner of the thought of origination. That is why he was able to 
say that, 'We become, so to speak, hearing through all our senses! "" The experience of 
standing out in the midst of nature, of attending to and 'hearing' the sounds and voices 
of nature, has ultimately no more to do with the particular sensory ability of hearing 
than sight or touch. Hearing may give us a first sense of this hearkening, but it is only if 
we begin in the middle and in the midst that we first gain this sense of perception. 
What exactly are we supposed to 'hear' in this hearkening? Perhaps the whole 
cacophony of nature? All of the multitude of sounds and tones which surround us? In 
particular, are we to hearken to the 'dark' language of the animal world, the cries and 
screams, songs, cooing, lowing and bleating of animals? Does the origin of language lie 
in 'hearkening' to this, the dark precursor of the revelatory word? An example which 
recurs at several points in Herder's text is the bleating of a sheep. Do we not learn 
language from the sounds and tones of nature itself, by hearing the 'baah' of a sheep and 
then fixing this as a mark of recognition, effectively saying, 'You are the one who 
126 OEL, p. 96/113 
127 Abhandlung p. 747, Treatise, p. 109. cf. OEL, p. 93/109 
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bleats! '? Only if, Heidegger claims, we can attend to what occurs between the tone of 
the animal and the 'baah' of a child who recognizes it, do we hearken to what is essential 
to language. Only if we can attend to the silence between the tone and the word. What 
do we hear in silence, in the silencing of language between the language of nature and 
the language of man? A simple break in the pattern of sound? A silent punctuating mark 
which can say more than words? Or something else altogether, perhaps the, 'ground of 
the "sound"? or even abyssal-ground? "" In that silence we begin to hearken to the 
essencing (Wesung) of the word. It is no longer a question of identifying the ambiguity 
in the investigation of origins and negotiating the terrain between origination 
(Entstehung) and essence (Wesen). The essencing of the word is an event of presencing 
in the clearing, 'in the midst' of nature. Man and animal are joined here otherwise than 
in the continuum of nature. In the silent essencing of the word and the presencing of 
nature, they are joined in an event which allows them to belong together in radical 
disjuncture. 
§18 The Disjunction of Physis and Logos in Truth 
Our task is now to gain a better understanding of the belonging together in disjuncture 
of nature and language. That should allow us to see how this issue is linked to two 
central concerns of this thesis: firstly, to see how this connective disjuncture of nature 
and language opens the relation of human beings and animality to being constituted 
otherwise; secondly, to see how these renewed possibilities rely upon the 'withdrawal' 
or 'poverty' of beyng which is now said to take place as the silencing of the word and 
what I understand to be a corresponding recovery of nature. 
128 OEL, p. 93/109 
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Is language, then, a natural phenomenon? Already in the introduction to Being and 
Time Heidegger had pointed toward an affinity of phenomena and logos, such that the 
'showing itself from itself of a phenomenon and the 'letting be seen' of that which is 
spoken of in logos, allow for 'phenomenology' not as a doctrine or science of 
phenomena, but a letting be seen of that which shows itself. Nevertheless, despite the 
common endeavour of manifestation in nature and the revelation of the word there was 
something in the phenomena which withdrew. Not some being which remained 
obstinately hidden, nor something remaining 'behind' the phenomena, but the being, the 
very prevailing of the phenomena. (BT, 51-51/28-35) 
In The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics Heidegger reminds us that he now 
understands the connection of physis and logos as something which can only be 
understood within the point of view opened up by the recovery of the Greek 
understanding of truth: 
The Greek concept of truth presented here manifests to us an intimate 
connection between the prevailing of beings, their concealment, and man. 
Man as such, insofar as he exists, in the logos tears physis, which strives to 
conceal itself, from concealment and thus brings beings to their truth. 
[... ]This word for truth [aletheia] in antiquity is a primal word precisely on 
account of its 'negativity'. It testifies that truth is a fate of the finitude of man 
and, so far as the philosophy of antiquity is concerned, has nothing to do 
with the harmlessness and indifference of proven propositions. 
(FCM, 29-30/44-45) 
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We see here the gestation of the role which man will play in Introduction to 
Metaphysics. It is important to note that his being bound up in this strife of logos and 
physis in truth is precisely the mark of man's finitude in antiquity. We have been witness 
to the overwhelming violence that occurs when in the course of the history of being this 
finitude falls out of view. 
That which withdraws in truth is given the name physis. Heidegger cites and interprets a 
fragment from Heraclitus to which he will often return: 
'physis... kruptesthai philei'. "The prevailing of things has in itself a striving 
to conceal itself. " You can here see the innermost connection between 
concealment and physis, and at the same time the connection between 
physis and logos as revealing. 
(FCM, 27/ 41) 
Physis is the prevailing of the whole. As such it is connected to logos as revealing. Yet 
in this very revelation it continues to conceal itself. The prevailing of that which 
prevails, the 'inner law' of prevailing things, strives for concealment. Yet, if the 
connection between physis and logos is revealed in the light of the recovery of truth 
thought as unconcealment (Unverborgenheit), it will not be enough simply to recognise 
the Greek term aletheia as the root of this connective disjuncture. We must follow in 
somewhat greater detail precisely how nature and language are placed in a disjunctive 
connection in the truth, so as to see how it is that only a turning in the truth itself can 
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transform the relation between language and nature. 
Towards the end of The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics Heidegger focuses our 
attention on the point in Greek thought where the disjunction between logos and physis 
came to prevail over their connection. In the course of a detailed analysis of Aristotle's 
understanding of logos apophantikos, the 'propositional statement', which is intended to 
fill out the third 'guiding thesis' of the second course of lectures, that man is 'world- 
building', Heidegger summarises Aristotle's position on natural beings and logos as 
follows: 
Aristotle states: logos is not physei, is not some product of a physical event 
or process; it is not anything like digestion or the circulation of the blood, 
but has its genesis in something quite different: not physei but kata 
syntheken. Corresponding to this is that part of the earlier theory of the 
logos which says that language is thesei: Words do not grow, they do not 
occur and form like organic processes, but are what they are on the basis of 
reaching an agreement. 
(FCM, 309/447) 
Here we find the root of long standing distinctions, in particular, the distinction between 
the natural and the conventional or 'agreed upon', real and symbolic, nature and culture. 
Notice that it is no longer physis itself which is at stake here, but natural beings and 
processes, physei on. Words are not natural beings, they do not unfold from out of 
themselves, they do not have the principle of their growth and movement in themselves. 
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Here the Heraclitean physis as the prevailing of beings as such and as a whole and the 
logos as the very revealing and making manifest of that prevailing has been resolved 
into a question of distinguishing and classifying beings. This is one tendency which 
crystallised in the Aristotelian determination of propositional statements. '29 However, 
this should not lead us to think that in the works of Aristotle we find only the 
dismemberment of that which should belong together, nature and language. Heidegger 
always thinks it is possible to read against the grain and recover other tendencies at 
work. Furthermore, the dispersal of nature and language was a possibility that was 
already present in their belonging together in a more 'primordial' understanding. It is not 
a question of fusing nature and language back together. Not a question, as I said before, 
of logisicing nature or naturalising language. It is a question of finding our way into an 
event whereby they can belong together in disjunction. That is the event of truth, an 
event which can take place otherwise than it has done in its first inception. 
In order to get a better idea of precisely what this means and to guard against certain 
influential misunderstandings it will be helpful to contrast this reading with that of an 
important and powerful interpretation of Heidegger's significance for ecological 
thought, that of Michael E. Zimmerman. Zimmerman first formulated some of his views 
about the potential for developing a Heideggerian 'ethos' in 'deep ecology' in 1983.130 A 
decade later, after a great deal of historical and philosophical debate had been initiated 
concerning Heidegger's involvement with National Socialism, Zimmerman rethought 
129 That logos and physis once formed a 'unity', but then 'step apart' and are finally completely detached 
from one another, is a constant and pervasive theme for Heidegger once he begins to explicitly 
formulate these occurrences in terms of a 'history of being'. See, e. g. IM p. 130/94 for the unity of the 
two and IM p. 190/136 for the process of disjunction. 
130 Michael Zimmerman, Towards a Heideggerian Ethos for Radical Environmentalism' 5,2 (1983) 99- 
131 
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his position and became more skeptical of the ecological potential to be found in 
Heidegger's thought. 13' Since then Zimmerman has continued to develop nuanced 
readings of Heidegger's work in this light, finding both rich material for ecological 
thought, but also various obstacles for an ecological reading. Most importantly for our 
purposes, I think it can be shown that Zimmerman develops an important intuition about 
the duplicity or 'ambiguity' which remains in Heidegger's understanding of physis. 
However, because he misidentifies this ambiguity many of his criticisms and concerns 
remain misplaced. I will go on to argue that by establishing a more plausible reading of 
the disjunctive connection between physis and logos, we can discern that: a) Heidegger's 
thinking of the joining of physis and logos does indeed result in an ambiguity in his 
conception of animality and living nature that is not fully addressed; b) nevertheless, far 
from being an obstacle, it is the 'duplicity' of Heidegger's thinking of physis that must 
form the core of any ecological reading of his work. 
Zimmerman first presents the ambiguity that he finds in Heidegger's conception of 
physis in his work of 1990 Heidegger's Confrontation with Modernity: Technology, 
Politics, Art. It continues to inform many of his recent criticisms of Heidegger as an 
ecological thinker. In the early work the ambiguity is presented in terms of two guiding 
senses of the term physic: 'The first aspect of physis, an entity's self-emerging, would 
seem to be in some measure independent of the second aspect of physis, the appearing 
and presencing of an entity within a historical world. "" Here he names the two aspects 
of physis, its self-emergence and its appearance in a historical world, 'ousia-logical' and 
131Michael Zimmerman, `Rethinking the Heidegger-Deep Ecology Relationship' in Environmental 
Ethics 15,3 (1993) 195-224 
I32Heidegger s Confrontation with Modernity: Technology, Politics and Art (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1990) p. 224 
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'aletheia-logical' respectively. He then argues that in The Fundamental Concepts of 
Metaphysics we find an investigation of an 'ontological power' of self-emergence and 
self-production of living beings which can and should remain independent of our 
understanding of the way in which those beings appear in an historical world. Against 
William F. Vallicella, Zimmerman argues that although Heidegger moves to eliminate 
the first sense in favour of the second sense in his later work, because he simultaneously 
moves to make the site of presencing, Da-sein, no longer wholly co-extensive with 
'human being', the remnants of the first sense can be found throughout his work, albeit 
in a problematic and insufficiently clear relation to the second sense. 
There are various problems with the terminology that Zimmerman uses to present this 
argument, which in turn lead us on to underlying misconceptions. Firstly, it is a peculiar 
choice, if not a complete disaster, to denote that aspect of physis which refers to self- 
emergence as 'ousia-logical'. One of Heidegger's absolutely central arguments is that, 
for all of the complex intricacies of the Greek questioning of being, ousia is an 
understanding of being as presence (Anwesenheit). "' Now although ousia has a 
tendency towards the thinking of being as constantly present and the forgetting of 
presencing, the very notion of substance is from the first bound up with the presencing 
and manifestation that Zimmerman associates with the second 'aletheia-logical' aspect 
of physis. The redeployment of ousia in the way Zimmerman attempts would require a 
fundamental challenge to the idea that ousia must be understood within the horizon of 
time, precisely because it is a conception of being as constant presence which cannot be 
upheld within a more primordial interpretation of temporality. 
Secondly, we should note the surreptitious presence of logos in Zimmerman's 
133 See, for example, BT, p. 47/ 25 
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identification of an ambiguity in the concept of physis. Whilst physis is taken as the 
guiding concept, aletheia takes place in only one aspect of physis. What, then, of the 
logos which lets what shows itself be seen? It is not explicitly given a place in this 
scheme, but we might surmise that it should be placed on the 'presencing' aletheic side 
of the divide within physis. However, by naming each aspect 'ousia-logical' and 
'aletheia-logical', Zimmerman inadvertently makes logos co-extensive with his guiding 
concept of physis. Even the 'independent' self-emergence of natural beings is connected 
to a logos which draws it into the presencing of an historical world. Now it might be 
argued that this need not be the case and that this connection is only made when 
phenomenology attempts to bring to light what might have taken place without any 
illumination. Nevertheless, this is another reason for us to remain vigilant when 
unfolding the consequences of the Zimmerman's interpretation. 
In Contesting Earth's Future: Radical Ecology and Postmodernity Zimmerman takes up 
this critique of what he sees as an ambiguous concept of physis, but now presents it as 
part of a reading of Michel Haar's interpretation of the concept of earth. 14 Zimmerman 
seems to realise here that for Heidegger, if there are two 'aspects' to physis, then they are 
inseparable dimensions of an event of presencing and not in principle 'independent' as 
he had previously suggested. The aletheia-logical aspect is now identified with the 
'world' of the Origin of the Work of Art, whilst the ousia-logical is identified with the 
earth. Following Haar's reading, Zimmerman suggests that although these dimensions 
may be aspects of the same presencing, there is in the earth something which does not 
come to light in any historical world, a dimension irreducible to historicity and itself 
non-epochal. As we saw in chapter 3, however, the resistance to complete disclosure in 
134 Michael Zimmerman, Contesting Earth's Future: Radical Ecology and Postmodernity (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1994) p. 129 
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any historical world does not entail that one can speak of the earth itself as non- 
historical. On the contrary, unlike our usual concept of nature, the earth is historical 
through and through, because in resisting complete disclosure in any one world or 
epoch it is nevertheless drawn into history. To speak of the earth at all is to speak of the 
earth in an historical world, even if the earth cannot be fully integrated into that world. 
More recently, in an essay entitled 'Heidegger's Phenomenology and Contemporary 
Environmentalism', Zimmerman has again taken up his double aspect theory of physis 
and pointed towards further obstacles for a 'green' interpretation of Heidegger's 
phenomenology. "' Some of the problematic terminology is replaced but the basic 
distinction remains the same: 'physis somehow means both the self-manifesting of 
beings within the clearing and the process whereby an organism unfolds its own 
structure in the life-process. Heidegger never adequately reconciles these two aspects of 
physis. i136 This lack of clarity then seems to be left somewhat to one side to make way 
for what Zimmerman sees as a decisive challenge to ecological readings of Heidegger's 
understanding of the history of being. However, I think it can be shown that it is the lack 
of clarity concerning Heidegger's understanding of physis that makes this challenge 
possible. 
The central challenge is that a careful reading of the Heidegger's history of being will 
reveal that Heidegger's own thought is, 'consistent with modernity's project of the 
135 Michael Zimmerman, 'Heidegger's Phenomenology and Contemporary Environmentalism' in Charles 
S Brown and Ted Toadvine, ed. Eco-Phenomenology: Back to the Earth Itself (Albany: SUNY Press, 
2003) pp. 73-101 
136 Ibid p. 85 
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technological domination of nature. "" That in itself, of course, would not amount to a 
decisive challenge since it is certainly true that Heidegger is constantly involved in an 
excavation of the philosophical grounds of that domination. If technology is, 'the 
fulfillment of metaphysics' then philosophy itself moves in this element, so it is certain 
that thinking will generally be 'consistent' with technological domination and indeed 
consist of a thought which underpins that domination. Zimmerman's challenge, 
however, is to suggest that ultimately Heidegger cannot and does not provide any 
resistance to that domination, but rather he finds it to be inevitable and irresistible. This 
challenge is made on the basis of an essay by Thomas Sheehan in which a distinction is 
made between two types of nihilism, that of the technological domination of nature in 
modernity and the 'essential' nihilism of the withdrawal of being in a clearing which 
makes room for all historical presencing. 13S If the 'essence' of nihilism itself cannot be 
overcome and is itself the condition of the possibility of technological nihilism then 
how is any resistance to be found in the essence of nihilism, in Ereignis, to complete 
technological disclosure? And if no resistance is to be found then is not Heidegger's 
thought indeed 'consistent' with the technological domination of nature, does it not in 
fact make it inevitable and even demand and require it? 
In order to meet this challenge, or rather, to resist being drawn into a mode of thought 
which continually challenges forth, we must return to the so-called ambiguity in 
physis. '39 Zimmerman is partially correct in his intuition that there is a fundamental 
137 Ibid p. 86 
138 Ibid p. 86-87. For a more somewhat more variegated analysis of different'nihilisms', which makes a 
similar distinction but does not draw the same conclusions see, Miguel de Beistegui Heidegger and 
Politics: Dystopias (London: Routledge, 1998) pp. 67-86 
139 In an excellent and provocative essay lain Thomson also refuses to accept the basis for Zimmerman's 
challenge. He does so by insisting that Heidegger during the period of the Contributions does have a 
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duplicity in physis, but his misidentification of where that duplicity lies leads his 
interpretation astray. Rather than seeing aletheia as one aspect and self-emergence 
(whether wholly or partially independent of manifestation) as the other, it is aletheia 
that is indeed the guiding notion. It is under the sway of truth as unconcealment that 
physis has been understood and interpreted. Aletheia has guided the interpretations of 
nature and of language throughout the history of metaphysics, whilst never itself being 
brought under interrogation, since it remained the most obvious and unquestioned 
realm within such interpretations could be carried out. If we take aletheia as our guiding 
notion, then we can see that in the discussion of Heraclitus in The Fundamental 
Concepts of Metaphysics, physis and logos are essentially connected because they both 
participate in the event of unconcealing. It is physis and logos which then name 
different aspects of that event. Physis places the emphasis on the concealment inherent 
notion of'being as such' which differs significantly from the meaning being sought in Being and Time. 
This choice of term, which I take to refer to what Heidegger more usually indicates with the term 
beyng and later with crossed out 'being', could be somewhat misleading. Nevertheless, the point is 
similar, although I would not go so far as to say, as Thomson does, that Zimmerman makes no room 
for what Heidegger thinks in the withdrawal of 'being as such'. 
Thomson goes on to deal with the 'ethical question of animality' by attempting to variegate what 
he sees as a 'simplistic' tripartite division of beings in The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics into 
a 'continuum' of nature approaching closer and closer to Dasein. Whilst this is an interesting attempt 
to answer a worry which has motivated a number of critics, I would argue that it not only completely 
misses the point of the phenomenology of living nature as I have elaborated it in chapter 1, but it is 
also in danger of reinstating a metaphysical 'chain of being' with certain constantly present properties 
making up the 'rich world' of Dasein. Since Thomson then suggests that perhaps there could be beings 
which have 'even richer worlds' that Dasein, he is seriously in danger of advocating the full 
reinstatement of a chain of being. See, lain Thomson, 'Ontology and Ethics at the Intersection of 
Phenomenology and Environmental Philosophy' in Inquiry, 47,380-412 (Taylor and Francis 2004) 
p. 398 & 402 
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in unconcealing, whilst logos emphasises the tearing out of concealment and bringing 
into presence which takes place in truth. In physis there could never be pure closure nor 
in logos could ever be a pure disclosure, it is a matter of existing in the duality of the 
event. Physis, a-letheia, Da-sein; Logos, a-letheia, Da-sein. 
If we recall the project of Contributions to Philosophy (From Ereignis), which we began 
to explore in the preceding chapter, then it will be clear that it is the possibility of 
hearing a shift in emphasis which is absolutely vital for Heidegger. He writes that the 
'originary grounding question of Da-sein can be unfolded historically: 1. proceeding 
from aletheia as the grounding character of physis. ' (CP, 215/306) Aletheia is the 
grounding character of physis. Our interpretation of the grounding question which 
Heidegger posed there showed that in the first beginning the emphasis had already been 
placed on the dis-closure of the concealed. So that whilst concealment remained it was 
already in itself thought as that which is ready for disclosure. In this sense it might be 
said that the history of metaphysics has been the history of the logicisation of nature. 
Another beginning would not be a beginning which simply starts elsewhere and thinks 
outside or beyond the first beginning. Another beginning would think through the first 
beginning. In a sense it would be an attempt to re-naturalise nature. Better, it would be 
an attempt to hear a shift or turn within aletheia as the grounding character of both 
physis and logos, so that we can attend to the closure and preservation which is inherent 
in truth itself. In the turning from unconcealment (Unverborgenheit) to dis-closure 
(Entbergung) begins the recovery of nature. 
In 1939, the same year in which the Herder seminars took place, Heidegger wrote an 
essay on 'The Essence and Concept of Physis in Aristotle's Physics, B, L"' In Aristotle's 
140 PM, pp. 183-230/239-301. For an extensive commentary on this essay which brings out steresis as the 
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text he finds an interpretation of the twofold nature of physis and begins to trace a line 
of interpretation that has missed what is truly appropriate to this twofold nature. It is 
towards the end of the chapter in question that Aristotle speaks of the twofold nature of 
physis and moreover links it essentially to the concept of steresis, privation. Heidegger's 
translation reads: 'However, the self-placing into appearance- and therefore physis as 
well- is spoken in two ways, for'privation' too is something like appearance. "" It is in 
the question of privation and a certain orientation towards privation that physis can be 
questioned in its ground, as we saw also to be the case for dynamis in an earlier reading 
of Aristotle. The 'privation' in question is not a negation but a certain way in which 
some things come to presence, the presencing of what is absent: 'In steresis, "privation, " 
(Beraubung) it is a matter of "taking something away" by a kind of saying-it-away. 
Steresis certainly refers to an "away, " but always and above all it means something falls 
away, remains away, becomes absent (abwest). i142 By'saying-it-away' we do not bring it 
into presence as if it were standing in front of us. We find in language the possibility of 
bringing absence to presence without dispelling absence or tearing it away from the 
closure of nature altogether. 
In this notion of 'privation'- the poverty which has been our guiding thread- the 
grounding of physis might be initiated. For the kernel of the twofold nature of physis 
can be found in the duplicity of privation. As a taking away, 'privation' is literally a 
stealing away (Beraubung). It is in these terms that Heidegger elucidates the privative 
heart of Aristotle's 'twofold' understanding of being and which goes on to link this to the important 
part which steresis plays in the analysis of dynarnis in the 1931 lectures on Metaphysics Theta, see. 
Walter A. Brogan, Heidegger and Aristotle: The Twofoldness of Being (Albany: SUNY, 2005) 
141 PM 225/294 
142 PM, p. 226/296 
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'a-' of aletheia in Being and Time. Truth must be stolen from, even torn away from 
concealment, it is a 'kind of robbery'. (BT, 265/222) Privation thus refers to the 
disclosure of truth. On the other hand, steresis can also point us towards the withdrawal 
in being, to the concealing which takes place in all presencing, rather than the dispelling 
of closure and preservation. If robbery tears absence into presence, presence may also 
steal away into absence. We could not then be content with an interpretation of physis 
that emphasises the kinetic, dynamic 'self-emergence' of nature from out of itself, 
whether or not this might be 'independent' of manifestation. Rather, it is this 'self- 
emergence' which has constantly guided metaphysics. From this self-emergence we 
need to recover a movement back into itself; the recalcitrance of nature, and perhaps 
above all of living nature: 
Nonetheless, in essentially "being-on-the-way, " each being that is pro- 
duced or put forth (excluding artifacts) is also put away, as the blossom is 
put away by the fruit. But in the putting away, the self-placing into the 
appearance- physis- does not cease to be. On the contrary, the plant in the 
form of fruit goes back into its seed, which, according to its essence, is 
nothing other than a going-forth into the appearance, hodos physeos eis 
physin. With its very coming-to-life every living thing already begins to die, 
and conversely, dying is but a kind of living, because only a living being has 
the ability to die. 
(PM, 227/297-298) 
Physis is not only the emergence from out of themselves of natural and living beings, 
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but it is their simultaneous and ineluctable return into themselves. Coming forth is at the 
very same time a passing away. That is what is forgotten in the first beginning, struck 
with wonder as it is at the products which nature has brought forth. 
This shift in emphasis or turning within truth should not be mistaken for the advocacy 
of a disclosure which could remain innocent before nature. A recovered nature, a nature 
re-naturalised, would not be left to remain in the depths of its own hiding places. On the 
contrary, it is only within a mode of disclosure in which beings as a whole and as such 
are ready prepared for discovery, in which they stand in reserve ready to be put to work, 
that a pure passivity over and against nature can reign. Once nature has been turned into 
pure objectivity, as standing reserve that no longer even stands over and against a 
subject, the absolute domination of nature has nothing to distinguish it from an 
absolutely non-violent and pacifist relation to nature. Truth no longer needs to be torn 
from nature because nature has already been prepared for unconcealment. We need to 
be careful not to confuse the pacifism that masks an already complete act of domination 
with a turning in the truth which would allow us to discover nature whilst at the same 
time sheltering it and releasing it into its own self-sheltering. A recovery of nature 
would require that disclosure itself become at the same time sheltering. 
At the end of the physis essay Heidegger returns to the Heraclitean fragment with which 
we began this section. He makes it clear that what is involved in allowing nature its 
propensity towards concealment which I have been calling the recovery of nature, is not 
an occultism of nature; not a giving over of nature into obscurity, nor a reaction to en- 
lightenment. Such an occult would miss completely the mystery of nature. Rather, it is a 
question of turning truth towards self-hiding in its self-emergence: 
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"Being loves to hide itself. " What does this mean? It has been suggested, 
and still is suggested that this fragment means being is difficult to get at and 
requires great efforts to be brought out of its hiding place and, as it were, 
purged of its self-hiding. But what is needed is precisely the opposite. Self- 
hiding belongs to the predilection (Vor-liebe) of being; i. e., it belongs to that 
wherein being has secured its essence. And the essence of being is to 
unconceal itself, to emerge, to come out into the unhidden- physis. Only 
what in its very essence unconceals must conceal itself, can love to conceal 
itself. Only what is unconcealing can be concealed. And therefore the 
kruptesthai of physic is not to be overcome, not to be stripped from physis. 
Rather, the task is the much more difficult one of allowing to physis, in all 
the purity of its essence, the kruptesthai that belongs to it. 
(PM, 229-230/370-371) 
Now that we have a better idea of how Heidegger himself understands the duplicity of 
physic there are two tasks which remain in this chapter. Firstly, we need to see how the 
understanding living nature as self-emergence which returns into itself forms a further 
duplicity and potential ambiguity in Heidegger's thinking of animality. Does the 
physicality of living beings fit with the ecological dimension of animality which was 
opened from the perspective of the environing spheres of living beings? Does the 
perspective gained from the interpretation of physis fit with the 'environmental' 
interpretation of animality developed in 1929/30? Secondly, we must ask how a focus 
upon language is to aid us in the re-naturalisation of nature. 
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§19 The Duplicity of Animality and The Early Greek Experience of Zöe 
This is the background against which the duplicity of animality can be properly 
understood. Not an unclarified ambiguity between two faces of physis, whereby living 
beings seem to belong to self-emergence but not to manifestation. Rather, the essential 
duplicity of aletheia is the opening in which both logos and physis receive their 
determinations. They both contain that duplicity in themselves. A turning in truth would 
work its way into both language and nature. Such a turning might be described as a 're- 
naturalisation' only in so far as physis itself can be re-naturalised in the self-hiding of 
self-emergence. 
If we now turn to the last two lecture courses which Heidegger gave before the end of 
the war we can see that this duplicity finds its way into the thinking of animality and 
living nature. It is a duplicity indeed hinted at in Zimmerman's reading, although he 
generally locates living nature on what he sees as the 'self-emergence' side of physis. 
We can now show that if the centrality of truth is established and the turning in truth 
from unconcealment to dis-closure is anticipated then the problem of living nature does 
not disappear, but requires a different approach. Heidegger's apparent 'exclusion' of the 
animal from truth and language is well known, but how are we to understand this in the 
light of the thought that bothphysis and logos receive their determination from truth? 
First of all, in the Parmenides lecture course of the winter semester of 1942-43 we find 
various statements which are frequently cited as signs of Heidegger's failure to maintain 
a critical attitude when it comes to living beings and of his failure to keep the question 
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of animality open. "' The animal is excluded from the unconcealed in a way which 
makes one suspect that we may be once more witness to those operations which have 
functioned to exclude the animal from the polls and thus political consideration, but 
here transformed into an ontological given: 
The animal, on the contrary, does not glimpse or see into, and certainly does 
not behold, the open in the sense of the unconcealedness of the unconcealed. 
Therefore neither can an animal relate to the closed as such, no more than it 
can comport itself to the concealed. The animal is excluded 
(ausgeschlossen- shut out) from the essential domain of the strife between 
between unconcealedness and concealedness. The sign of this essential 
exclusion is that no animal or plant "has the word. " 
143The context of Heidegger's remarks on animality at the end of this lecture course is a critique of Rilke 
in which he argues that Rilke's 'open' is in no way to be identified with aletheia, but is instead an 'open 
sea': The "open" is for him the constant progression by beings themselves, from beings to beings 
within beings. ' Parmenides p. 152/226. It would require more space than I have available here to 
elaborate and assess this critique and its grounding of Heidegger's criticism Rilke's notion the 
'creature'. The critique will be taken up and substantially modified a few years later in the essay 'Why 
Poets? ', OBT pp. 200-241/248-295. For interpretations and criticisms of Heidegger's reading of Rilke 
see: Giorgio Agamben, The Open: Man and Animal, trans. by Kevin Attell (Stanford: Stanford 
Univesity Press, 2004) pp. 57-62; Michel Haar, The Song of the Earth: Heidegger and the Grounds of 
the History of Being, trans. by Reginald Lilly (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993) pp. 30- 
33,120-138; Virginia Lyle Jennings, 'Heidegger's Critique of Rilke: On the Venture and the Leap' in 
Heidegger Studies Vol 21,2005 pp. 17-34; David Farrell Krell, Daimon Life: Heidegger and Life- 
Philosophy (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992) pp. 22-23,303-304; John Llewlyn, The 
Middle Voice of Ecological Conscience, A Chiasmic Reading of Responsibility in the Neighbourhood 
ofLevinas, Heidegger and Others (Basingstoke: MacMillan, 1991)pp. 146-173; Joan Stambaugh, The 
Finitude of Being (Albany: SUNY Press, 1992) pp. 35-52,93-104 
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(Parmenides, 159-160/237) 
Initial suspicions are only deepened by the appeal to the apparently undeniable sign of 
exclusion, that no animal or plant "has the word. " Is this not a straightforward 
reiteration of the Aristotelian exclusion of living beings from the city on the basis of 
their not being possessed of logos? That seems even more evident if one recalls that 
earlier in this lecture course Heidegger has given a reading of the Greek understanding 
of polis as only derivatively a city and essentially 'the pole of the presence of beings 
determined by aletheia. ' Is this not the reaffirmation of a tendency that philosophy has 
so frequently colluded with, man's hope to elude and elide his own animality by 
excluding living beings from the truth? 
I think it can be shown that although there is an undeniable reiteration of the 'primal 
scene' whereby life is excluded from the city here, it is a repetition which ultimately 
opens up other trajectories for thinking animality, particularly with regard to the relation 
of animals to 'the word. ' Heidegger goes on to qualify the exclusion of living beings 
from the unconcealed by sketching a view of animality which heavily relies on the 
concepts which he first worked out in The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics. The 
animal is related to a'circle of food, prey, and sex in a way which is essentially different 
to the way the stone is related to the earth upon which it lies. ' The basis of the relation 
which takes place in the animal circle is a certain 'excitability' in which the living being 
is, 'stirred to an emerging into a circle of stimulatability on the basis of which it draws 
other living beings into its circle of activity. ' (Parmenides, 160/238) The dimension of 
'animality' is not itself open to us to view and survey from the first. It is only opened for 
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us in an inherently problematic 'transposition' into the animal circle which itself opens 
on to the ecological dimension of interwoven living circles. However, another 
dimension is now added to this story: 
Plant and animal are suspended (hängen) in something outside themselves 
without ever being able to "see" either the outside or the inside, i. e., to have 
it stand in an aspect unconcealed in the free of being. And never would it be 
possible for a stone, no more than for an airplane, to elevate itself towards 
the sun in jubilation, and to move like a lark, which nevertheless does not 
see the open. What the lark "sees, " and how it sees, and what we here call 
"seeing" on the basis of our observation that the lark has eyes, these 
questions remain to be asked. In fact, an original poetising would be needed 
to surmise what is concealed in the living being, a poetic capacity to which 
more and higher things are charged, and more essential things (since they 
are genuinely essential), versus a mere humanisation of plants and animals. 
(Parmenides, 160/238- translation modified) 
The lark jubilates in the sun's light and warmth. What kind of jubilation is this 'for the 
lark', one might ask, if the sun is never disclosed to it? Heidegger's unyielding 
qualification that it nevertheless does not see the open itself seems to entail this is only a 
'poetic' description of the lark's flight. Is this 'jubilation' then nothing for the lark? On 
the contrary, the lark jubilates in the sun, it elevates itself in an 'upsurgence' reminiscent 
of physis itself and an originary poeticising could bring this even more clearly to the 
fore. The inevitable conclusion to be drawn, one which Heidegger perhaps keeps in 
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reserve to avoid misunderstanding, is that the lark does participate in the disclosure of 
truth. It is in the truth and is true to itself in the upsurgence of physis which can be 
brought out in an originary poeticising. True enough, the dimension of unconcealment 
is not open for it to see. Yet that does not mean that the flight of the lark only opens the 
truth 'for us', as if it were brought into the service of man in opening the truth in the 
same way that it was brought into the service of his home and city as a source of food or 
to provide a pleasant song. Such 'humanisation' can of course take many forms, some of 
them more obvious than others. But this jubilation of the lark is the very opposite of 
anthropomorphism, it is the lark coming into its own. In doing so it can put us on the 
way towards the truth of disclosure. 
The real duplicity of Heidegger's thinking of animality now comes into view. It is not a 
question of competing or opposing theses, but more of a change of perspective or 
standpoint. The first we might name, following Herder, the fundamental perspective of 
'animal spheres. ' It is this perspective which is developed in The Fundamental Concepts 
of Metaphysics. We have shown that some characterisations of these 'spheres', 
especially that of 'dis-inhibiting ring' which is clearly still present in the Parmenides 
lectures, commits Heidegger to a framework of understanding behaviour in terms of 
drives, which is in itself highly questionable and which should be brought into question 
on the basis of Heidegger's own retrieval of dynamis. Nevertheless, opening up the 
perspective of 'animal spheres' remains fundamental, not as something which can be 
taken for granted, but as a standpoint from which what I have called the ecological 
dimension can be entered. It is not a question of moving beyond the perspective of 
'animal spheres' but of moving through it. The second perspective, might be called the 
perspective of the physic of living beings, if physis is understood in its relation to 
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aletheia and to a logos of originary poeticising. This perspective was already present in 
the background of The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, but it was not developed 
or brought to the fore. Here in the Parmenides course the two perspectives are brought 
side by side. 
There is a tension to be felt in this duplicity of standpoints. But it is far from a 
contradiction which could be overcome or even an ambiguity which could be clarified. 
One might say the animal is in the truth 'for us, ' whilst it is does not see the truth itself, 
were it not that both perspectives are attempts to lead us to a space between and before 
the petrification of those positions. Neither 'perspective' is a projection from a fixed 
position. Neither is the duplicity of perspective a 'zone of undecidability' in which the 
living being would vacillate between exclusion and inclusion in the truth. Rather, living 
beings are outside the truth from the perspective of animal spheres, but they are in the 
truth from the perspective of their physicality. It remains questionable whether either 
standpoint is fully ours or theirs. They are both perspectives that can become 
appropriate for Dasein to take up in the truth. 
These two perspectives are brought into even closer proximity in the two lecture courses 
on Heraclitus which Heidegger delivered in the following two semesters. The first of 
these lecture courses, The Inception of Western Thought: Heraclitus', is an 
interpretation of Heraclitus which takes its departure from a few key fragments, each of 
which Heidegger understands as concerned with the nature physis. The second course, 
'Logic: Heraclitus' teaching from Logos' is concerned with Heraclitus' understanding of 
logos and the mutations which have occurred in the 'logic' of western thought since its 
inception. However, it soon becomes clear that these two courses are not ultimately 
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concerned with different aspects or topics in Heraclitus' thought. Rather, the thinking of 
physis and logos both belong to the reorientation of aletheia and the attempt to draw out 
the closure essential to disclosure, the eliding of which begins even in the first inception 
of thought. Thus, Heidegger claims that: 'Aletheia, the disclosure (En: bergung) in 
uncovering (Unverborgenheit), is the essence of physis... ' (GA 55,173). On the one 
hand, language participates in nature, so that it is part of the 'upsurging' of physis, 'how 
man gathered in the look arises from out of himself, how in speech he discloses to 
human beings the upsurging world and himself along with it, how mind (Gemüt) 
unfolds itself in gestures... ' (GA 55,87) On the other hand, logos is originally an aspect 
of physis and aletheia as a whole, the 'inner logic' of things themselves: 'When we try to 
think reading and the read, gathering and the gathered in the sense explained, then we 
will perhaps for once reach that point where we can intimate the originary essence of 
logos, i. e., to think its essence at one with what the the early Greek thinkers named 
together when they used the name logos: physis- aletheia. ' (GA 55,269) 
In the first set of lectures, concerned primarily with physis, an interpretation of zöe as 
one of the fundamental words of inceptive thinking unfolds, as a word which helps us to 
illuminate the essence of physis. So in the inception of thought life was not a part of 
being, not a region of being, nor something comprised of a particular set of beings. Life 
was the very character of being, something which is echoed and 'modernised' in Leibniz 
and several of Nietzsche's aphorisms. Importantly for our purposes, Heidegger then 
briefly turns once more towards some of the consequences of this thought for our 
understanding of animality: 
The animality of the animal (Das Tierhafte), as the Greeks thought it, is 
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determined from out of zöon, that upsurging (Aufgehenden), which properly 
reposes in itself, in that it does not speak itself forth (sich nicht auspricht). 
We require, for example, in the case of an approximate and indeterminate 
representation of the bird only a few steps in order to see the bird as the 
Greeks did. To experience the animal and to recognise that, in its hovering 
and soaring the free measure of the open comes to presence, as do the lore 
(die Kunde) and the call and the magic in its singing, so that the essence of 
the bird (Vogelwesen) bears away in the open and brings it forth. To that 
there also necessarily belongs the closing and preserving of the enclosed, 
e. g., in mourning. The bird, flying, singing, binds and points out in the open. 
It is enmeshed (verstrickt) in the open. Seira means rope in Greek. The 
sirens are'in Greek' the ensnarers in more than one sense of the word. 
(GA 55,95-96) 
Whether the bird named here is the lark of the Parmenides lectures remains unsaid. The 
hovering and soaring could put one in mind of a kestrel, whilst the singing which brings 
to presence the lore and the magic and call could bring forth any number of songbirds. 
The closing and preserving in mourning and sadness inevitably suggests that favourite 
of romantic poetry, a nightingale. The sirens, who began as two virgins in a field of 
flowers and bones in Homer's epic, in the course of legend gradually grew more birdlike 
features, feet, feathers and wings. Siren also came to mean simply a small song bird. 
Perhaps a flycatcher, which weaves a net around itself with both song and its own 
doubled-back sallies. The pied flycatcher, a summer visitor to northern Europe, is even 
called the 'mourning flycatcher' in German. Each would be borne away in the disclosure 
266 
of physis in its own way and in doing so would preserve and recover its closure. " 
What we can say is that Heidegger brings together the two perspectives on animality 
which still seemed somewhat separate and even discordant in the Parmenides lectures. 
The bird brings forth the open in being by bearing itself away. It is enmeshed, 
144 David Farrell Krell has analysed these passages from the Parmenides and Heraclitus courses in 
conjunction with the two essays on Heraclitus which were written in the fifties and raised some 
decisive questions. Yet it seems to me that some of the alternatives that he sketches would raise 
problems similar to those that he fords in Heidegger's approach. When Heidegger claims that the root 
of zöe is za-, a prefix of intensification and goes on to say that we cannot understand zöe unless we 
can properly experience that which it is an intensification of, namely physis, Krell claims: 'The issue is 
whether or not the "life-essence" of animality must rise, insofar as it is living, as the clearing, the 
clearing as such. What if the unified field of essence in the za-, the unified field of essence as such, 
the field of physis, were daimon life rather than what Heidegger prefers to call Ek-sistenz or Da-sein? ' 
David Farrell Krell, Daimon Life: Heidegger and Life-Philosophy (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1992) pp. 17-18 These alternatives appear to me to equally unsatisfactory. For Heidegger since 
Contributions to Philosophy (from Ereignis), Da-sein no longer coincides exactly with the being of 
that being for which its own being is an issue, so that a question of 'man' arises once more. The 
identification of animality with the clearing as such would raise many of the problems of that original 
identification. Why should it be that a clearing identified with daimon life is the only site where 
mountains and rivers, human beings and gods could come to presence? On the other hand, it could be 
argued, as I am arguing here, that there is a need for animality in the opening of the clearing, just as 
Heidegger insisted upon the need for mortals in the countering of the fourfold. The contribution of the 
mortals would be the possibility of saying 'the clearing as such. ' What Krell seems to be striving 
towards is a sense of the distinction between nature as it appears for us and nature as it unfolds in 
itself, which is also important for Zimmerman. But whilst Zimmerman understands these as two 
aspects of physis the relation between which needs further clarification, Krell seems to want to move 
towards the ontological priority of the second with the idea of a "second" history of being, a history of 
the field of daimon life, which would turn out to be the primary history of being. It is exactly such a 
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interwoven, knitted in to the open and as such it can itself entangle other living things, 
including men, in this open net. One need not chose between the understanding of 
animals as 'captivated' by their environment, enmeshed in and ensnaring others in its 
cycle of capacities and the standpoint which sees animals as participants in the 
upsurging of physis. Heidegger thinks that the two belong to one another. 
Animality is certainly still understood as an upsurgence which essentially does not 
'speak itself forth'. That is because, whilst its stands in the clearing it does not look into 
the clearing. But it is now impossible to understand the 'standing' in the clearing of 'a 
rock, a tree, a mountain, an animal, ' as a life that depends upon the gaze of a human 
being. They are not 'standing around' in the clearing waiting to be gazed upon. Rather, 
all of them invite our look in such a way that we are enabled to see into the clearing 
itself and in doing so we become those who are unable to hide themselves before the 
upsurgence of nature. (GA 55,173) 
When Heidegger highlights the speechlessness of the animal we must not take him to be 
denying the ability of animals to communicate or express themselves in a multitude of 
ways. Nor is he denying that animality has its own 'inner logic' as does the whole of 
physis. What he is claiming is that living capacities do not 'gather in' that logic nor do 
they express nature as such nor look into the clearing of truth. Living nature can invite 
and enable such capabilities for human beings and since they are enabled in such a way 
grounding priority which Heidegger wishes to avoid. Furthermore, we would have to ask in what way 
the field of physis is 'unified. ' It may be that living beings can be encountered as articulations and 
intensifications of physis, but like Heraclitus' bow and lyre, physis is not at one with itself. And what 
is it which gathers the dissemination of life and nature and acts as the string to the bow? Is it not 
precisely logos? 
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those capabilities are not solely our own property. They cannot be horded away from 
the living nature which enables them without allowing them to wither. Correspondingly, 
if we are able to hearken to the essence of language, the language which nature speaks 
in silence and find that echoed in our own capability for logos, then we may be able to 
recover living nature within and throughout that mode of life that enables us to discover 
so much about it. 
§20 The Language of Nature Seeks Silence 
If, as I have argued, physis and logos are joined as two faces of aletheia, then we can 
begin to formulate a little more precisely how it is that we might initiate the recovery of 
nature within language. If Heidegger's philosophical project in the Thirties revolved 
around his attempts to recover what the first inception of thought by the early Greek 
thinkers already began to lose sight of in aletheia, not through any fault of their own but 
because of their very attention to the matter, then it is this reorientation of aletheia 
which must be sought in language, that face of the truth which has been so orientated 
towards discovery. In a parenthetic note in the Heraclitus lectures Heidegger names that 
which is unthought in aletheia the clearing, in the sense of a 'brightening opening 
preservation' (erhellend öffnenden Bergen) (GA 55,17) What is essential to the clearing 
is not so much the light that illuminates, for that light penetrates metaphysics right 
through to the enlightenment. What is essential is that the clearing is at once preserved 
by the surrounding darkness. The light is let through the trees and they fall away, for 
example when the sun picks out a deer in the clearing, but there is no clearing without 
the trees. There is no clearing where the forest is clear-cut. Clearings are frequently 
created by animals. We might even consider risking the translation of Lichtung as 
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glade. That translation brings with it the importance of the trees and their presencing in 
the glade can still be felt in the rhyme with 'shade'. Furthermore, there is a gladdening 
and lightening in etymology of glade that is inseparable from the darkening of the wood 
and reminds us of the importance of fundamental attunement in preserving this site of 
presencing. 
The language which is appropriate to nature, which helps to preserve what it discovers, 
is therefore not a language that brings the conditions of presencing to light. It is not 
transcendental in that sense. It is a language that preserves both its own power to bring 
to light and the upsurgence of that which it speaks of. If we are to begin to voice a 
language more appropriate to nature then we must first hearken to language and to the 
apparent speechlessness of nature, for there we may hear the silent origin of both. 
Language, which seemed to act as a veil between human beings and nature and to be the 
very element in which the humanisation of the world is fulfilled can prepare for the 
recovery of nature. Yet this recovery can only be initiated if we can hearken to the silent 
origin, which is neither origination (Entstehung) nor essence (Wesen), but the essencing 
(Wesung) that is co-originary of language and nature. One of the reasons that Heidegger 
turns towards poetry in his thinking of language, is that poetry is not a raw expression, 
but language that can also point back towards that which it does not express, the 
reticence of language, its silencing. The refusal of language to divulge all of its secrets 
or to express itself completely. What remains silent is the appropriating event which 
delivers over that which is expressed. 1 ' It is from this silent appropriation, if we can be 
still enough to hearken to it, that our relation to living nature can be forged 
appropriately. 
145 OEL, p. 61/ 72 
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At the same time we must learn to hear this silence in the naturing of nature. Can we 
find in the thinking of nature and ecology any hints towards this possibility? It would 
appear that the silence of nature remains an ambiguous experience for us. The 'peace 
and quiet' which many seek outside of towns and cities is not just an attempt to escape 
certain kinds of sounds, the background drone of traffic and industry. Apart from the 
fact that it becomes increasingly difficult to really escape from such 'noise, ' it is not the 
sheer absence of sound which is sought, but the particular quality of the silence of 
nature. Otherwise a sound proof chamber would do just as well. Theodor Adorno 
appreciates something of this quality of silence when he writes: 
If you exclaim 'What a sight! ' in some natural setting, yoii detract from its 
beauty by violating the silence of its language. Appearing nature seeks 
silence, whereas that person who is able to appreciate appearing nature is 
constantly driven to verbalise something so as to free himself momentarily 
of his monad-like imprisonment. " 
Notice that Adorno writes of 'appearing nature, ' a phrase which sets his thought, for a 
moment at least, very much on a par with Heidegger's thinking of physis, the presencing 
of nature. Appearing nature seeks 'silence, ' in which it can come to presence, whilst 
those who can appreciate this are nevertheless driven to dispel that silence. The sounds 
of living nature, on the other hand, do not dispel silence but if we listen aright, deepen 
it. Our words dispel it because we feel that we are not at home here in the midst of 
silence. We mistakenly think that the only way to escape an isolated existence is to 
make ourselves heard. If, however, it could be shown that it is not in verbalising 
146 T. W. Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, trans. C. Lenhardt (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1984), p. 102 
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something, anything, that we can free ourselves from a 'monad-like imprisonment, ' but 
on the contrary that freedom lies in a hearkening to the silence which nature seeks for 
itself, then the silence which appearing nature seeks and the silencing of the word might 
participate in the same essencing. Our words would no longer dispel that silence but 
preserve it. 
On the other hand, there has been an altogether more terrifying experience of the 
silencing of nature. In her 1962 book Silent Spring, a book which has had a huge 
influence on the modem environmental movement, Rachel Carson describes the effects 
of the use of pesticides in North America at that time. The silence which she writes of 
has a very different quality: 
There was a strange stillness. The birds, for example- where had they gone? 
Many people spoke of them puzzled and disturbed. The feeding stations in 
the backyards were deserted. The few birds seen anywhere were moribund; 
they trembled violently and could not fly. It was a spring without voices. On 
mornings that had once throbbed with the dawn chorus of robins, catbirds, 
doves, jays, wrens, and scores of other bird voices there was now no sound; 
only silence lay over the fields and woods and marsh. 147 
This silence is not the silence which nature's own language seeks for itself. That silence 
was only intensified by the bird song which suddenly breaks out, giving the silence its 
own contours, rather than dispelling or annihilating it. The silence which Carson 
describes can only be dispelled and broken with relief by a voice seeking to distract 
attention from its awful weight. Yet its uncanny quality does call for our attention just 
147 Rachel Carson, Silent Spring (London: Penguin, 1991) p. 22 
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as much as the silence which nature seeks. How can we give voice to the spring once 
more? Not simply by discovering alternative ways to control insects and disease. Not 
simply by developing an organic agriculture, or as Carson called it a 'biological' 
agriculture in the broadest sense. We must also learn to hearken to the silence which 
nature seeks for itself, a silence which is dispelled neither by bird song nor by a word 
which preserves its own silent source. Our rush to cover over the memory of that silent 
spring should not prevent us from listening out for what we have long forgotten to pay 
heed to, the echo of which can still be heard in the terrible silence resounding over the 
fields and woods and marsh. If we can bear to pay heed to that, then perhaps we will 
also be able to hearken to another silent spring, the source of the word and living nature. 
In the uncanny silence which grows more awful and still and which we have not 
managed to obliterate with ever more noisy exploits, we might still hear the echo of the 
silence which the language of nature seeks for itself. 
If there is to be thinking provoked by and brought to bear upon ecological politics then 
we must learn to hearken to both of these experiences of silence in nature. Yet it will 
remain a thinking of politics, not necessarily because it takes place in the polis or 
through the expansion of the laws of the polis, but because it brings the experience of 
the silent spring into political life. First of all it is essential not to conflate the silence 
which nature seeks for itself with the silence which it has been reduced to. Beyond that, 
however, ecological politics must not conflate logos and physis, although it seeks the 
appropriation of the two and sees the possibility of a recovery of nature in the 
reorientation of each in a truth which preserves as it uncovers. It takes time to find 
words appropriate to nature. That is not to say we can afford to disengage our language 
from the concerns which press upon us. But the demand for reconciliation can lead to 
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the blending and dissolution of language and nature rather than the articulation of their 
point of juncture. 
Finally, ecological politics cannot come about without a return to the moment at which 
politics was initiated and nature was apparently excluded from the polls. Perhaps we 
can think that space opened up by Aristotle not as the zone of indifference as Agamben 
would have it, the inclusive exclusion which transforms life into bare life and grounds 
sovereignty and the domination of nature, but as precisely the space in which ecological 
difference is to be preserved. The difference between speech and voice would then not 
be the first result of machination on its way to the humanisation of the world, but would 
allow language to become the site of resistance to that humanisation. We would then be 
called upon to raise a very different set of questions about the relation of language and 
nature. No longer concerned with whether nature can be made to speak our language, 
whether it be sign language or some other form of communication. Nor would it be a 
case of filling out the bare voices of nature with our own logic or expressive intentions. 
Rather we would need to ask whether the poetic word in which a world is wrought can 
retain that power without the jubilation of the lark? The lark may not be world-building, 
but could a world be built without its song? 
Conclusion 
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§ 21 The Experience of Poverty as Earthly Freedom 
The earthly has long been thought as lacking. The earth and what belongs to the earth 
long to overcome themselves. Whether it is by joining with the Word from outside or by 
immanently developing according to a concept to which earthly nature as such is not 
equal, nature only comes into its own and lives in freedom when it is in the process of 
moving beyond itself. What is living in nature, the life of nature, is the striving of the 
earthly to overcome the earth. On the other hand, when nothing of this lack is 
experienced and the naturing of nature is thought as the overflowing expression of what 
is from the start an absolute plenum, as it was for Spinoza, then physis is already at one 
with the Word and Law of God and freedom in nature can mean nothing but the 
unimpeded productive power of substance. The earth has always been too poor or too 
rich for a freedom of its own. 
The complex interplay of poverty and riches in the striving of life can be found in the 
two thinkers who for Heidegger mark the beginning and the end of metaphysics or the 
'first beginning' of thought: Plato and Nietzsche. Diotima, according to Socrates in 
Plato's Symposium, claims that eros is the child of poros and penia, resourcefulness and 
poverty. He thus has a double nature which in itself is neither rich nor poor, but which 
does partake in both by turns: 'Because he has his mother's nature, he dwells ever with 
want. But on the other hand, by favour of his father, he ever plots for good and beautiful 
things, because he is courageous, eager and intense, and clever hunter ever weaving 
some new device, desiring understanding and capable of it, a lover of wisdom through 
the whole of life, clever at enchantment, a sorcerer and a sophist. "" One is reminded of 
148 Plato, The Symposium 203 c-e. See, The Dialogues of Plato, Vol. II, The Symposium, translated with 
comment by R. E. Allen (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991) pp. 146-147 
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the second 'point of inner integrity' in the Antigone ode interpretations that we explored 
in section 12: pantoporos, aporos, in his encounter with physis man is both full or 
resource and without resource. It will be recalled that Heidegger insists that these are 
not separate points in our physical life, but integrally related aspects of existence in the 
midst of living nature. When this double aspect of earthly life is thought by philosophy 
it finds its way into Plato's understanding of the love of knowledge which 
resourcefulness cultivates in eros and sets the scene for the way Aristotle derives 
representative thought from the striving of the soul. Thought, far from being a free 
floating activity that transports us away from our physicality, was already set in the 
context of striving and struggling life at the inception of the first beginning. 
At the other end of that history we find Nietzsche insisting that truth and thought be set 
back into the context of life, which they have struggled in vain to free themselves from. 
The poverty and abundant resourcefulness which formed the complex interplay and 
inner integrity of eros for Plato are now set apart as two fundamentally different ways 
of life and thought. In the fifth book of The Gay Science Nietzsche sets out the two 
ways in which the struggling and striving of life can be experienced: 
What is romanticism? - Every art, every philosophy may be viewed as a 
remedy and an aid in the service of growing and struggling life; they always 
presuppose suffering and sufferers. But there are two kinds of sufferers: 
first, those who suffer from the over fulness of life- they want a Dionysian 
art and likewise a tragic view of life, a tragic insight- and then those who 
suffer from the impoverishment of life and seek rest, stillness, calm seas, 
redemption from themselves through art and knowledge, or intoxication, 
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convulsions, anaesthesia, and madness. 
10' 
Art and philosophy can both act as a remedy for life in which there is no getting away 
from suffering and sufferers, which are simply the consequence of the growth and 
struggle to overcome itself that life presupposes. But the living can suffer from an 
overflow and abundance able to incorporate lack and loss, as occurs in tragic art; or they 
can suffer in a way which leads to a shrinking away from growth and struggle. 
Romanticism, on the other hand, takes on many forms, seeking to escape from life into 
anaesthesia or apocalypse. It is not by chance that these two escape routes have also 
been identified as strong tendencies in the 'romanticism' of ecological thought. 
Whether contemporary ecological thought is thoroughly 'romantic' in this sense is 
debatable. The influence of Spinoza and of course Darwin could support either a 
'Dionysian' or 'romantic' view. Nietzsche himself connects these two thinkers on the 
side of romanticism when he interprets Spinoza's conatus as an 'instinct for self- 
preservation' and suggests that, 'our modem natural sciences have become thoroughly 
entangled in this Spinozistic dogma (most recently and worst of all Darwinism with its 
incomprehensibly onesided doctrine of the 'struggle for existence')... "" Life is not a 
struggle to exist and continue but to expand. Nietzsche puts the point in the strongest 
possible terms, attributing this style of thought to the socio-economic conditions of 
Victorian England. That charge resonates with Heidegger's accusation that Darwinism 
was born from an economic view of man. Nietzsche, of course, understood expansion 
and growth as the rule of life and the doctrine of 'will to power' sees no essential 
149Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage Books, 1974) 
p. 328 
150 Ibid p. 292 
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difference between biological, cultural, economic, political and psychological life. On 
the other hand, a less 'onesided' reading of Spinoza and Darwin might well find 
dionysiac traits in the infinite productive power of Deus sive Natura or the exuberance 
of life which always produces more offspring than can possibly survive on an earth 
generally close to ecological plenum. 
The question that I have posed in this thesis is whether we find in Heidegger's work a 
way to think the 'poverty' and 'richness' of living nature otherwise and in so doing 
transform our understanding of ecological thought itself? If thought is to be ecological 
does that require that it be set into the context of striving life? Or has the metaphysical 
image of thought always been ecological in that sense? Would not ecological thought 
then require that we begin to think earthly life in the context of a truth that gives it its 
own freedom, rather than truth and thought as the end result of a life whose only 
freedom comes in the form of its continuing living struggle? Whether that struggle is 
driven by the poverty of lack or the exuberance of overflow, neither thought nor the 
earth will come into a freedom of their own in this way. 
If we are to find a way towards that freedom then it is not a case of simply leaving 
behind all that has been thought in metaphysics concerning living nature and the earth. 
We cannot be content, for example, to eschew apparently outmoded forms of ethical 
thought in order to incorporate living beings and the earth into an ethics of 
responsibility. Such a project can only be successful if we are able to identify as 
precisely as possible those points in the thinking of the 'first beginning' which have led 
towards the exclusion of living beings from consideration in ethical life, but equally 
their enthusiastic inclusion in ethical life broadly conceived in a way that has led to such 
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captivation, exploitation and annihilation. As I have tried to show throughout this thesis, 
the great advantage of Heidegger's approach to this history is that it helps us to pin point 
these decisive moments whilst at the same time highlighting counterpoints which help 
to prepare a way of thinking that is truly another beginning rather than a 're-vitalisation' 
of what has gone before. 'Poverty', steresis, privation all name counterpoints of this 
kind, which cannot be simply taken up as we find them, but can help us to cultivate 
another side to our current understanding of living nature. Beyond that, poverty might 
lead us towards an ecological thought that thinks the relation of poverty to riches 
otherwise than as the economy of striving in living nature. 
In a manuscript written in 1938-9 entitled The History of Beyng, at the beginning of the 
war which he would end by composing the essay on 'Poverty' with which I began, 
Heidegger continues to reflect on the nature of power and life. In this text we still find 
the remains of a thinking of the earth in terms of 'strife, ' but also signs of a move away 
from that struggle towards an interplay more characteristic of his later thought. 
Nevertheless, there is still room here for reflection on the specificity of living nature, 
which becomes more implausible as the vision of world and thing emerges post-1949. 
Ecological thought would do well to return to this moment, a moment at which 
Heidegger articulates the difference between being and beings in terms of poverty and 
property. 
In the first place, Heidegger sketches that phase in the history of being when the 
beingness of beings becomes 'presentationality'. He links presentationality, on the one 
hand, with the thinking of nature and living nature in particular in terms of various 
forms and modes of striving. On the other hand, presentationality is also an 
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understanding of the beingness of beings with direct links the technological thinking of 
being that Heidegger will later name Gestell: 
24. The presentationality (Vorgestelltheit) of beings as of the actual. 
This pre-sentationality in the sense of "certain", securing presentations 
(representations), i. e. the provision of the actual as what is set forth as 
functional. 
Hence energeia is now for Leibniz held fast at once as ousia and vis, 
"force", neither "possibility" nor "actuality". 
Neither is it the "between", but rather "origin"and what is proper to beings 
nisus, conatus. 
Possibility and actuality are then correspondingly transformed. 
Nisus and the empowerment of power. "Urge" 
What becomes of "nature"? 
What sense does natural science now get? 
Mechanics directly liberates forces. 
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Hence: living being as "organism". 
From organism to the "organic". 
The organic and the drive as elemental. 
Drive and urge as the "actual". 
* 
Presentationality not in the sense of idea (this not aesthetic-optical)- physis. 
Presentationality just as little in the sense of an empty, simply naive [7] 
objectification. 
The pre-sentation as bringing-before-itself of the actual as the functional 
and along with that the letting loose of "beings" in such a way. 
The self-pre-sentation in the ambiguity of the representatio. 
Pre-sentation and "Technics". 
(GA 69,25-26) 
Presentation (Vorstellung) will eventually be gathered together along with various other 
words stemming from the verb stellen in the Ge-stell. It is important to notice that it is 
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not only the objectification of nature that takes place in the modern scientific 
worldview. Presentationality is already on its way to the thinking of being as self- 
empowerment that dissolves all subjectivity and objectivity into power. Ecological 
thought that sets out to de-objectify nature by emphasising its dynamic or organic 
character may thus simply feed into the movement of thought that has already been 
fulfilled in technology. If the earth is to be released into a freedom of its own then such 
critiques of objectification can only be one step towards a more thoroughgoing recovery 
of living nature. 
Whether Heidegger's own thinking of the earth would allow it that freedom becomes 
questionable when we read passages such as the following: 
16. World-Relation (Welt-bezug) 
World-relation. Let in to the "Earth". Both, because belongingness to beyng 
and with this dis-countering. (Entgegnung) 
Earth and life (the loving) (Liebendes) of darkening towering-overshooting 
itself earthly urge (Drang). As strife towards world. 
(GA 69,20) 
This characterisation of the earth, still recognisably that which was presented in The 
Origin of the Work of Art, seems to bring with it precisely those urges that led it to be 
ensnared in the technological net. The earthly urge leads it into strife with the world, 
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which it nevertheless towers through and overshoots. Earthly life is even linked to love, 
in a way that roots it in the soil of Plato's eros. 
Is not the thinking of living nature that comes out of Heidegger's middle period still 
compromised by a metaphysical drive? Had not ecological thought better move beyond 
this characterisation of the earth if it is to continue to prepare for earthly freedom? In 
fact, we already find a thinking of the earth in The History of Beyng that is more closely 
reminiscent of some of Heidegger's later essays; a thinking of the earth which is 
intimately linked to the notion of poverty. Poverty now understood as the expropriation 
(Enteignis) that clears a space for living beings to come into their own (Ereignis). 
99. Poverty 
The ex-propriation of beings and their predominance. Such expropriation is 
not robbery or taking away, but the essential consequence of an 
appropriation of beyng in its truth. The inabidingness of this appropriation is 
the giving (a-way) of the essence of beyng in delivery, displaced 
(enthobene) from every need and lack. 
Poverty is the from-out-of-itself-abyssal-decisive inexhaustibility of giving. 
Impoverishment from poverty, the grounding of Da-sein which springs from 
such impoverishment is history. 
Poverty: the essence of beyng as appropriation. 
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Property- as the essence of 'beings' 
Impoverishment- closed into the appropriation "of' Da-sein as the 
inabidingness and guardianship of the truth is belonging to history as the 
history of beyng. 
(GA 69,110) 
Once more it is not a question of overcoming poverty understood as lack or of negating 
its negativity in sublimation (Aufhebung), but to displace and release (entheben) poverty 
from the economy of lack and fulfillment. If the truth of beyng is now poverty that 
clears a space for beings to come into their own, rather than any kind of beingness that 
belongs to beings, guaranteeing them in their being, how do things stand with beings? 
Beings become the property that comes into its own in the truth of beyng: 
112. Property 
[... ] 
s 
The Er-eignung of the Da through the voice of silence allows as clearing all 
at once the earth to find itself in the world, the world in humankind, 
humankind in god and god in the earth. This allowing-to-find-oneself as the 
essencing of beyng grounds property and lets what is ownmost 
(Eigentümliches) emerge here. Not that the tree over there for comparative 
representation has what is 'peculiar' to it and through its here and now its 
'uniqueness' (Einziges), that is not what gives it its ownedness, but rather: 
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the earth encloses itself in it and is taken up into it by way of its roots, 
whilst it at once stands free in the encircling clearing references of worldly 
prevailing. It is properly, because it is grounded in its belonging to the in- 
between, so that each is in a different way an essence in appropriation 
(Wesen im Er-eignis). 
(GA 69,126) 
The event whereby beings come into their own takes place in the poverty that clears a 
space in which they can find themselves. The tree described here comes into its own 
between the world, humankind, god and earth. This is not quite that 'fourfold' in whose 
'mirror-play' the thing will take its place, but it is certainly a move in that direction and 
away from the strife of world and earth in the work of art. 
Is it a coincidence that Heidegger chooses a tree to illustrate this conception of 
property? The central illustrations in The Origin of the Work of Art were a painting and 
a temple. They formed a point of articulation in which living nature found itself 
between earth and world, but there was no indication that living beings themselves 
could articulate world and earth in this way. Later, in the essay entitled 'The Thing', 
which was originally one of the Bremen lectures of 1949, we find a complex interplay 
between the earth thought as 'the building bearer, nourishing the fruitful, tending the 
gatherings of water and stone, plant and animal, "" suggesting a kind of pre-individual 
gathering of living and non-living nature, where 'Gewässer und Gestein, Gewächs und 
Getier, ' echo the'Ge= prefix of the 'Geviert itself, and the singular thing illustrated with 
151 Poetry, Language, Thought, trans. by Alfred Hofstadter (NewYork: Harper & Row, 1971) p. 178, 
Vorträge undAufsätze, 9th edn. (Stuttgart: Neske, 2000) p. 170- translation modified 
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the description of a jug, but which we are told at the end might also be found in what we 
usually think of as living things: 'But tree and pond too, brook and hill, are things, each 
in its own way. Things, each thinging, from time to time in its own way, are heron and 
roe deer, horse and bull. "" Although four animals are here grouped together, the tree is 
grouped with pond, brook and hill, things that we usually think of as non-living in 
themselves. Indeed, the logic that allows the thinking of a thing in this way to point us 
towards the singularity that we miss when comparative representation tries to specify 
the class in which each being belongs also seems to make this kind of reflection unable 
to see anything peculiar about living nature. When the world is played out in the 
absolute singularity of things there is no longer a question to be asked concerning living 
nature. This danger already arises in the description of property, but here the focus on 
what is ownmost to the tree demands the question as to whether we can allow the tree to 
come into its own between earth and world, whilst continuing to appreciate the 
particularity and peculiarity that it lends to earth and world as a living being. 
Between the strife of world and earth in the work of art and the mirror-play of the 
fourfold played out in the thing, we find this tree coming into its own as property in a 
space allowed to it by poverty. If we are to develop an ecological thought that can 
adequately address the question that living nature poses, neither classifying the living as 
one set of beings amongst others in comparative representation nor as a particular 
instance of the being of beings thought as life, urge, drive and finally the self- 
empowerment of power, then it is to this crossroads in Heidegger's path of thought that 
we need to return. There the economy of self-empowerment is confronted with a 
conception of poverty and property that could allow us to do full justice to an ecological 
thinking of living nature. There the earth might finally be released into a freedom of its 
152 Ibid, p. I82/p. 175- translation modified 
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Working Translation of 'Die Armut', first published in Heidegger Studies 1994, Vol. 10, 
5-11 
Poverty 
Martin Heidegger 
Towards an essay outline on the historical periods of the West, Hölderlin writes the 
guiding word: 
"For us everything is concentrated on the spiritual, we have become poor so 
as to become rich. " 
This word was written around the time of the transition from the 18th to the 19th 
Century. The opinion that Hölderlin says this about his own present is so obvious that 
one shies away from expressly noting it. Hölderlin also says, 'For us everything is 
concentrated on the spiritual. ' Does 'for us' in the saying mean only the Germans and 
does 'us' mean us, the contemporaries of that time in European history which was 
Hölderlin's lifetime? This cannot be decided immediately and easily. We only know 
this, that when Hölderlin speaks of history, by which he always means the West, he 
thinks in long time periods. If he says 'now' and names us 'us, ' then he does not mean 
the historical datable time of that point at which he writes down the sentence; then again 
with 'us' he also means himself, but 'himself not as the ascertainable historical person, 
but 'himself as the poet who, poeticising, soars over his 'own time' and addresses the 
'years of the peoples' To the Germans IV, 133) and thus addressing them meditates 
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upon that which secretly occurs in Western history, but which is never to be read in 
historically ascertainable events. That is why Hölderlin's word may not be said from the 
time and for the time at which it was written and therefore the time in which it was 
written is also another time from that of the historical date and the distinguishable 
periods of the chronologically familiar centuries. 
Hölderlin says: "For us everything is concentrated on the spiritual, we have become 
poor so as to become rich. " We can only understand the content and the relevance of 
this saying when we know what Hölderlin thinks when he says 'the spiritual. ' 
The 'spiritual, ' to be sure, is that which is determined out of spirit and through spirit. But 
what is 'spirit'? 
From a long tradition of thinking we have various ready-made answers to this quest on. 
We say: spirit is the opposite of matter. The spiritual is the immaterial, as opposed t' the 
material. But, this determination of spirit and the spiritual remains caught in the ºnere 
negation of matter and the material. The Greek word pneuma, the Latin word sj'iritus 
and the French word /'esprit already say more. The immaterial is the 'pneumatic' : nd the 
'spiritual' [Spirituelle]. That means: spirit is the effective power of inspirat; on and 
wisdom, in Greek sophia. This substantial essence of spirit was thought throu£h in the 
theological-philosophical speculation of the Christian Church on the Trinity; 
Augustine's work de trinitate becomes standard for the Roman Church; in the Eastern 
Church a different development occurred, especially in the Russian unfold. ng of the 
teaching of holy Sophia. It is still alive today in Russian mysticism in a way that we can 
hardly imagine. The work of spirit as the all working-through power of inspiration and 
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wisdom (Sophia) is the 'magical. ' The essence of the magical is as dark as the essence of 
the pneumatic. Yet we know that the theosopher and philosopher Jacob Böhme- the 
cobbler of Görlitz, the stillest of all cobblers, as he has been named- recognised the 
magical in the cobbler's orb and thought it as primordial will. Böhme's teaching of the 
divine Sophia (Theosophia) was already becoming famous in 17th Century Russia, at 
that time the Russians spoke of the holy church father Jacob Böhme. A renewal of 
Böhme's influence was carried out in Russia at the beginning of the 19th Century, at the 
same time as the powerful effect of Hegel and Schelling (Wladimir Schowjof ). Hence 
it is far from an exaggeration if I say that that which we today take short-sightedly and 
half-thought to be only 'political' or even grossly political and name Russian 
communism, comes from a spiritual world about which we hardly know anything. Not 
even to mention the fact that we have already forgotten to think this, how even gross 
materialism, the foreground of communism, is itself nothing material but something 
spiritual and a spiritual world, that can only be experienced and brought to the delivery 
of its truth and untruth in spirit and out of spirit. 
Yet spirit is not only the effective will as substance, it is at the same time and especially 
since Descartes throughout modernity thought as self-consciousness, i. e. as subject, 
intellect, reason and understanding, given precedence over, or given equality with, or set 
against the soul as the principle of life, in the sense of bare vitality and embodiment (cf. 
Klages' interpretation of Nietzsche: spirit is the antagonist of the soul; spirit as 
"understanding", by which the pneumatic and the spiritual are forgotten, that which 
Nietzsche knew so well). The essence of spirit is primordial will, which wills itself, 
such will is at times thought as substance, at times as subject, at times as the unity of 
both. These more or less familiar but everywhere prevailing representations of the 
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essence of spirit- those of metaphysics- must now be briefly recalled, so that we can 
then pay attention to what it means for Hölderlin to think the essence of spirit 
completely differently. 
What is a spirit for Hölderlin? On what is the spiritual based for him? What does it 
mean that for us everything is concentrated on the spiritual? 
Around the same time as the aforementioned saying came Hölderlin's philosophical 
sketch, from which the following lines are taken (<On Religion> 1113,263). 
"Neither from himself alone, nor only from the objects which surround him, 
can man experience that more than a mechanical operation, a spirit, a god, is 
in the world, but [he can experience it] in a more lively relationship raised 
sublimely above [erhabenen] bare need [Notdurft], in which <he> stands 
with that which surrounds him. " 
What is the sublime relationship in which man stands with that which surrounds him? In 
the experience of this relationship we experience spirit and the spiritual. Hölderlin gives 
no details concerning this relationship, - so in coming up to meet him we must attempt to 
think it more clearly. The relationship is not with objects, says Hölderlin, it is not the 
relation of subjects to objects, which relation is mostly determined from the prevailing 
bare need, insofar as objects are what we work on and use to satisfy goals and aims and 
therefore needs, which bare need awakens in us. 
Man stands in a relationship with that which surrounds him and that relationship is 
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sublimely above the relation of subjects to objects. "Sublime" does nöt mean here 
simply floating above, but reaching high, of which Hölderlin says at one point, man- 
especially the poet- could also "fall" into the height. The highness of the hei ; ht of the 
sublime is therefore the same as the deep. The sublime relationship is that which towers 
above all objects and men and at the same time bears all of these. And what is that? 
Hölderlin does not say. We must think it for ourselves and that means to move towards 
it in poeticising. What usually surrounds us, the individual objects, we also name 
beings, or that which is. But this `is' of beings is not itself any further being, but that 
which lets all beings first of all be a beyng, and thus that which tends to ard surrounds 
it. We name it beyng. The sublime relationship in which man stands is the relationship 
of beyng to man, so in truth beyng itself is this relationship, in which pulls the essence 
of man into itself as that essence which stands in this relationship and ii so standing 
protects and inhabits. In the open of this relationship of beyng to human essence we 
experience "Spirit"- it comes out of beyng and presumably prevails for beyng. 
Hölderlin's saying says: "For us everything is concentrated on the spiritual. " That now 
means: a concentration happens i. e. a gathering in the relationship cf beyng to our 
essence. That relationship is the centre, the middle, that is everywhere is the middle of a 
circle which is nowhere a periphery. 
"For us everything is concentrated on the spiritual"- that is no factual historical 
ascertaining of the situation of these times, but a thinking-poeticising naming of events 
which conceal themselves in beyng, that extends far out into that which is to come, that 
only a few, and perhaps only he who says and thinks it, are capable of foreseeing. 
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That which follows from the first part of the saying has the same character of 
poeticising-saying: "For us everything is concentrated on the spiritual, we have become 
poor so as to become rich. " What does "poor" mean? In what does the essence of 
poverty lie? What does "rich" mean, so that through poverty we first become rich? 
"Poor" and "rich" are both concerned according to their usual meaning with possession, 
with having. Poverty is a not-having and indeed a doing without the necessary. Wealth 
is a not-doing-without the necessary, a having exceeding the necessary. The essence of 
poverty, however, is rooted in beyng. To be truly poor means: to be in such a way that 
we spare nothing, it is then the unnecessary. 
To truly spare something means: to be unable to be without the unnecessary and so to 
belong solely to the unnecessary. 
But what is the unnecessary? What is the necessary? What does necessary mean? The 
necessary is that which comes out of and through bare need. And what is bare need? 
The essence of need is according to the fundamental meaning of the word, compulsion. 
Neediness and the necessary and what harries are the compulsory, namely, the 
compulsion that forcefully obtains in our "life" what it needs for its maintenance and 
compels us exclusively towards the satisfaction of these needs. 
The unnecessary is that which does not come from need, i. e. not from compulsion, but 
from the free. 
Yet what is the free? From the intimating saying of our oldest language. the free' is, 
Freien meant 'to court', referring back to the relationship of beyng, but here also with the connotation 
of freedom in comparison to necessity. 
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"fri", the unviolated, the safe-guarded, that which is not taken up into use. "To court" 
means originally and properly: to safe-guard, to leave something rooted in its ownmost 
essence through guarding. But to guard is: to keep the essence in care, in which it only 
stays when it can return to rest in its ownmost essence. To guard is: helping to remain in 
this resting, to be at its service. This alone is the appropriating essence of safe-guarding, 
which is in no way exhausted in the negatives of not disturbing and not using. 
The free is rooted in authentic safe-guarding. The freed is that which is left in its 
essence and kept from the compulsion of need. The freeing of freedom turns need away 
or around in advance. Freedom is the turning of need. Only in freedom and its safe- 
guarding of the free does necessity prevail. Therefore, when we think the essence of 
freedom and necessity, necessity is in no way, as in all metaphysics, the opposite of 
freedom, but freedom alone is in itself a turning of need. [Not-wendingkeit] 
Metaphysics goes so far as to teach through Kant, that necessity, namely the force of the 
ought and the empty compulsion of the duty to will duty, is true freedom. The 
metaphysical essence of freedom fulfils itself in that freedom becomes the "expression" 
of necessity, out of which the will to power as the reality and life wills itself. E. Jünger, 
for example, writes on the meaning of the will to power (The Worker, p. 57): "To the 
characteristics of freedom belongs the certainty of having a share in the innermost 
kernel of time, - a certainty which wonderfully enlivens deeds and thoughts, in which the 
freedom of the perpetrator recognises itself, as the particular expression of necessity. " 
But thinking the turning more deeply, everything is now the other way around. Freedom 
is necessity, insofar as freeing, not hounded by need, is the un-necessary. 
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Beyng-poor means: sparing nothing, it is then the unnecessary- to spare nothing except 
the freeing of freedom. 
Certainly: we do not own what we spare, freely it falls to us in such a way that what is 
spared wishes to be owned to us. We do not have what spare, but what is spared has us. 
It can even have us in such a way that our essence solely depends upon the spared, 
because it belongs solely to it. It has been (once before and in what is to come) 
appropriated to it. 
Beyng-poor - i. e. only sparing the unnecessary, i. e. belonging to the erstwhile freeing of 
freedom, i. e. standing in relationship to freeing openness. 
But now it is beyng that lets each and every being be what it is and how it is. It is 
therefore precisely the freeing which lets everything rest in its essence, i. e. protects it. 
When the essence of man properly stands in the relationship of freeing beyng to man, 
i. e. when human essence spares the unnecessary, then man has become poor in the 
proper sense. 
Hölderlin says: "For us everything is concentrated on the spiritual, we have become 
poor so as to become rich. " The concentration on the spiritual means according to the 
saying: gathering oneself in the relation of beyng to man and standing gathered in it. 
We have become poor so as to become rich. The becoming-rich does not follow from 
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the beyng-poor like the effect from the cause, but properly beyng-poor is in itself 
beyng-rich. In that we spare nothing from poverty, we have everything beforehand, we 
stand in the abundance of beyng, that overflows every pressing need in advance. 
So, as freedom in its freeing essence is all that which turns bare need from the outset, 
the turning in need [Not-wendigkeit], so beyng-poor as the sparing of nothing [Nichts- 
entbehren] but the unnecessary [Unnötige] is itself also already being-rich. 
In that for us everything is concentrated on the spiritual, beyng-poor appropriates itself. 
In this event human essence becomes attuned. Poverty is the grounding tone of the still 
concealed essence of Western peoples and their destiny. 
Poverty is the mourning joy, never to be poor enough. In this still disquiet rests its 
releasement [Gelassenheit], that is used to getting over all necessity. 
The proper danger of need and needy times lies therein, that they hinder us in the bustle 
of need, from truly experiencing the essence of need and out of this essence to perceive 
the hint of getting over need. 
For example, the danger of famine and of lean years, seen in the context of the whole 
and ownmost Western destiny, is in no way the possibility that many people will starve, 
but rather that those who come through still only live in order to eat and so to live. 
"Life" revolves around itself in its own emptiness, by which it is put under siege in the 
form of a hardly noticed and unconceded boredom. In this emptiness man is run down. 
He mistakes the way through which he learns the essence of poverty. 
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We do not become poor through that which is in store under the inappropriate name 
"communism, " as the destiny of the historical world. We are only poor when for us 
everything is concentrated on the spiritual. 
Only when the European nations have been attuned to the grounding tone of poverty, 
will they become the rich people of the West, that are not declining and cannot decline, 
because they have not yet in the least arisen. The beginning of its arising lies much 
more in that its people- first awakening each other in their essence- learn to know the 
essence of poverty, so that they can be poor. 
In beyng-poor communism will not be avoided or got around, it will be outstripped in 
its essence. Only thus will we be able to truly overcome it. 
The way is long. But greater still than this length is the inability truly to think and to 
listen to the already thought and said carefully, to hear in it the singular and primordial, 
and to transform what is heard and belongs to us [das Gehörte] into knowledge. 
Wars are not in the position to decide historical destiny, because they already stem from 
spiritual decisions and they insist upon this. Neither do World Wars have this ability. 
But they themselves and their ending can become the occasion upon which peoples are 
forced to reflection. Yet this reflection itself springs from another source. It must begin 
to flow from the proper essence of peoples. That is why we need self-reflection in the 
reciprocal discussions of peoples with one another. 
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Appendix 2 
Translations of the 1" Stasimon of Sophocles' Antigone 
Greek Text: 
polla; ta; deina; koujde; n ajn- 
qrwvpou deinovteron pevlei: 
touAto kai; poliouA pevran 
povntou xeimerivw/ novrw/ 
cwreiA, peribrucivoisin 
perwAn uJp! oi[dmasin, qewAn 
to ta; n u; pertavtan, GaAn 
a[fqiton, ajkamavtan ajpotruvetai, 
ijllomevvwn ajrtovrwn e[to" eij" e[to", 
i]ppeivwl/ gevnei poleuvwn. 
koufonovwn to fuAlon ojr- 
nivgwn. ajmfibalw; n ajgreiA 
kai; qhrwAn ajgrivwn e[qnh 
povntou t! eijnalivan fuvsin 
speivraisi diktuoklwvstoi", 
perifradh; " ajnhvr: krateiA 
de; macanaiÄ" ajgrauviou 
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qhro; " ojressibavta, Iasiauvicenav q+! 
iJppon u)paxevmen ajmfivlofon zugo; n 
ou[reiovn t! ajkmhAta tauAron. 
kai; fqevgma kai; ajnemoven 
frovnhma kai; ajstuovmou" 
ojrga; " ejdidavxato kai; dusauviwn 
pavgwn uJpaivqreia kai; 
duvsombra feuvgein bevlh 
pantopovro": a[poro" ejp! oujde; n e[rcetai 
to; mevilon: [Aida movnon 
feuAxin d! ajmacavnwn fugav" 
xumpevfrastai. 
sofovn ti to; macanoven 
tevcna" uJpe; r ejlpivd! e[cwn 
tote; me; n kakovn, a[Iiot! ejp! ejsqlo; n e{ rpei. 
novmou" peraivnwn cgono; " 
qewAn t! e[norkon divkan, 
u]yiwmoli": a[poli" o[tw/ to; mh; kalo; n 
xuvnesti tovima" cavrin. 
mhvt! ejmoi; parevstio" 
gevnoito mhvt! i[son fronwAn 
o(" tavd! e[rdoi. 
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Standard English Translation: 
H. D. F Kitto 
in Antigone, Oedipus the King, Electra, ed., Introduction and notes by Edith Hall 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, World's Classics Edition, 1994) 
Strophe 1 
Wonders are many, yet of all 
Things is Man the most wonderful. 
He can sail on the stormy sea 
Through the tempest rage, and the loud 
Waves roar around, as he makes his 
Path amid the towering surge. 
Earth inexhaustible, ageless, he wearies, as 
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Backwards and forwards, from season to season, his 
Ox-team drives along the ploughshare. 
Antistrophe 1 
He can entrap the cheerful birds, 
Setting a snare, and all the wild 
Beasts of the earth he has learned to catch, and 
Fish that teem in the deep sea, with 
Nets knotted of stout cords; of 
Such inventiveness is man. 
Through his inventions he becomes lord 
Even of the beasts of the mountain: the long-haired 
Horse he subdues to the yoke on his neck, and the 
Hill-bred bull, of strength untiring. 
Strophe 2 
And speech he has learned, and thought 
So swift, and the temper of mind 
To dwell within cities, and not to lie bare 
Amid the keen, biting frosts 
Or cower beneath pelting rain; 
Full of resource against all that comes to him 
Is Man. Against Death alone 
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He is left with no defense. 
But painful sickness he can cure 
By his own skill. 
Antistrophe 2 
Surpassing belief, the device and 
Cunning that Man has attained, 
And it bringeth him now evil, now to good. 
If he observe the Law, and tread 
The righteous path God ordained, 
Honoured is he; dishonoured, the man whose 
reckless heart 
Shall make him join hands with sin: 
May I not think like him, 
Nor may such an impious man 
Dwell in my house. 
'Wonders' translates ta; deina; in almost every English translation. They thus fail to 
highlight the essential polysemy which is so important to Heidegger. On the other hand, 
a translation such as Ian Johnston's, 'strange and wonderful thingsi1S3, fails to capture the 
equally important unity of the phenomenon, which Heidegger highlights most obviously 
in translating the plural ta; deina; with the singular 'das Unheimliche'. 
153http: //www. mala. bc. cal-johnstoi/sophocleslantijzone. htm 24/10/2005 
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The recent verse translation by Seamus Heaney, The Burial at Thebes: Sophocles' 
Antigone (London: Faber and Faber, 2004), also translates ta; deina; as 'wonders'. A 
comparison between this translation and those of Hölderlin would be very instructive. 
Whilst Heaney brings forward the progression of man into civilisation, so that it 
already takes place within the incursions into nature of the first strophe and antistrophe 
and not only in the transition point to the second strophe, his version completely misses 
the points of 'inner integrity', the points of essential ambiguity, which tlölderlin's verse 
takes such care to preserve. 
German Translation used by Hans Jonas in Das Prinzip Verantwortung: Versuch einer 
Ethikfür die technologishe Zivilisation: 
Ungeheuer ist viel, und nichts 
ungeheurer als der Mensch. 
Der nämlich, über das graue Meer 
im stürmenden Süd fährt er dahin, 
adringend unter rings 
umrauschenden Wogen. Die Erde auch, 
der Göttlichen höchste, die nimmer vergeht 
und nimmer ermüdert, schöpfet er aus 
und wühlt, die Pflugschar pressend, Jahr 
um Jahr mit Rössern und Mäulern. 
Leichtaufmerkender Vögel Schar 
umgarnt er und fängt, und des wilden Getiers 
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Stämme und des Meeres salzige Brut 
mit reichgewundernem Netzgespinst- 
er, der überaus kundige Mann. 
Und wird mit Künsten Herr des Wildes, 
des freien schweifenden auf den Höfen, 
und zwingt den Nacken unter das Joch 
den dichtbemähnten des Pferdes, und 
den immer rüstigen Bergtier. 
Die Rede auch und den luft'gen Gedanken und 
die Gefühle, auf denen grüdet die Stadt, 
lehrt er sich selbst, und Zuflucht zu finden vor 
unwirtlicher Höhen Glut und des Regens Ge- 
schossen. 
Allbewandert er, auf kein Künftiges 
geht er unbewandert zu. Nur den Tod 
ist ihm zu fliehen versagt. 
Doch von einst ratlosen Krankheiten 
hat er Entrinnen erdacht. 
So über Verhoffen begabt mit der Klugheit 
erfindender Kunst, 
geht zum schlimmen er bald und bald zum 
Guten hin. 
Ehrt des Landes Gesetze er und der Götter 
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beschworenes Recht- 
hoch steht dann seine Stadt. Stadtlos ist er, 
der verwegen das Schändliche tut. 
Heidegger's translation, used in both Introductions to Metaphysics 1935 (GA 40) and 
Hölderlin's Hymn "The Ister" 1942 (GA 53) 
Vielfältig das Unheimliche, nichts doch 
über den Menschen hinaus Unheimlicheres ragend sich regt. 
Der fährt aus auf die schäumende Flut 
beim Südsturm des Winters 
und kreuzt im Gebirg 
der wütiggeklüfteten Wogen. 
Der Götter auch die erhabenste, die Erde, 
abmüdet er die unzerstörlich Mühelose, 
umstürzend sie von Jahr zu Jahr, 
hintreibend und her mit den Rossen 
die Pflüge. 
Auch den leichtschwebenden Vogelschwarm 
umgarnt er und jagt 
das Tiervolk der Wildnis 
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und des Meeres einheimisch Gerege 
der umher sinnende Mann. 
Er überwältigt mit Listen das Tier, 
das nächtet auf Bergen und wandert, 
den rauhmähnigen Nacken des Rosses 
und den niebezwengenen Stier 
mit dem Holze umhalsend 
zwingt er ins Joch. 
Auch in das Getöne des Wortes 
und ins windeilige Allesverstehen 
fand er sich, auch in den Mut 
der Herrschaft über die Städte. 
Auch wie er entfliehe, hat er bedacht, 
der Aussetzung unter die Pfeile 
der Wetter, der ungattigen auch der Fröste. 
Überall hinausfahrend unterwegs, erfahrungslos ohne 
Ausweg 
kommt er zum Nichts. 
Dem einzigen Andrang vermag er, dem Tod, 
durch keine Flucht je zu wehren, 
sei ihm geglückt auch vor notvollen Siechtum 
geschicktes Entweichen. 
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Gewitziges wohl, weil das Gemache 
des Könnens, über Verhoffen bemeisternd, 
verfällt er einmal auf Arges 
gar, Wackeres zum anderen wieder gerät ihm. 
Zwischen die Satzung der Erde und den 
beschworenen Fug der Götter hindurch fährt er. 
Hochüberragend die Stätte 
ist er, dem immer das Unseiende seiend 
der Wagnis zugunsten. 
Nicht werde dem Herde ein Trauter mir der, 
nicht auch teile mit mir sein Wähnen mein Wissen, 
der dieses führet ins Werk. 
English translation by Gregory Fried and Richard Polt in Introduction to Metaphysics 
(New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2000) pp. 156- 158 
Manifold is the uncanny, yet nothing 
uncannier than man bestirs itself, rising up beyond him. 
He fares forth upon the foaming tide 
amid winter's southerly tempest 
and cruises through the summits 
of the raging, clefted swells. 
The noblest of gods as well, the earth, 
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the indestructibly untiring, he wearies, 
overturning her from year to year, 
driving the plows this way and that 
with his steeds. 
Even the lightly gliding flock of birds 
he snares, and he hunts 
the beast folk of the wilderness 
and the brood whose home is the sea, 
the man who studies wherever he goes. 
With ruses he overwhelms the beasts 
that spends its nightson mountains and roams, 
and clasping with wood 
the rough-maned neck of the steed 
and the unvanquished bull 
he forces them into the yoke. 
Into the sounding of the word, as well, 
and into wind-swift all-understanding 
he found his way, and into the mettle 
to rule over cities. 
He has considered, too, how he might flee 
exposure to the arrows 
of unpropitious weather and frosts. 
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Everywhere trying out, underway; untired, with no way out 
he comes to Nothing. 
A single onslaught, death, he is unable 
ever to resist by any flight, 
even if in the face of dire illness 
deft escape should be granted him. 
Clever, indeed, for he masters 
skill's devices beyond expectation, 
now he falls prey to wickedness, 
yet again valor succeeds for him. 
Between the ordinance of the earth and the 
gods' sworn dispensation <Fug> he fares. 
Rising high over the site, losing the site 
is he for whom what is not, is, always 
for the sake of daring. 
Let him not become a companion at my hearth, 
nor let my knowing share the delusions 
of the one who works such deeds. 
Heidegger compares Hölderlin's two drafts of the ode in Hölderlin's Hymn "The Ister ". 
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ý. 
p. 69-70, GA 53 p. 85 
Hölderlin: V Draft 
(Heidegger reports that Helingrath dates this draft to 1801. The Stuttgarter Ausgabe 
dates it to autumn 1799. Vol. 5 p. 370) 
Vieles Gewaltige gibts. Doch nichts 
Ist gewaltiger, als der Mensch. 
Denn der schweifet im grauen 
Meer in stürmischer Südluft 
Umher in wogenumrauschten 
Geflügelten Wohnungen. 
Der Götter heilige Erde, sie, die 
Reine, die mühelose, 
Arbeitet er um, das Pferdegeschlecht 
Am leichtbewegten Pflug von 
Jahr zu Jahr umtreibend. 
Leichtgeschaffener Vogelart 
Legt er Schlingen, verfolget sie, 
Und der Tiere wildes Volk, 
Und das salzigen Meers Geschlecht 
Mit listiggeschlungenen Seilen, 
Der wohlerfahrne Mann. 
Beherrscht mit seiner Kunst des Landes 
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Bergebewandeindes Wild. 
Dem Nacken des Rosses wirft er das Joch 
Um die Mähne und dem wilden 
Ungezähmten Stiere. 
Sämliche Werke: Kleine Stuttgarter Ausgabe, cd. Friedrich Beissener, (Stuttgart: W. 
Kohlhammer, 1965) Vol. 5 S. 48 
Hölderlin: 2"d Draft 
(Appeared in a translation of the whole play in 1804) 
Ungeheuer ist viel. Doch nichts 
Ungeheuerer, als der Mensch. 
Denn der, über die Nacht 
Des Meers, wenn gegen den Winter wehet 
Der Südwind, fähret er aus 
In geflügelten sausenden Häusern. 
Und der Himmlischen erhabene Erde, 
Die unverderbliche, unermüdete, 
Reibet er auf; mit dem strebenden Pfluge, 
Von Jahr zu Jahr, 
Treibt sein Verkehr er, mit dem Rossegeschlecht, 
Und leichtträumender Vögel Welt 
Bestrickt er, und jagt sie; 
Und wilder Tiere Zug, 
Und des Pontos salzbelebte Natur 
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Mit gesponnenen Netzen, 
Der kundige Mann. 
Und fängt mit Künsten das Wild, 
Das auf Bergen übernachtet und schweift. 
Und dem rauhmähnigen Rosse wirft er um 
Den Nacken das Joch, und dem Bergen 
Bewandelnden unbezähmten Stier. 
Und die Red und den luftigen 
Gedanken und städtebeherrschenden Stolz 
Hat erlernet er, und übelwohnender 
Hügel feuchte Lüfte, und 
Die unglücklichen zu fliehen, die Pfeile. Allbewandert, 
Unbewandert. Zu nichts kommt er. 
Der Toten künftigen Ort nur 
Zu fliehen weiß er nicht, 
Und die Flucht unbeholfener Seuchen 
Zu überdenken. 
Von Weisem etwas, und das Geschickte der Kunst 
Mehr, als er hoffen kann, besitzend, 
Kommt einmal er auf Schlimmes, das andre zu Gutem. 
Die Gesteze kränkt er, der Erd und Naturgewaltger 
Beschwornes Gewissen; 
Hochstädtisch kommt, unstädtisch 
Zu nichts er, wo das Schöne 
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Mit ihm ist und mit Frechheit. 
Nicht sei am Herde mit mir, 
Noch gleichgesinnet, 
Wer solches tut. 
Sämliche Werke: Kleine Stuttgarter Ausgabe, ed. Friedrich Beissener, (Stuttgart: W. 
Kohlhammer, 1965) Vol. 5 S. 238- 239 
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